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P R E F A C E
ONE OF THE burning questions of the day concerns the rightful place 
of science in our culture. The main purpose of this book is to make this 
debate more understandable—hrst by baring its historic roots and then 
by focusing, as a concrete example, on Albert Einstein's profound and 
lasting impact on our civilization. What can we learn about the powers 
and limitations of science by tracing Einstein's way of thinking, his view 
of the world, even his personal life?
Ours is an especially opportune time to examine these questions. 
In every society, the way in which science—as a body of knowledge, as a 
source of technical applications, as a generator of models for thinking 
and acting, as a troubling challenger of established ideas—is viewed 
and used affects its moral authority, much like the other significant 
components of a culture, such as religion and art. Indeed, in C. P. 
Snow's sharp formulation, science and its applications can determine 
human destiny, "that is, whether we live or die." It has been so through­
out history. Sultan Muhammad II used technical innovations to pound 
Byzantium into submission in 1453; an Asian emperor in the nine­
teenth century made the fateful error of isolating his people from 
Western knowledge and might; in World War II, the perfection of 
radar provided a crucial edge for warding off the fascists' challenge to 
Western civilization itself. Equally essential has been the role of science 
and technology in mankind's ancient wars against ignorance, disease, 
and other blights and human burdens. Even the notion of human rights 
has been expanded by scientific findings; thus, modern anthropologists 
have exposed the falsity of the centuries-old idea about "inferior races," 
on which bigotry has long rested comfortably; and biomedical advances
in contraception have had a iiberating effect on women around the 
world.
But every age rethinks what its culture is and should be, what roles 
its components play. And as in many periods in the past, we are today 
again in the middle of a serious debate. Some academics, students, 
statesmen, policy makers, religious leaders, and other citizens— 
embracing a variety of ideological positions, and some of them fright­
ened by abuses of science and technology as the result of corporate or 
governmental policies—are challenging the very legitimacy of science 
and technology in our culture and social fabric. For a decade or so, 
among influential intellectuals outside science, and gradually among 
segments of the general population, a seismic shift has occurred in the 
belief, espoused since the Enlightenment, that science and technology 
are on balance predominantly positive forces.
Ironically, this counter-movement is asserting itself just when the 
understanding of natural phenomena, the methods for reaching such 
understanding, and the agreement among scientists on responsible 
conduct, are all at their highest point. Yet the notion of progress, 
outside the laboratory, is considered by many "an idea whose time has 
passed," to quote the call to a recent conference at one of America's 
most prestigious universities. The term Mfo-LzMMitc is becoming a 
badge which some wear proudly. As Isaiah Berlin noted in his most 
recent book, no one predicted that the current version of the recurring 
historic phenomenon, called the Romantic Rebellion, against such 
notions as rationality and objectivity, would attain dominance in the 
last third of the twentieth century, that we would see again "the rejec­
tion of reason and order as being prison houses of the spirit."
In this atmosphere, it has become easy to overturn a long-standing 
social contract. President Roosevelt, at the end of World War II, 
received a report from a group of scientists, engineers, and other 
intellectuals (the so-called Vannevar Bush report), which promised "a 
fuller and more productive life" if scientific research were allowed to 
flourish. That set the stage for major financial and political support of 
science. Now, major industrial laboratories and the new majority in the 
United States Congress are drastically cutting back spending for civil­
ian research and development, even though economists have shown 
that the annual rate of social return on investments in research and 
development is remarkably high. Similarly, while the authority of sci-
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entire thought has been decreasing—and the scientific community so 
far has been on the whoie ineffective in reevaluating and reasserting its 
sense of self—an ever-widening gap separates the corpus of knowledge 
and the scientific worldview on the one hand and the popular under­
standing of these on the other.
In some of the foremost universities in the United States, the 
attention to science and mathematics required from college students in 
the total curriculum ranges from zero to a mere 6 percent. Into this 
vacuum of scientific illiteracy among our future leaders are rushing 
bizarre notions about science, scientists, and their roles in society. 
These are eloquently propagated by ambitious factions with a wide 
range of motivations, from the ideological to the supernatural. The 
spokespeople for this movement include, for example, well-placed aca­
demics and New Age fanatics; museum curators who were reported to 
be intent on showing that science equals "pollution and death"; a 
widely read radical who claims that Newton's PriHap/ef is
merely a "rape manual"; and a social scientist who announced, "There 
is no Nature," only "a communication network" among scientists. In 
the present climate, such depictions of science have become more and 
more prominent in the marketplace of ideas, going far beyond the 
reasonable and necessary scrutiny of abuses and limitations of this, as of 
any, human enterprise.
The early chapters of this book provide the historical context and 
taxonomical order of the present controversy over the rightful place of 
science in our society. They set the stage for considering the 
interactions—some plainly visible, others subterranean but equally 
vita!—between the world of science and the other components of our 
culture. What are the major images of science among the public? What 
are the signs of dangerous excess, both of uncritical "scientism" on one 
side and of antiscience on the other? How did trust in scientific findings 
evolve, and what are its limits? How indeed does the individual scien­
tific imagination work, including both reason and intuition, logic and 
thematic choice? What does it take to understand an event in the 
history of science?
These matters, discussed in Part One, are followed in Part Two by 
exemplifications from the life and work of a scientist who had a trans­
forming effect on our era. There I trace in specific terms the influence 
of Albert Einstein on the culture of his century. His carefully thought-
through considerations of the meaning of progress and goals for sci­
ence remain fully applicable today. Through his personal papers we can 
discern how, as a young scientist, he tried to build a life in which work 
and love were made into a seamless whole; we can follow his analysis of 
how to think effectively, not only about scientific problems; and we 
shall see in him an example of the creative role of a rebel operating 
*zr;^ 272 the scientific tradition.
My foremost hope is that this volume will convey the civilizing 
power of scientific thought, and thereby enable the reader to partici­
pate more actively and confidently in today's cultural debate.
xii
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FoR  ABOUT A decade, a movement among a segment of academics, 
eloquent popularizers, and policy makers has been mounting a chal­
lenge to the very legitimacy of science in our culture. Through these 
efforts, concepts such as the "end of the modern era," the "end of 
progress," and the "end of objectivity" are making an unquestioned 
place for themselves in the public mind. Far from being a passing phase 
or a preoccupation, this movement signals the resurgence
of a recurring rebellion against some of the presuppositions of Western 
civilization derived from the Enlightenment period. A chief object of 
this countercultural swing is to deny the claim of science that it can lead 
to a knowledge that is progressively improvable, in principle univer­
sally accessible, based on rational thought, and potentially valuable for 
society at large. The impact of this reviving rebellion on the life of the 
scientist, on the education of the young, on public understanding of 
science generally, and on the legislation of science support is measur­
ably growing, and has become visible even to the least attentive.
The aim of these chapters is to study this movement, and its driving 
ambitions, in the hope of understanding it. To do so we must first con­
sider the views of some of the twentieth century's chief theorists of sci­
ence and culture, which laid the foundation for the implicit "contract" 
forged in the aftermath of War War II between science and society.
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That contract, still the dominant image among the majority of 
scientists even while it hardly corresponds to reality today, was the 
result of a more innocent phase. For a few decades the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge was widely thought—above all by scientists them­
selves—to embody the classical values of Western civilization, starting 
with the three primary virtues of truth, goodness, and beauty. That is, 
science tended to be praised as a central truth-seeking and enlightening 
process in modern culture, what one might call the Newtonian search 
for omniscience. Science and scientists were also thought to embody 
the ethos of practical goodness in an imperfect world, both through the 
largely self-correcting practice of honor in scientific research, and 
through applications that might improve the human condition and 
ward off the enemies of society, a sort of Baconian search for a benign 
omnipotence. Finally, science was also thought of as a Keplerian en­
chantment; the discovery of beauty in the structure, coherence, sim­
plicity, and rationality of the world was the highest reward for the 
exhausting labor the discipline required.
BEFORE THE EUPHORIA ENDED
The last time the optimistic portrayal given above could have been said 
to be generally taken for granted, at least in the United States, was the 
period following the end of World War II. It was embodied also in the 
famous Vannevar Bush report, Frowfz'f?*, of 1945,
which became a driving force of U.S. science policy. Because it is such a 
convenient example of modern post-Enlightenment optimism about 
the role of science in culture, one which so many scientists tacitly 
assume to be still operative, it will be illuminating to look at the main 
thrust of that document.
In November 1944, President Roosevelt requested from Vannevar 
Bush, the head of the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Devel­
opment, a report that would outline how, in the postwar world, re­
search in the natural sciences—he called it "the new frontiers of the 
mind"—could be strengthened and put into service for the nation and 
humanity. Roosevelt was particularly interested in three results: waging 
a new "war of science against disease," "discovering and developing 
scientific talent in American youth," and designing a new system of
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vigorous federal support for scientific research in the public and private 
sectors. Above and beyond those, he argued that science's applications, 
so useful during the bitter war to preserve the world from fascist dic­
tatorship (with the successes of the Allies' radar, antisubmarine devices, 
and synthetic rubber the most striking examples at that time), could now 
be harnessed to "create a fuller and more fruitful employment, and a 
fuller and more fruitful life."
Vannevar Bush's detailed response came less than eight months 
later, the result of a crash program by an impressive brain trust of about 
forty experts from industry, academe, and government. Roosevelt had 
died, but with the war's successful end in sight, the American adminis­
tration proved generally hospitable to the report's ideas. While some of 
the details were overly optimistic and others were modified in practice 
(often to Bush's dismay), his vision, it is generally agreed, set the stage 
for the development of new institutions for the support of science 
during the following decades, and paralleled the generally favorable 
popular attitudes that were prerequisites for action. The base was laid 
for global leadership in many branches of basic science. Not until the 
Vietnam War escalated was there substantial popular disenchantment 
both with governmental authority and with the widely visible use of 
sophisticated technology in a hopeless and unpopular war, and by 
implication with science that presumably could help give birth to such 
abuse. This turn signaled the end of what might be called a rather 
euphoric phase in the relation of science and society in this century.
The Bush report, as well as the rival proposals by Senator Harley 
Kilgore, were historic exemplars of the science-based progressivism in 
post-World War II America, which saw science and democracy as 
natural allies in the service of the ideal of empowerment and instruction 
of the polity as a whole. In this sense, they were part of the American 
dream as far back as Benjamin Franklin and his fellow statesmen and 
science amateurs. Vannevar Bush himself hinted as much in the brief 
preface to his report, taking courage from the fact that, as he put it, "the 
pioneer spirit is still vigorous within the nation." And to make the 
connection with the tradition of Condorcet even more explicit, he 
added a sentence which, while presenting the reigning opinion of a 
citizen of the mid-1940s, is likely to be rejected today by many who 
think of themselves as the children of the 1960s and 1970s. He wrote: 
"Scientific progress is one essential key to our security as a nation, to
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our better health, to more jobs, to a higher standard of living, and to 
our cultural progress." One could hear an echo of Thomas Jefferson's 
formula: "The important truths [are] that knowledge is power, knowl­
edge is safety, knowledge is happiness."
Bush and his contemporaries could hardly have imagined that by 
the early 1990s those hopes would have begun to be rejected, even at 
the highest levels—that, for example, a key person in the U.S. Con­
gress for science policy would imply (as we shall see in more detail later) 
that science and technology alone can be held to account for the whole 
sorry list of failures of decades of misdirected political and business 
leadership; he said: "Global leadership in science and technology has 
not translated into leadership in infant health, life expectancy, rates of 
literacy, equality of opportunity, productivity of workers, or efficiency of 
resource consumption. Neither has it overcome failing education sys­
tems, decaying cities, environmental degradation, unaffordable health 
care, and the largest national debt in history. And another highly 
placed observer, formerly the director of the National Science Founda­
tion, exulted: "The days of Vannevar Bush are over and gone . . . the 
whole world is changing."
TH E CHANGING BALANCE OF SENTIMENTS
We turn now from momentary vagaries to a look at the causal mecha­
nisms responsible for the changes in the place assigned to science at 
significant stages in the intellectual history of the past hundred years. 
For if we know the general causes in the variation of the underlying 
ideology, we shall better understand the changes in policy toward 
science at any given moment.
Here we must confront at once the question of whether these 
changes are gradual, and part of an evolutionary development, or are so 
sudden that, as if in a political revolution, one passes discontinuous^ 
from the end of one age to the beginning of another. If the latter is the 
case, we would now be passing through a rupture of history, with 
"modern" behind us and "postmodern" right, left, and all before us. 
While I doubt this is the case—and it certainly is not visible in the 
fOMtewt of science as against some of the current writings about science 
today—a fashion in history proper has for some time been the attempt
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to discern the arrival of a new age. Periodization, the arranging of the 
how of events into clearly separate eras, is a common tool, although 
applied more wisely from the safe distance of retrospection. That is 
how we got such schoolbook chapters as "The Age of Reason" and 
"The Progressive Era in America" around the turn of the century.
A chastening example of periodization was provided by the Ameri­
can historian Henry Adams. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
he had been impressed by the publications of the chemist J. Willard 
Gibbs of Yale on the phase rule for understanding heterogeneous 
equilibria. Adams was also fascinated by the strange idea of some 
physicists of that day that the phase rule can serve, by analogy, as a 
means for putting into hierarchical order the following sequence: solid, 
fluid, gas, electricity, ether, and space, as if they formed a sequence of 
phases. Stimulated by such ideas, Adams believed that thought itself 
passed in time through different phases, each representing a different 
period. In his essay of 1909, "The Rule of Phase Applied to History," 
Adams came to a remarkable conclusion about the imminent passing of 
modernity: "The future of Thought," he wrote, "and therefore of 
History, lies in the hands of the physicist, and . . . the future historian 
must seek his education in the world of mathematical physics. . . .  [If 
necessary] the physics departments will have to assume the task alone." 
Henry Adams's conclusion might fairly have been called in its own day a 
declaration of what the postmodern age would look like. But today's 
formulation is likely to state the exact opposite.
I cite this example—and many others come to mind—to signal my 
discomfort with the division of history into distinct periods. A less rigid 
and more workable notion is to recognize that at any given time and 
place, even during a period when a civilization appears to be in a more 
or less settled state of dynamic equilibrium, there exist simultaneously 
several competing and conflicting ideologies within the momentary, 
heterogeneous mixture of outlooks. As Leszek Kolakowski noted, "It is 
certain that modernity is as little modern as are the attacks on moder­
nity. . . . The clash between the ancient and the modern is probably 
everlasting and we will never get rid of it, as it expresses the natural 
tension between structure and evolution, and this tension seems to be 
biologically rooted; it is, we may believe, an essential characteristic of 
life."2
It is sometimes possible in retrospect to identify one of the
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competing worldviews as the most dominant one for a longer or shorter 
period. But whatis also likely to occurwhen followed in real time are two 
effects. The first is that each of the different competing groups works 
fervently to raise its own ideology to a position where it would be 
accepted as the "taste of the time" or the "climate of opinion" which 
characterizes that particular age and region. The newest and most ambi­
tious one trzV/ %/yo IryzMg o/zA m Jz? to <A/cgziz77Mtr q/hr
77MZ7! rzizzz/y. Especially when the previously relatively stable equilibrium 
begins to crumble, the pandemonium of contrasting voices gets louder. 
Some partial victors rise to be major claimants above the rest, and one of 
them may even be generally recognized for a while as the embodiment 
of the new worldview or "sentiment" of the society.
In addition, in this constant seesaw of changing historic forces, 
mankind's inherent liability to engage in overambition or one-sidedness 
may infect some of these claimants (not excluding, on occasion, scien­
tists). This is the tendency, as Hegel had warned, toward "the self- 
infmitization of man," or simply to yi'e/J to evroy.s'—which in turn can 
generate the same sort of excess among the opposing claimants. Recog­
nizing these two facts—the mutual attempts at delegitimation and the 
tendency to yield to excess—is central for understanding the course of 
cultural conflict, today as in the past.
In this general struggle, from that of Apollo vs. Dionysus in 
Greece to this day, the specific, more limited question of the place 
assigned to the scientific conception of the world has always played 
a part. Sometimes this place has been at the cherished core of the 
rising or victorious overall worldview; sometimes it has found itself 
embedded in the sinking or defeated one, and then was even 
accused of nourishing a great variety of sins against the better inter­
ests of humanity.
Historians of ideas have mapped the changing forms of the general 
contrary trends. Wise political leaders, too, have at times watched with 
apprehension as the net balance of prevailing sentiments has taken a 
turn, for as Jefferson said, "It is the manner and spirit of a people which 
preserve a republic in vigor. A degeneracy in these is a canker which 
soon eats into the heart of its laws and constitution." Weighty scholar­
ship has chronicled how one of the world conceptions, and the scien­
tific position within it, gained predominance over the others for some 
decades in significant segments of Western culture—an example is
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Robert K. Merton's early study on science and seventeenth-century 
Puritanism. There is also much documentation of how such sentiments 
subsequently gave ground, as the overall balance of benignity or dis­
tress moved the other way. As to the practicing scientists themselves, 
whether for reasons of preoccupation or timidity, most of them have 
paid little attention to this constant seesaw of sentiments, except to 
weigh in now and then as promoters of the positive swings, or occa­
sionally to become victims of the negative ones.
Today, at our own /hz & rzet/f, this oscillating spectacle, so engross­
ing to the scholar, has ceased to be merely the site for research by 
historians. The general balance among the contending elements, and 
with it the attitude of traditional patrons, is changing before our eyes. 
Studying this current drama is as fascinating and fruitful for the histo­
rian of ideas, whose perspective I shall be taking here, as the appearance 
of a supernova may be for an astronomer. But in both cases, the present 
state is the product of a historic process, the latest member of a motley 
progression.
TOWARD A "MONISTIC CENTURY"
Let us therefore look at some of the ideologies that have claimed to 
represent the climate over the past hundred years or so up to the 
present—a sequence of selected samples meant to be analogous to 
stages in the growth of a culture of cells seen under the microscope. 
Our first sample concerns an event that occurred as the new century 
was signaling its beginning: the World's Columbia Exposition at Chi­
cago in 1893. The fair was intended as a triumphant celebration of 
human and social progress in all fields—above all, industrial, scien­
tific, and architectural. The big attractions were Machinery Hall, the 
Electricity Building, the Electric Fountain, and the halls on Transpor­
tation and Mines. On the opening day, President Grover Cleveland 
was on hand to push a button that turned on an abundance of electric 
lights and motors. (Electric light bulbs and AC motors were still fairly 
new.) This caused such an excited forward surging of the thousands of 
spectators that many fainted in the crush. One may safely assume that 
few among the twenty-seven million attendees during the exposition 
worried about, say, the ill effects of rapid industrialization. And few if
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any would have guessed that, just a century later, at a World's Fair 
held in South Korea, the official U.S. exhibit, as if in obeisance to a 
new Zeitgebt, would be dedicated to the detritus of the postindustrial 
world, featuring mounds of broken machinery and views of festering 
nuclear disposal sites; or that the new permanent exhibition at the 
Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American History, "Science in 
American Life," would devote much of its space to an expose of the 
hazards of science and the public's alleged disillusionment with tech­
nology.
Another indication of how much the worldview changed during 
one century is that one of the major events of the exposition of 1893 was 
a spectacular World's Parliament of Religions. Personal religion is, and 
always has been, close to the hearts of most Americans. But it now seems 
surprising that on that occasion, in a setting glorifying science and 
industry, hundreds of religious leaders from all parts of the world metto 
present their views in two hundred sessions during seventeen days. It 
was a colorful affair, with Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Jews, Protestants, 
Catholics, adherents of Shinto and Zoroaster, and so forth, all meeting 
together in their robes "for a loving conference," in the words of the 
chairman of the parliament, J. H. Barrows. The purpose was clear. As it 
was for the exposition as a whole, the subtext of that Parliament of 
Religions was progress and harmonious unity. Hence the exposition, 
Barrows said, could exclude religion no more than it could exclude 
electricity. Science was invoked as an ally in reaching a higher unity 
while serving the needs of mankind.
One of the passionate believers that science, religion, and indeed 
all cultural activities are aspects of one grand unification program was 
one of the organizers of the Parliament of Religions, Paul Carus, a 
publisher now remembered mainly for having brought the writings of 
Ernst Mach to readers in the United States. The title of his presenta­
tion  ^was nothing less than "Science, a Religious Revelation." His was a 
sort of anticlerical post-Christian deism, much of which would have 
appealed to some American statesmen-philosophers of an earlier cen­
tury. Individual dignity, Carus thought, can only be found through the 
discovery of truth, and that is the business of science. Hence, he 
announced, "Through science, God speaks to us." One did not have to 
choose between the Virgin and the Dynamo; rather, the laboratory was 
the true cathedral, and vice versa. As the masthead of his journal
P/%<rf y<9?' o f f/?{? Mo&rw '? H
Opcw CoMTt put it, he was "devoted to the science of religion [and] the 
religion of science... ."
Carus typihed a popular, science-favoring universalism of that 
time which today is severely challenged, from the Right and from the 
Left. I have chosen Carus because his world picture is a good example 
of a movement then prominent: Modern Monism, based on the belief 
in a "unitary world conception." It arose essentially as an antithematic 
response against the Cartesian dualism of the material versus the men­
tal, and against the multiplicity of commonsense experience, with its 
starting point in personal individuality. The movement on behalf of 
Monism had the enormous ambition, in the words of Carus, "to direct 
all efforts at reform, and to regenerate our entire spiritual life in all its 
various fields." This meant of course replacing conventional religion 
with what Carus called the "Religion of Truth," where Truth is defined 
as "the description of fact. . .  ascertainable according to the methods of 
scientific inquiry." In this sense, "science E revelation"; and in this way 
one would overcome the old, unacceptable dualism of scientific truths 
versus religious truths.
The head of the small but ambitious international monistic move­
ment was the great German chemist Wilhelm Ostwald (Nobel Prize, 
1909). Whereas most modern scientists are quite aware of the limits 
even within their research—as Max Planck said in 1931, "A science is 
never in a position completely and exhaustively to solve the problem it 
has to face"—the publications of the monistic movement show that it 
hoped every aspect of culture, life, and society would be guided by 
monistic ideas, from the education of children to the economy of 
nations, and of course within the research program of science itself. 
Thus Ernst Haeckel, another patron of the movement, predicted that 
physical science would eventually trace back all matter to a "single 
original element."
Despite the philosophical naivete of its leaders, the movement 
attracted for a time an enthusiastic following. In Germany, it had 
branches in forty-one cities and even organized public mass demon­
strations against the Church. One must perhaps allow for the effects on 
them of having to live under the reactionary political clericalism of 
Germany. But I have intentionally chosen this case of "scientism," of 
excess on the part of a small minority of scientists, as my first example 
of of% fy 7%??2y
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xmre, 0 7 2 0 2 1^0 7* i/Jo. Thus, caught up in this fervor, Ostwald, with hubris 
unequaled by the few remaining captives of scientism today, was pro­
pelled to the heights of overambition, with such claims as these in 1911: 
"We expect from science the highest that mankind can produce and win 
on this earth. . . . Everything that mankind, in terms of its wishes and 
hopes, its aims and ideals, combines in the concept God, is fulhlled by 
science." And finally, "Science, now and with immeasurable success 
takes the place of the divine." Ostwald added the prophecy that "we see 
arrive the Monistic Century. . . .  It will inaugurate a new epoch for 
humanity, just as 2,000 years ago the preaching of the general love for 
humanity had inaugurated an epoch.
Only a year after this publication, neither the Monistic nor the 
Christian base for kindness and love of fellow man had triumphed. 
Instead, war, which Williamjames called the inevitable "bloody nurse of 
history," had taken charge. Strangely enough, it was Henry Adams who 
had sensed that the trend would be ultimately against a monistic century. 
Writing in 190$ in his autobiography, 7%c EJ2 2 0 2 2 2 0 7 2  o/*He727y HJ22772X, he 
identified the course of history as away from unity and toward fragmen­
tation and multiplicity. Indeed, in the aftermath of World War I, the 
idea of progress, and optimism about the place of science in culture, 
were war casualties. The balance had swung the other way. The only 
major movement with large political ambition that continued to claim a 
scientific basis was of course Marxism, especially as defended by Lenin 
in his 1908 book, 2272 J  ^ 772^27*2 0 -0 7 *2222*2x772. The assertion that
Marxism-Leninism, the founding ideology of the Soviet Union, had 
anything to do with real science, was a purely rhetorical device, one of 
this century's great delusions even if this propaganda was taught to every 
child in communist countries. It is disproved, not least by the faulty 
analysis of science and its philosophy in Lenin's own book, and by the 
widespread mistreatment which Soviet scientists experienced when 
their theories did not please their governments.
SPENGLER'S PREDICTION OF THE END OF SCIENCE
Perhaps the most widely read attack against the claims of science 
appeared as the war was ending in 1918, and later it deeply influenced 
such theoreticians of history as Arnold Toynbee and Lewis Mumford.
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The book was called 7Ee DerAyze o/^  tAe fk&t, written by a German 
mathematics teacher, Oswald Spengler. No quick summary can do 
justice to that richly baroque work, but the point I want to focus on 
here is what it had to say about the topic before us. Spengler's key 
conception was that for every part of mankind, in every epoch since 
Egypt, Greece, and Rome, the history of a civilization has taken funda­
mentally the same course, and this will continue in the future. Thus our 
own inevitable destiny in the West is to go to dust according to a 
timetable that can be calculated from the available precedents. Speng­
ler predicted the very date of our undoubted demise: the year 2000.
The end stages of every civilization, Spengler wrote, can be recog­
nized by the ideas science treasures in its own progress—by the adop­
tion of the notion of causality instead of destiny; by attention to 
abstractions, such as infinite space; and to cause and effect, rather than 
to "living nature." The primacy of the soul is replaced by intellect; 
mathematics pervades more and more activities; and nature is rein­
terpreted as a network of laws within the corpus of what Spengler calls 
"scientific irreligion." Here Spengler introduces his most startling idea, 
one that has become familiar in new garb also. He warns that it is 
characteristic of the winter phase of civilization that precisely when 
high science is most fruitful within its own sphere, the seeds of its 
undoing begin to sprout. This is so for two reasons: the authority of 
science fails both within and beyond its disciplinary limits; and an 
antithetical, self-destructive element arises inside the body of science 
itself that eventually devours it.
The failure of science's authority outside its laboratories, Spengler 
says, is due in good part to the tendency to overreach and misapply to 
the cosmos of history the techniques that are appropriate only to the 
cosmos of nature. Spengler holds that the thought style of scientific 
analysis, namely "reason and cognition," fails in areas where one actu­
ally needs the "habits of intuitive perception" of the sort he identifies 
with the Apollonian soul and the philosophy of Goethe. But asserting 
that an unbridgeable contrast exists between a pure "rationality" of 
abstract science and the intuitive life as lived, Spengler commits the 
same error as all such critics before him and after, of whom few seem 
even to have come closer to science than through their school text­
books. Therefore they are ignorant of the vast difference between, on 
the one hand, "public science"—the final results of intersubjective
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negotiations to fashion at least a temporary consensus on the basis of 
experiment and logic—and on the other hand, the earlier, "private" 
stage of work in science, where the particular researcher's intuitive, 
aesthetic, thematic, or other nonlogical preference may be the key to 
the individual's advance beyond the previous level of public science. 
The complementarity between these two quite different stages in the 
actual development of any scientific result explains why in any given 
held the findings by natural scientists, operating within vastly different 
cultures and styles, are eventually harnessed into common products 
with global validity.
All this may be clear enough to practicing scientists. But, Spengler 
continues, even in the cosmos of nature there is an attack on the 
authority of science, arising from within its own empire: Every concep­
tion is at bottom "anthropomorphic," and each culture incorporates 
this burden in the key conceptions and tests of its own science, which 
thereby become culturally conditioned illusions. All our rushing after 
positive scientific achievements in our century only hides the fact, he 
thinks, that as in classical times, science is once more destined to "fall 
on its own sword," and so will make way for a "second religiousness."
What Spengler termed the orgy of two centuries of exact sciences 
would shortly be ending, together with the other, more valuable com­
ponents of valuable Western civilization. As a kind of postscript, 
Spengler added his opinion in his later book, (1931),
that advancing technology, with its mindlessly proliferating products, 
will also turn out to undermine the society of the West—because, he 
prophesied, its interest in and support of science and engineering will 
decrease: the "metaphysically exhausted" West will not maintain ad­
vances in these fields. Instead, the previously overexploited races in the 
rest of the world, "having caught up with their instructors," will surpass 
them and "forge a weapon against the heart of the Faustian [Western] 
Civilization." The non-Caucasian nations will adopt the technical 
skills, excel in them, and turn them against the Caucasian originators. 
In short, as H. Stuart Hughes put it, Spengler's prediction was that the 
East will triumph through better technology, first in commerce, and 
then militarily. 5
A  "SCIENTIFIC WORLD CONCEPTION"— THE 
VIENNA CIRCLE
The early response to Spenglerls diagnosis was predictably bimodal— 
on one side there was wide and enthusiastic acceptance, which con­
tinues among people today who have never read Spengler but, so to 
speak, have imbibed his ideas with their mother's milk. On the other 
side, the opponents of Spenglerian scenarios included of course many 
prominent scientists. Some of these had joined in a study group that 
called itself the Vienna Circle, which met in the 1920s and early 1930s 
for discussion and publication. It included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf 
Carnap, Philipp Frank, Kurt Godel, and Otto Neurath. Among their 
active sympathizers, they could count Hans Reichenbach and Richard 
von Mises in Germany, and in America, B. F. Skinner, P. W  Bridgman, 
Charles Morris, and Wi V Quine.
The most influential publication of the core group was a slim 
pamphlet issued in October 1929 as a kind of manifesto of the move­
ment, titled TA ShcMh/h' ComryhoM o/TA IFF/AV The very title was a 
trumpet blast in the fight to change the balance again, to put science 
back at the center of modern culture, and against what the booklet 
called, in the first sentence, the chief alternative, the tendency toward 
metaphysical and theologizing thought, those old helpmates of the 
Romantic movement.
Although most of the scholars involved in the Vienna Circle 
concerned themselves chiefly with the study of the epistemological and 
logical problems at the foundations of science, there was a clear under­
current of wider cultural, social, political, and pedagogic ambitions as 
well. For, as the manifesto said, "The attention toward questions of life 
is more closely related to the scientific world conception than it might 
at first glance appear. . . . For instance, endeavors toward the unifica­
tion of mankind, toward a reform of school and education, all show an 
inner link with the scientific world conception. . . . We have to fashion 
intellectual tools for everyday life. . . . The vitality that shows itself in 
the efforts for a rational transformation of the social and economic 
order permeates the movement for a scientific world conception, too" 
(pp. 304-305).
The members of the circle associated themselves explicitly 
not with the Platonists and Pythagoreans, but with the Sophists and
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Epicureans, "with those who stand for earthly being, and the here and 
now." A science free from metaphysics would be a unified science; it 
would know no unsolvable riddles; it would train thinking to produce 
clear demarcations between meaningless and meaningful discourse, 
between intellect and emotion, between the areas of scientific scholar­
ship on the one hand and myth on the other. Just as this approach 
would, by this formulation, clarify the foundations of mathematics, 
of the physical sciences, of biology and psychology, it would also 
demystify the foundations of the social sciences, "and in the first place 
. . .  history and economics." The empiricist, antimetaphysical attitude 
would hasten the rejection of such dangerous conceptions as "folk 
spirit," and would "liberate one from inhibiting prejudices."
Thus, the "debris of millennia" would be removed, and "a unified 
picture of this world" would emerge, free from magical beliefs. The 
social and economic struggles of the time would be ameliorated be­
cause the "broad masses of people" would reject the doctrines capable 
of misleading them (pp. 315-317). Beyond that, the spirit of the scien­
tific world conception would penetrate "in growing measure the forms 
of personal and public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and 
the shaping of economic and social life according to rational princi­
ples." And the manifesto for a new modernity ended with the blazing 
formulation, in italics: worAf rerver /i/c,
receiver i t "  (p . 318 ).
Perhaps the most carefully developed of the many publications 
expressing the circle's position on science and its rationality as the keys 
to a sane world picture was the major book by Richard von Mises, the 
Austrian scientist, mathematician, engineer, and philosopher (as well as 
scholar of the poet Rainer Maria Rilke). Von Mises entitled his weighty 
volume, with a bit of irony, LcArAMcA Jar P&rhzvMWMr: The aim
was not only to show what an empiricist-rational scientific world con­
ception would consist of, what its tools would be, and what problems it 
could solve within the sciences, from mathematics and physics to 
biology and the social sciences.? All this is done in great detail; but an 
equally motivating force was to present thereby a choice from the then- 
reigning alternatives in German-speaking Europe: the Kantianism in 
Germany and the clerical-metaphysical trend in Austria, both of which 
were then being interspersed with the growing totalitarian ideologies. 
Von Mises noted his quite explicit opposition to what he called "nega­
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tivism," in which he includes systematic philosophical and political 
anti-intellectualisms that have remained part of the present landscape. 
Among the examples he cited were, in fact, Oswald Spengler, and the 
once-popular German philosopher Ludwig Klages, whose point of 
view was enshrined even in the title of his main work, Tfe 
Ew6wy o/tfo SoM/.
As a sign that von Mises's main aim of the book was to put science 
at the center of a healthy culture in the largest meaning of the term, his 
volume dealt at length with the way the scientific world conception 
would illuminate the understanding of metaphysics, poetry, art, the law, 
and ethics. The underlying commonality of the various forms of cul­
tural achievements was considered by von Mises to be due to the 
principal unity of their methods if carried through rationally and 
soundly. The original readers of the book must have felt themselves to 
be in the presence of an updated follower of Auguste Comte. The very 
last sentence is, as it were, the summary of the entire project: "We 
expect from the future that to an ever-increasing extent scientific 
knowledge, i.e., knowledge formulated in a connectable manner, will 
regulate life and the conduct of man" (p. 370).s
FREUD: INSTINCTUAL PASSIONS VERSUS 
REASONABLE INTERESTS
But now we shall see the lever of sentiments shift the balance once 
more, and indeed on the very issue of whether knowledge formulated in 
a scientific manner can lead mankind to saner and more rational con­
duct. In 1929, the same year in which the optimistic manifesto of the 
Vienna Circle was published, Sigmund Freud, writing in the same city, 
produced a book of his mature years giving his somber and pessimistic 
answer. To the founder of psychoanalysis, the role of science in human 
culture had been a continuing preoccupation, and in 1911 he had still 
been optimistic enough to sign the of the Society for Positivistic
Philosophy. But in that book of late 1929, iw &'?*
Freud found that science, while counting among the most visible mani­
festations of civilization, was at best only an ameliorating influence in a 
titanic struggle on which the fate of the culture depended. That strug­
gle, he said, was centered on mankind's often doomed effort to master
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"the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction." Even at that 
time he saw, as expressed in the last paragraph of the book, that "man­
kind has gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that 
with their help it may have no difficulty to exterminate one another to 
the last man" (p. 92).
Freud held that the restrictions which civilization imposes upon 
our instinctual urges produce an irremediable antagonism against 
those fetters. Our innate "Destructive Instinct," or "Death Instinct" 
(pp. 7, 8), is a drive constantly at odds with the civilizing project to 
elevate the moral condition of mankind. Freud wrote, ". . .  man's 
natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all, and of all 
against each, opposes this program of civilization. This aggressive 
instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death 
instinct which we have found alongside of Eros and which shares 
world-domination with it. And now, I think, the meaning of the 
evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us. It must present the 
struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life 
and the instinct of destruction (DesYr^hom'trz^), as it 
works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life 
essentially consists of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore 
be simply described as the struggle for life of the human species. And 
it is this battle of the giants that our nursemaids try to appease with 
their lullaby about Heaven" (p. 69).
In this conflict, scientific and other cultural activities arise as the 
result of a "sublimation of instinctual aims," making science at first 
glance merely a "vicissitude which has been forced upon the instincts 
by civilization." The accomplishments of science and technology origi­
nated as welcome tools in the effort to protect men against the hostile 
forces of nature; they have now become "cultural acquisitions" that "do 
not only sound like a fairy tale, they are actual fulfillments of every—or 
almost every—fairy tale wish." They verge on our attaining the old 
ideas of "omnipotence and omniscience." Man "has, as it were, become 
a kind of prosthetic God" (pp. 38-39).
But there's the rub: happiness still eludes him. "Present-day man 
does not feel happy in his God-like character," either individually or 
in terms of the group. That again has its reason in the fact that 
"civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct," such as sexuality 
and aggressiveness, and "presupposes precisely the nonsatisfaction (by
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suppression, repression, or some other means) of powerfui instincts." 
Hence the "cultural frustration" which dominates the en­
tire held of social relationships between human beings (pp. 43-44, 62).
Freud's pessimistic conclusion follows: "In consequence of this 
primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetu­
ally threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common 
would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than 
reasonable interests. . . .  In spite of every effort these endeavors of 
civilization have not so far achieved very much. . . .  It is always possible 
to bind together a considerable number of people in amity, so long as 
there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their 
aggressiveness," as in religious or ethnic persecution (pp. $9, 61).
During the decades since this was written, modern history has all 
too often seemed to be the experimental verihcation of Freud's dark 
assessments, according to which science and all other cultural activities 
cannot fully displace our animal nature from its reigning position, but 
can only delay the ultimate fate that threatens our society.
SCIENTISTS AS "BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH"
Let us now turn to the most recent period. We are familiar enough with 
the fluctuations, during the 1960s and 1970s, of opinion in academe 
and among the public regarding the interactions of science and society. 
But starting in the early 1980s, a new and powerful element entered 
into this discussion which has now been assuming ever greater atten­
tion and institutionalization, at least in the United States. The new 
element, the new force adding to the derogation of the credibility of 
science, is the insistence from some quarters—which increasingly has 
fallen on receptive ears among the population—that to a previously 
completely unrealized degree the pursuit of science is, and has been all 
along, ever since the days of Hipparchus and Ptolemy, thoroughly 
corrupt. Consequently, severe external measures must be applied to the 
practice of science. This assertion, which has become louder and louder 
over the past few years in books, official reports, and hundreds of 
articles, has spawned dramatic public hearings, the formation of special 
government agencies, university bureaucracies, and quite a few careers. 
The safeguarding of ethical practices and uses of science, of which
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there has been a long tradition within the scientific community, is now 
to be put into better and wiser hands.
A striking, pacesetting example of this assertion was the 1982 book 
by two influential New H'wex science editors, William Broad and 
Nicholas Wade. It states its intention in its title, tN 7rM?A.'
Deceit zw tf?e FD/B SeieMee/*' and follows up with the 
unqualified cannon shot of the opening sentence: "This is a book about 
how science really works." Going far beyond the need to expose the 
relatively few rotten apples in any barrel, which the scientific commu­
nity itself has long recognized as an obligation if only for its own health, 
this kind of rhetoric has become commonplace. As this book and its 
many followers proclaim, the relatively few, sad cases of real or alleged 
misbehavior are the litmus test for the entire enterprise; fraud and 
deceit are depicted as being part of the very structure of scientific 
research.
Similarly, the report to Congress by the Congressional Research 
Service, entitled "Scientific Misconduct in Academia," stated that, 
more and more, "the absence of empirical evidence which clearly 
indicates that misconduct in science is not a problem . .. suggests that 
significant misconduct remains a possibility." Among all the targets to 
preoccupy those who are charged with timely attention to misconduct 
damaging our republic, this formulation singles out the conduct of 
science as being guilty until proven innocent. Moreover, the tendency 
has recently been to include in the allegation ofyrzezzrz^ r misconduct not 
only falsification of data, plagiarism, and the like, but also the spectrum 
of misdeeds more common to flawed mankind generally, and for which 
sanctions have existed, e.g., "use of university resources for inappropri­
ate purposes, sexual harassment, racial discrimination," etc.' '
Similarly, the Office of Scientific Integrity Review (OSIR) of the 
Department of Health and Human Services made part of its proposed 
definition of "misconduct" in science, apart from fabrication, falsifica­
tion, and plagiarism, "practices that seriously deviate from those that 
are commonly accepted in the scientific community" (Federal Code: 
42 C.F.R. 50.102). The intention here may have been to parallel the 
way the Supreme Court defined obscenity by reference to the cur­
rent standards of the local community. However, when it comes to 
making progress in science, some practices contrary to those common 
at the time have again and again been the very hallmark of needed
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innovations—from putting mathematics into physics in the seven­
teenth century to the introduction of quanta, which pained even the 
originator, Max Planck himself, and to the more recent innovation of 
modern teamwork. The proposed definition of misconduct, with its 
potential for mischief, was one more example of the gap between the 
culture of science and the culture outside the lab. One should add that 
to her credit the director of the National Institutes of Health at the 
time intervened on that point, objecting that such a community stan­
dard "would have implicated even the discoverer of penicillin, who 
serendipitously found good use for bacteria growing in a contaminated 
lab dish. " * 2
The power of the current generalized allegations against the con­
duct of scientists has two components. The first is of course the aston­
ishing claim that basic research scientists in considerable numbers are 
intentionally false to their own most fundamental avowed mission, 
namely, to the pursuit of truths; in other words, that not just a few 
apples are rotten, but that the entire barrel is.
Without the vastly overblown allegation of pervasive and in­
grained fraud and deceit in science, even the presence of the occa­
sional scandalous misdeeds by a relatively small number of the world's 
millions of scientific researchers would not have been taken so seri­
ously that in the United States the newspapers, college courses, train­
ing courses for scientists and physicians, commissions, congressional 
committees, scientific societies, and so on, have become massively and 
expensively preoccupied with the institutionalization of prevention of 
misconduct in science. The unrelenting accounts of specific incidents, 
some outrageous, more of them sensationalized, have left the public 
feeling that a great plague of dishonesty has invaded all academic 
laboratories. As the journal noted shrewdly, the current trend
is resulting in "a slow—and Hollywood-assisted—erosion of [the 
scientists'] public image, . . . [replacing it] in the public mind by a 
money-grabbing plagiarizing con-artist."*3 magazine chimed in
with an essay on scientists today, beginning with, "Scientists, it seems, 
are becoming the new villains of Western society." A raft of best­
selling books add up the allegations in diatribes that have the frank 
view, in the words of Bryan Appleyard's polemic UMJfTy&wJmg 
Pr&svMt.' ScicMfe Sow/ q/ M%72, that science must be "humbled."
We are, it appears, standing only on the shoulders of dwarfs. As the
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distinguished chemist and molecuiar biologist M. F. Perutz put it in a 
masterful expose of the faults in a typical book that recast a pioneer 
scientist as a perpetrator of fraud and careerism: "The entire approach 
emphasizing 'relative' truth seems to me a piece of humbug masquer­
ading as an academic discipline; it pretends that its practitioners can 
set themselves up as judges over scientists whose science they fail to 
understand."^
What is getting lost in this avalanche of excitement, and also in the 
generally poor, even self-flagellating, responses from most scientific 
institutions, is a thorough inquiry into the actual rate of serious mis­
conduct among scientists, the kind of empirical research that would 
yield a reasonable estimate of the relative rate of unacceptable inci­
dents. I have found only some scattered, preliminary steps in this 
direction, but these suggest that in fact the actual rate of misconduct 
(rather than suspected, alleged, or "perceived" without hard evidence) 
is remarkably /o*zr. Among the available, reasonably quantifiable mea­
sures is, for example, the National Library of Medicine finding that for 
the period of 1977 to 1986, when about 2,780,000 articles were pub­
lished in the world's biomedical literature, 41 of these had to be with­
drawn because fraudulent or falsified data appeared in them—a rate of 
under two one-thousandths of one percent of scientific publications per 
decade. Other data support the same point. Thus the Food and Drug 
Administration, responding to allegations or evidence of misconduct in 
clinical research with investigational new drugs, submitted twenty 
cases of suspected fraud or other criminal violations to the U.S. Attor­
ney General's office. These resulted in thirteen convictions of clinical 
investigators—about one per year, on the average.^
Nobody does or should condone even a single case of misconduct. 
But even if the actual rate were as much as a hundred times greater than 
these figures indicate, the intellectually most interesting questions 
would be, first, why science as a whole progresses so well despite being 
the work of mere human beings; second, how rare the cases of alleged 
misconduct are in this field compared with those in others, ranging 
from the world of finance, law, industry, journalism, and government at 
every level; and third, why the few cases of highly publicized charges of 
misconduct in science can so severely undermine the trust and confi­
dence of the public and its representatives in the integrity of research 
in general.
S C IE N C E  AS M Y T H
The answer to those questions is in good part that there is indeed 
another, reinforcing reason for the widespread success of the assault on 
the credibility of scientific research. This second line of attack has been 
opened up by a loose assemblage made up of a branch of contemporary 
philosophy of science, the so-called "strong-program" constructivist 
portion of sociology, a subset of the media, a small but growing number 
of governmental officials and political aspirants, and a vocal segment of 
literary critics and political commentators associated with the avant- 
garde of the postmodern movement. This is a potent and eloquent 
collective of just the sort that in the past has successfully challenged the 
prevailing worldview.
The overall message evolving over the past decade or two from 
that direction is no longer based only on stories of unacceptable behav­
ior among a few scientists. The charge has been generalized and made 
even more serious: Put in starkest terms, the claim is that the most basic 
fraud committed by the members of the scientific community is their 
assertion trMtfy to A /owzJ %//. For there really is
nothing there even to betray and falsify; and consequently, science is 
inherently not corrigible, even if all misconduct were eliminated.
From that point of view, the business of science is mainly careerist: 
for example, building and operating expensive institutions that claim to 
be looking for objectively ascertainable information about entities 
such as quarks and bosons—which, however, are nothing more than 
"socially constructed" fictions. Against the naive realism that most 
scientists still embrace, and the agnosticism of the more sophisticated 
ones, the new critics counterpoise the radical solution: as one sociolo­
gist of science put it recently, "There is no Nature; there is only a 
communication network [among scientists]." The literature in aca­
deme is now full of statements such as "science is a useful myth," or "we 
must abolish the distinction between science and fiction," "science is 
politics by other means," or "the search for knowledge is driven by the 
desire for power."*6
Scientists have tended to adopt the Baconian view that the acquisi­
tion of basic knowledge of causes and interrelations of phenomena—by 
processes not easily predictable or fully understood—can yield power 
over those of nature's forces which cause our burdens and ills. But now,
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the new consortium tells us, the arrow really goes the other way: not 
from knowledge to power, but from power to knowledge, and to a 
rather questionable knowledge at that. The attempts to hnd generally 
applicable, shareable knowledge about what might be called reality— 
through the use of both the rational and the intuitive faculties of 
individual scientists, through the positing of freely chosen concepts 
that later can be tested for merit (as Einstein will show us in Part Two 
of this book), and through the skeptical but collaborative attempt to 
achieve consensus—are not only disguised as doomed exercises, but are 
said to have led ironically to the disasters that have marked the twen­
tieth century. The modern era, launched under the Hag of progress, has 
only led to tragedy. The extreme overoptimism of a Herbert Spencer or 
a Friedrich Engels can never be replaced by a soberer conception. 
Progress is illusion. The globalizing program of science—to hnd basic 
unities and harmony transcending the level of apparent variety and 
discord—is held to be completely contrary to the postmodern drive, 
which celebrates individual variety and the equality of standing of every 
conceivable style and utterance, every group and competing interest. 
Ours is the time to face the end of the search for foundations, the "End 
of the Modern Era"; we are in a state called the "objectivity crisis"—a 
fashionable phrase found in the titles of learned conferences as well as 
in policy-setting documents to be examined shortly.
Together, these slogans of the newly emerging sentiment indicate 
that the aim is not merely a call for the improvement of practice or 
for increased accountability, which is appropriate and being pursued 
through earnest actions, but is at bottom, for the main branch of the 
movement of critics, the delegitimation of science as one of the valid 
intellectual forces, a reshaping of the cultural balance, as we shall see in 
more detail below. Even the most irrational fringe borrows from the 
ideas, widespread in parts of academe, that technology is inherently a 
source of "disaster for the human race," and that the scientist's "motive 
is neither curiosity nor a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go 
through the power process," to quote from the lengthy manifesto 
"Industrial Society and Its Future," written by the so-called Una- 
bomber. (When the FBI circulated this manifesto among academics 
for their reactions, the o/ Higher EJMnzfz'oM reported, "Some
historians of science said that except for his endorsement of violence, the 
bomber's arguments are consistent with the critical strain of scholarly
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thought in the held," and quoted one scholar who observed that except 
for the call for violence, "it's a sensible academic piece.")
There is a big difference in the current attack against science and 
the history of b^er7M/ movements of protest, such as those of the logical 
positivists within philosophy, the impressionists or dadaists within art, 
the modern composers within music, etc. In all those cases, it was some 
of the best talent in the held that took up the task of renewal. Not so 
here—the motivating force is not renewal from within, but radical 
cultural politics from without.
TH E ROMAN TIC MOVEMENT'S CHALLENGE
Here we meet a clarifying fact: The contest before us is not new, but 
draws on historic forces of great strength and durability. Therefore it 
will be instructive to trace some of the individual steps and stages in this 
remarkable development, so as to make it easier to extrapolate and to 
preview the new terrain we may have before us. While I can here only 
point briefly to a few recent milestones, I shall seek documentation in 
the recent writings of some of the most distinguished thinkers, rather 
than, say, through representatives of the Dionysian undercurrent.
Our first informant and guide is Isaiah Berlin, widely regarded as a 
most sensitive and humane historian of ideas. The collection of his 
essays, published as the fifth volume of his collected papers, i s opens with 
a startling dichotomy. He writes: "There are, in my view, two factors 
that, above all others, have shaped human history in this century. One is 
the development of the natural sciences and technology, certainly the 
greatest success story of our time—to this great and mounting attention 
has been paid from all quarters. The other, without doubt, consists of 
the great ideological storms that have altered the lives of virtually all 
mankind: the Russian revolution and its aftermath—totalitarian tyran­
nies of both right and left and the explosion of nationalism, racism and, 
in places, of religious bigotry, which interestingly enough, not one 
among the most perceptive social thinkers of the nineteenth century had 
ever predicted" (p. 1). He adds that if mankind survives, in two or three 
centuries' time these two phenomena will "be held to be the outstanding 
characteristics of our century, the most demanding of explanation and 
analysis."
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What might the author intend by so juxtaposing these two "great 
movements"? One's hrst temptation may be to see a connection 
through the fact that during World War II the ingenuity and frantic 
work of scientists among the Allies, supporting the valor of the Allied 
soldiers, brought an end to the totalitarian tyranny of that period, 
which might well have triumphed over the democracies and established 
itself at least throughout Europe.
But such a response would not be to the point here. What is on 
Isaiah Berlin's mind is quite different. As we follow his eloquent and 
subtle analysis, it dawns on the reader that science and tyranny, the two 
polar opposite movements which he holds to have dehned and shaped 
the history of the twentieth century, are somehow intertwined—that 
the development of the modern natural sciences and technology may, 
t/royvgf? TYWchoTM have unintentionally and indirectly
contributed to the rise of "totalitarian tyrannies."
This stunning connection, to be sure, is never explicitly spelled 
out by the author. But we can glimpse the implicit argument later in the 
book, in his chapter signihcantly entitled "The Apotheosis of the 
Romantic Will: The Revolt against the Myth of an Ideal World." 
There, Berlin summarizes the chronology of some basic concepts and 
categories in the Western world, specifically the changes in "secular 
values, ideals, [and] goals." What commands his attention is the change 
away from the belief in the "central core of the intellectual tradition . . . 
since Plato," and toward a "deep and radical revolt against the central 
tradition of Western thought" (p. 208), a revolt which in recent times 
has been trying to wrench Western consciousness into a new path.
The central core of the old belief system, one that lasted into the 
twentieth century, rested on three dogmas that the author summarized 
roughly as follows. The hrst is that "to all genuine questions there is 
one true answer, all others being false, and this applies equally to 
questions of conduct and feeling, to questions of theory and observa­
tion, to questions of value no less than to those of fact." The second 
dogma is that "the true answers to such questions are in principle 
knowable." And the third: "These true answers cannot clash with one 
another." They cannot be incommensurate, but "must form a harmo­
nious whole," the wholeness being assured by either the internal logic 
among the elements, or their complete compatibility (pp. 209-211).
Out of these three ancient dogmas both institutionalized religions
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and the sciences developed to their present form (although one might 
add that modern scientists, in their practice, have become aware of the 
need of proceeding antidogmatically, by conjecture, test, refutation, 
and assaying probability). In their pure state, these systems are utopian 
in principle, for they are imbued by the optimistic belief, inherent in 
and derivable from the dogmas, that "a life formed according to the 
true answers would constitute the ideal society, the golden age." All 
utopias, Isaiah Berlin reminds us, are "based upon the discoverability 
and harmony of objectively true ends, true for all men, at all times and 
places"—and by implication the same is true for scientific and technical 
progress, which are aspects of our drive toward what he calls "a total 
solution: that in the fullness of time, whether by the will of God or by 
human effort, the reign of irrationality, injustice and misery will end; 
man will be liberated, and will no longer be the plaything of forces 
beyond his control [such as] savage nature.. .." This is the common 
ground shared by Epicurus and Marx, Bacon and Condorcet, 7Ee 
Co77277%M7zbf AEym/esto, the modern technocrats, and the "seekers after 
alternative societies" (pp. 212-213).
But, Isaiah Berlin now explains, this prominent component of the 
modern world picture is precisely what was rejected in a revolt by a 
two-centuries-old countermovement that has been termed Romanti­
cism or the Romantic Rebellion. From its start in the German StMrzM 
MwJ Dr%7zg movement of the end of the eighteenth century, it grew 
rapidly in Western civilization, vowing to replace the ideals of the 
optimistic program based on rationality and objectively true ends, by 
the "enthronement of the will of individuals or classes, [with] the 
rejection of reason and order as being prison houses of the spirit."
My own favorite summary of the negative view of science in 
nineteenth-century literature is the antihero in Ivan Turgenev's grip­
ping novel, Ezt^ery One of the greatest figures of Russian
literature, together with Gogol, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy, Turgenev 
was a poet largely in the tradition of nineteenth-century Romanticism, 
inspired by Goethe, Schiller, and Byron, among others. Ezzt^ ery 
.SoTzy was published in 1861. Its main figure is Yevgeny Vassilevich 
Bazarov, a university student of the natural sciences, expecting shortly 
to get his degree as a physician. Being a scientist who "examines 
everything from a critical point of view," he confesses himself also to be 
ideologically and politically a nihilist, the natural consequence of not
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acknowledging any externai authority. Ail talk of love, or the "mystic 
relationship between a man and a woman," is to him just "romanticism, 
humbug, rot, art." It would be better to study the behavior of beetles. 
Even on his vacation he has brought along a microscope and fusses over 
it "for hours at a time." Reading Pushkin, he says, is for little boys. He 
thinks it would be much better to start with Ludwig Buchner's Forte J 
Matter, a book published in 1855 and embodying such a flagrantly 
materialistic view that Buchner was forced to resign from his professor­
ship in Germany. (It is, as it turned out later, the very book Albert 
Einstein singled out in his HMtoFogr%pFc%/ Noter as one of the two or 
three that most impressed him as a boy, and caused him to turn to the 
pursuit of science.)
What matters, Bazarov claims, "is that two and two are four—all 
the rest is nonsense." When he meets a clever and beautiful woman, he 
startles his friend by saying that hers would be a beautiful body to 
examine—on a dissection table. As if in revenge, fate brings him to the 
bedside of a villager dying of typhus, and he is made to help in the 
postmortem. But he cuts himself with his scalpel, and soon he is on 
the verge of delirium, a victim of surgical poisoning. As he is dying, he 
tries to keep hold on reality by asking himself aloud, "Now, what is 8 
minus 10?" In short, he is a caricature recognizable throughout litera­
ture, devoid of the spectrum of imaginative tools one actually needs to 
do science, as we shall see later on in this book—except that typically in 
literature the emotionally dysfunctional scientist, from Dr. Franken­
stein to Dr. Strangelove, causes surgical sepsis not only in himself but in 
all those around him.
Returning to Isaiah Berlin's account, it is striking that, as he notes, 
no one predicted that the current form of the worldwide Romantic 
Rebellion would be what dominates "the last third of the twentieth 
century." The Enlightenment's search for generalizability and rational 
order is depicted by the rebels of our time as leading at best to the 
pathetic Bazarovs of science, and those must be replaced by the celebra­
tion of the individual, by flamboyant antirationalism, by "resistance to 
external force, social or natural." In the words of Johann Gottfried von 
Herder, the rebel shouts: "I am not here to think but to be, feel, live!" 
(p. 225). Truth, authority, and nobility come from having heroically 
suffered victimization.
This assertion of the individual will over shareable reason has
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undermined what Isaiah Berlin called the pillars of the Western tradi­
tion. The Romantic Rebellion of course has also given us enduring 
masterpieces of art, music, and literature. But it originated, as it were, 
as an antithetical mirror image, created in reaction to the very existence 
of the earlier Enlightenment-based conception. In the apotheosis of 
the Romantic Will in our time, it glows forth as the alternative, the 
"romantic self-assertion, nationalism, the worship of heroes and 
leaders, and in the end .. . Fascism and brutal irrationalism and the 
oppression of minorities" (p. 225). Moreover, in the absence of "objec­
tive rules," the new rules are those that the rebels themselves make: 
"Ends are not. . . objective values. .. . Ends are not discovered at all but 
made, not found but created."
As a result, Berlin writes, "this war upon the objective world, upon 
the very notion of objectivity," launched by philosophers and also 
through novels and plays, infected the modern worldview; the "roman­
tics have dealt a fatal blow" to the earlier certainties, and have "perma­
nently shaken the faith in universal, objective truth in matters of 
conduct" (pp. 256-257)—and, he might have added, in science as well. 
As any revolt does, this one puts before us seemingly mutually incom­
patible choices. Just as with quite opposite cases of excess such as Ost- 
wald's, it is again Either/Or. Lost from sight in this combat is the needed 
complementarity of mankind's rational, passionate, intuitive, and spiri­
tual functions—a complementarity on which, as we shall see exem­
plified in Part Two of this book, good work in science itself depends. But 
one is reminded here of the fact that violent extremes tend to meet. Thus 
the poet William Blake, the epitome of the Romantic Rebellion—who 
called Bacon's, Newton's, and Locke's work satanic—composed in his 
7Er <%7? J Nr// (1790) one of the "Proverbs" that reveal
the outrageous credo of so many of the opposing actors in this story to 
this day: "7Ee o/Yxcrrs- to o / * "
TH E ROMANTIC REBELLION INFUSES STATE POLICY
Other authors provide verification and elaboration of the implications 
of Berlin's findings, and especially so of what in my view is the foremost 
danger posed by the movement: 07MZM0?o' yoz'mwg in fzrrTm'c/E
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JortrzzzM. This was evident in the Cultural Revolution in Mao's China, 
in the USSR, and in other totalitarian systems. To glance at one telling 
example, the historian Fritz Stern has written about the early phases of 
the growth of Nazism in Germany, when there arose in the 1920s, in 
his words, the "cultural Luddites, who in their resentment of moder­
nity sought to smash the whole machinery of culture." The fury over an 
essential part of the program of modernity, "the growing power of 
liberalism and secularism," directed itself naturally against science it­
self. Julius Langbehn was one of the most widely read German ideo­
logues in the 1920s, and Stern writes of him, "Hatred of science 
dominated all of Langbehn's thought.. . .  To Langbehn, science signi­
fied positivism, rationalism, empiricism, mechanistic materialism, 
technology, skepticism, dogmatism, and specialization. . . ."
Long before the Nazis assumed governmental power, some Ger­
man scientists and other scholars demanded that a new science be 
created to take the place of the old one which they discredited—a new 
"Aryan science," based on intuitive concepts rather than those derived 
from theory; on the ether, the presumed residence of the spirit, the 
"Gezfr"; on the refusal to accept formalistic or abstract conceptions, 
which they reviled as earmarks of "Jewish science"; and on the adoption 
as far as possible of basic advances "made by Germans."
In a classic study, Alan Beyerchen identified some of the other 
main pillars of Aryan science. There we find themes uncomfortably 
similar to those that are again fashionable. A prominent part of Aryan 
science was, of course, that science is, as some would now say, basically 
a social construct, so that the racial heritage of the observer "directly 
affected the perspective of his work." Scientists of undesirable races, 
therefore, could not qualify; rather, one had to listen only to those who 
were in harmony with the masses, the "Po/L" Moreover, this zw/UsY'/? 
outlook encouraged the use of ideologically screened nonexperts to 
participate in judgments on technical matters (as in the Po/Lfgcrz'f^ re). 
The international character of the consensus mechanism for finding 
agreement in science was also abhorrent to the Nazi ideologues. Mech­
anistic materialism, denounced as the foundation of Marxism, was to be 
purged from science, and physics was to be reinterpreted to be con­
nected not with the matter but with the spirit. "The Aryan physics 
adherents thus ruled out objectivity and internationality in science. . . .
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Objectivity in science was mereiy a slogan invented by professors to 
protect their interests." Hermann Rauschning, president of the Danzig 
Senate, quoted Adolf Hitler as follows:
We stand at the end of the Age of Reason. . . .  A new era of the 
magical explanation of the world is rising, an explanation based on 
will rather than knowledge. There is no truth, in either the moral or 
the scientific sense.. . .  Science is a social phenomenon, and like all 
those, is limited by the usefulness or harm it causes. With the slogan 
of objective science the professoriat only wanted to free itself from 
the very necessary supervision by the State.
That which is called the crisis of science is nothing more than 
the gentlemen are beginning to see on their own how they have 
gotten onto the wrong track with their objectivity and autonomy.^'
One issue was how technology, so useful to the state, could be 
fitted into the Romantic idea. In recent times, many antimodern move­
ments, including fundamentalist ones, have embraced technology. The 
physicist Philipp Lenard, a chief cultural hero of Nazi propaganda, 
spoke for at least a minority when he said that the tendency of scientific 
results to prepare the ground for practical advances has led to a dan­
gerous notion, that of man's "mastery" of nature: Such an attitude, he 
held, only revealed the influence of "spiritually impoverished grand 
technicians" and their "all-undermining alien spirit." This idea, too, 
had its roots in the centuries-old history of the rise of Romantic 
thought. Alan Beyerchen provides us with a summary with his observa­
tion that "the romantic rejection of mechanistic materialism, rational­
ism, theory and abstraction, objectivity, and specialization had long 
been linked with beliefs in an organic universe, with stress on mystery 
[and] subjectivity. . . ."
All these excesses were couched in phrases reminiscent of those cur­
rently used to delegitimate the intellectual authority of science. But it is 
necessary to keep in mind that the common ancestry of these views 
does not mean that there is necessarily a causal connection between 
them. Today's antiscientists usually do not know how closely they may 
be following the historical precedents. This applies also to the next
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case, as I turn now to the position embraced by another distinguished 
contemporary icon among humanists, although an advocate rather 
than an analyst. His writings on this topic are—like those of Oswald 
Spengler, or the positivists—of interest here not because they now 
represent majority positions, which they do not, but because they have 
the potential for wide resonance at a turning point of sentiments. Also, 
in this case we shall see that the relation between modern natural 
science and the rise of totalitarianism, which Isaiah Berlin considered 
to be only the result of an obscene historic counterreaction, receives 
now a much more sinister interpretation: the two become directly, 
causally linked.
This ominous linkage has been argued repeatedly in writings over 
the past ten years by Vaclav Havel, the Czech poet, playwright, re­
sistance lighter against Marxist-Leninist oppression, and statesman. In 
the passages to be discussed, we will notice that Havel subscribes to 
many of the themes discussed in Isaiah Berlin's analysis; but Havel's key 
point is that totalitarianism in our time was the perverse end result of a 
trend of ideas embodied in the program of science itself. In this sense, 
Western science gave birth to communism; and with the fall of the 
latter, the former has also been irremediably compromised.
Looking back on the twentieth century, other Central Europeans 
might characterize the tragedies of our age as due to the forces of brutal 
irrationality and bestiality, a reversion to ruthless autocracies in which 
the fates of millions were sealed by the whims of Kaiser Wilhelm, 
Hitler, Stalin, and their henchmen—rather than being the result of 
organized skepticism and the search for reasoned consensus, which are 
at the heart of science. But Havel hnds the chief sources of trouble in 
the twentieth century to have been the very opposite, namely, the 
habit—in his words—of "rational, cognitive thinking," "deperson­
alized objectivity," and "the cult of objectivity." He advises us to take 
refuge now in unrepeatable personal experience, in intuition and mys­
tery and the other mainstays of the Romantic Rebellion. I must let him 
put his case at some length in his own words; for while he eschews the 
documentation or balanced account of the scholar, he is instead in hne 
command of the rhetoric of persuasion, the ease of unspecified asser­
tions and generalizations, and of the chief art of the dramatist, the 
suspension of disbelief. The result, for many of his readers, has been 
hypnotic acquiescence that does not seek to question the generalities
/%<rr /or q/*^ <? Mo^ rrM Er%".? 33
and leaps in the prose. The "end of Communism," Havei writes in one 
of his most widely quoted essays,
has brought an end not just to the 19th and 20th centuries, but to the 
modern age as a whole.
The modern era has been dominated by the culminating belief, 
expressed in different forms, that the world—and Being as such—is 
a wholly knowable system governed by a Unite number of universal 
laws that man can grasp and rationally direct for his own benefit.
This era, beginning in the Renaissance and developing from the 
Enlightenment to socialism, from positivism to scientism, horn the 
Industrial Revolution to the information revolution, was charac­
terized by rapid advances in rational, cognitive thinking. This, in 
turn, gave rise to the proud belief that man, as the pinnacle of 
everything that exists, was capable of objectively describing, explain­
ing and controlling everything that exists, and of possessing the one 
and only truth about the world. It was an era in which there was a 
cult of depersonalized objectivity, an era in which objective knowl­
edge was amassed and technologically exploited, an era of systems, 
institutions, mechanisms and statistical averages. It was an era of 
freely transferable, existentially ungrounded information. It was an 
era of ideologies, doctrines, interpretations of reality, an era in which 
the goal was to find a universal theory of the world, and thus a 
universal key to unlock its prosperity.
Communism was the perverse extreme of this trend.. .. The 
fall of Communism can be regarded as a sign that modern 
thought—based on the premise that the world is objectively know- 
able, and that the knowledge so obtained can be absolutely 
generalized—has come to a final crisis. This era has created the first 
global, or planetary, technical civilization, but it has reached the 
limit of its potential, the point beyond which the abyss begins.
Traditional science, with its usual coolness, can describe the 
different ways we might destroy ourselves, but it cannot offer truly 
effective and practicable instructions on how to avert them. 2 *
A listener might object that these passages are built on immense 
overgeneralizations and illogical jumps, just as Rawed as those of the 
extreme Monists were on the other side; or that at least on factual 
grounds the self-designation of communist ideology as "scientific" was 
indeed a fraud. On this last point, the scholar of the history and
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philosophy of Soviet science, Loren Graham, made the trenchant 
observation: "In 1992, the playwright and President of independent 
Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel wrote that the fall of communism marked 
the end of an era, the demise of thought based on scientific objec­
tivity. . . . Was the building of the White Sea Canal in the wrong place 
and by the most primitive methods, at the cost of hundreds of thou­
sands of prisoners' lives, the blossoming of rationality? Was the disre­
gard of the best technical specialists' advice in the construction of 
Magnitogorsk, the Dnieper dam and the Baikal-Amur Railway a similar 
victory for objectivity? Was the education of the largest army of engi­
neers the world has ever seen—people who would come to rule the 
entire Soviet bureaucracy—in such a way that they knew almost noth­
ing of modern economics and politics an achievement of science? . . . .  
And even long after the death of Stalin, into the 1980s, what was the 
Soviet insistence on maintaining inefficient state farms and giant state 
factories, if not an expression of willful dogmatism that flew in the face 
of a mountain of empirical data?"22
Yet one may doubt whether Havel would reconsider his position, 
for the object of his essay is his conclusion, presenting the "way out of 
the crisis of objectivism," as Havel labels it. Only a radical change in 
man's attitude toward the world will serve. Instead of the generalizing 
and objectifying methods that yield shareable, repeatable, inter- or 
trans-subjective explanations, we must now turn, he says, to the very 
opposite, which presumably "science" somehow has totally banished 
from this world, i.e., to "such forces as a natural, unique and unrepeat­
able experience of the world, an elementary sense of justice, the ability 
to see things as others do . . . courage, compassion, and faith in the 
importance of particular measures that do not aspire to be a universal 
key to salvation. . . . We must see the pluralism of the world. . . . We 
must try harder to understand than to explain." Man needs "individual 
spirituality, firsthand personal insight into things . . . and above all trust 
in his own subjectivity as his principal link with the subjectivity of the 
world. . . ."
Despite Havel's hint, in passing, of a possible blending of the 
"construction of universal systemic solutions" or "scientific representa­
tion and analysis" with the authority of "personal experience," so as to 
achieve a "new, postmodern face" for politics, Havel's identification of 
the "End of the Modern Era" is not to be understood as a reasonable
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plea for some compromise or coexistence among the rival constructs; 
that much was announced in an earlier and even sharper version of his 
essay, one which dealt with the place of modern science quite unam­
biguously and hence deserves careful reading:
[Ours is] an epoch which denies the binding importance of personal 
experience—including the experience of mystery and of the 
absolute—and displaces the personally experienced absolute as the 
measure of the world with a new, man-made absolute, devoid of 
mystery, free of the 'whims' of subjectivity and, as such, impersonal 
and inhuman. It is the absolute of so-called objectivity: the objective, 
rational cognition of the scientific model of the world.
Modern science, constructing its universally valid image of the 
world, thus crashes through the bounds of the natural world which it 
can understand only as a prison of prejudices from which we must 
break out into the light of objectively verified truth.... With that, of 
course, it abolishes as mere fiction even the innermost foundation of 
our natural world. It kills God and takes his place on the vacant 
throne, so that henceforth it would be science which would hold the 
order of being in its hand as its sole legitimate guardian and be the 
sole legitimate arbiter of all relevant truth. For after all, it is only 
science that rises above all individual subjective truths and replaces 
them with a superior, trans-subjective, trans-personal truth which is 
truly objective and universal.
Modern rationalism and modern science, through the work of 
man that, as all human works, developed within our natural world, 
now systematically leave it behind, deny it, degrade and defame it— 
and, of course, at the same time colonize itT
Here we see the giant step which Havel has taken beyond Berlin's 
analysis: It is modern science itself that has been the fatal agent of the 
modern era; as if to answer Ostwald's excesses, it is held responsible 
even for deicide.
Many have been moved by Havel's powerful mixture of poetical 
feeling, theatrical flourish, and the bold waving of an ancient, blood­
stained shirt. The summary of his ideas, published conspicuously 
under the title "The End of the Modern Era, "24 made an immediate 
and uncritical impression on readers of the most varied backgrounds. 
Among them was one person especially well placed to ponder the
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values of science, and to draw conclusions of great import for the life 
of science in the United States. Here we arrive at the last stage on 
the road to the current understanding of the place of science in our 
culture.
The person so deeply affected by Havel's piece was none other 
than a distinguished chairman of the U.S. Congress Committee on 
Science, Space and Technology, and one of the staunchest and most 
effective advocates of science during his long tenure in the House of 
Representatives: George E. Brown, Jr., of California. In 1992 Brown 
acknowledged that he had received "inspiration" from Havel's essay, 
"The End of the Modern Era," and decided to reconsider his role as a 
public advocate of science. He therefore first wrote a long and intro­
spective essays under the title "The Objectivity Crisis," and then 
presented it to a group of social scientists in a public session at the 
annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, under the title "The Objectivity Crisis: Rethinking the Role of 
Science in Society."^
Persuaded by Havel's version of the Romantic Revolt, Brown cast 
about earnestly for the consequences it should have for the pursuit of 
science in the United States. As a pragmatic political leader, he was 
primarily concerned with how scientific activity may hold on to some 
legitimacy—by service to the nation in terms of visible "sustainable 
advances in the quality of life," "the desire to achieve justice" (which he 
says "is considered outside the realm of scientific considerations"), and 
all the other "real, subjective problems that face mankind." He now saw 
little evidence that "objective scientific knowledge leads to subjective 
benefits for humanity." The privileging of the claim of unfettered basic 
research is void too, he said, because all research choices are "contex­
tual" and subject to the "momentum of history."
Moreover, science has usurped primacy "over other types of cog­
nition and experience." Here Brown quoted Havel's definition of the 
"crisis of objectivity" as being the result of the alleged subjugation of 
our subjective humanity, our "sense of justice,. . . .  archetypal wisdom, 
good taste, courage, compassion, and faith," to the processes of science, 
which "not only cannot help us distinguish between good and bad, but 
strongly assert that its results are, and should be, value free." In sum, 
Brown held, it would be all too easy to support more research when the 
proper solution is instead "to change ourselves." Indeed, Brown came
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to the conclusion that "the promise of science may be at the root of our 
probiems." To be sure, the energies of scientists might still find use if 
they were properly directed, chiefly into the held of education or into 
work toward "specific goals that define an overall context for research," 
such as population control. Embracing a form of Baconianism, Brown 
thus rejected Vannevar Bush's more general vision for science, a re­
jection I quoted near the beginning of this chapter (see note 1.) Like 
Havel's, his answer to the question of whether science can share a place 
at the center of modern culture was clearly No.
When George Brown presented his ideas to an audience of scien­
tists at the session he had organized and for which he had selected a 
panel of social scientists,2? only one of the panelists allowed himself to 
disagree openly; while another of the panelists urged Brown to go even 
further still: Perhaps not realizing how close he was coming to the 
"vo/LioN" solution tried earlier elsewhere, including in Mao's Cultural 
Revolution, he seriously suggested that to screen proposals for scien­
tific research funding, the federal government should form a variation 
of the National Science Foundation's board whose membership should 
contain such nonexperts as "a homeless person [and] a member of an 
urban gang." No one there dared to raise an audible objection. One felt 
as if one glimpsed the shape of a possible future. But it is gratifying to 
note also that in early 1994, Mr. Brown was apparently moved by the 
intellectual objections, such as those given above, when they were 
voiced to him by one or two scientists. He distanced himself from 
Havel's position's Yet when the new Congress, elected in 1994, dras­
tically reversed the support science had enjoyed for five decades, it was 
a scenario along Havel's lines rather than Vannevar Bush's. Moreover, 
one highly placed Congressman of the new majority announced that 
funding for the gathering of scientific data should be eliminated be­
cause such information often leads to Congress adopting regulations, 
such as those on the protection of the environment or the workplace, 
which are found burdensome by those whose interests he apparently 
values more.
In this overview, ranging from the trembling pillars of the Platonic 
tradition of the West to today's so-called "End of the Modern Era" and 
the "End of Progress," we have identified some of the chief historic
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trends that have risen and fallen and risen again in the dynamic out of 
which the predominant view of an epoch emerges. Today's version of 
the Romantic Rebellion, while strong in other fields, represents still 
only a seductive minority view among analysts and science policy 
makers. It comes not up from the grass roots but down from the tree- 
tops. However, while it is held among prominent persons who can 
indeed influence the direction of a cultural shift, the scientists at large, 
and especially the scientific establishment, have chosen to respond so 
far mostly with quiet acquiescence. If those trends should continue, and 
the self-designated postmodernists rise to controlling force, the new 
sensibility in the era to come will be very different indeed from the 
recently dominant one.
Experts in science policy are now debating what they call the 
ongoing renegotiation of the "social contract" between science and 
society. 2 9 One can argue that such a change has been overdue for many 
reasons, one being that the relatively protected position given to sci­
ence for a good part of the last five decades has less to do with society's 
commitment than with the Cold War and with the implicit over­
promises regarding spin-offs which, as Don K. Price warned long 
ago,3° would eventually come back to haunt scientists. Adding con­
cerns about the state of the economy, competitiveness, the lack of 
general scientific literacy, etc., there is much in such a list to help 
explain the public's readiness for a reappraisal. But by my analysis, such 
factors act only as catalysts or facilitators of the tidal change that 
historically is always potentially present in our culture.
Of course, it may turn out that the present version of the Romantic 
Rebellion will peter out—although I doubt it will. Or it may gain 
strength, as it did in the nineteenth century and again at various times 
in the twentieth, especially when the scientific community paid little 
attention to the course of events. Or at best a new accommodation 
might gradually emerge, a "third way," based on a concept analogous to 
complementarity. That is, it may at last be more widely recognized, by 
intellectuals and the masses alike, that the scientific and humanistic 
aspects of our culture do not have to be opposing worldviews that must 
compete for exclusive dominance, but are in fact complementary as­
pects of our humanity that can and do coexist productively (as Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge put it memorably in chapter 14 of his Rzcgwp/ui?
"in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant
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qualities"). At any rate, historians will watch the next stages of the old 
struggle to define the place of science in our culture with undiminished 
fascination—although also with an uneasy recollection of Oswald 
Spengler's prophecy for our^M Jr rzA/r, of Sigmund Freud's pessimism, 
and of Isaiah Berlin's analysis of the trajectory of our modern era.
T H E  P U B L I C  I M A G E  O F  
S C I E N C E
W H E N  FUTU RE GENERATIONS look back to our day, they will envy 
our generation for having lived at a time of brilliant achievement in 
many fields, and not least in science and technology. We are at the 
threshold of basic knowledge concerning the origins of life and the 
universe itself. We are near an understanding of the fundamental con­
stituents of matter, of the process by which the brain works, and of the 
factors governing behavior. We launched the physical exploration of 
space and have begun to see how to conquer hunger and disease on a 
large scale. Scientific thought appears to be applicable to an ever wider 
range of studies. With current technical ingenuity one could in princi­
ple hope to implement many of the utopian dreams of the past.
Hand in hand with the quality of scientific work today goes an 
astonishing quantity. The worldwide scientific output is vast. And the 
amount of work being done is increasing at a rapid rate, doubling 
approximately every ten or twenty years. Every phase of daily and 
national life is being penetrated by some aspect of this exponentially 
growing activity.
It is appropriate, therefore, that searching questions are now being 
asked about the function and place of this lusty giant. Just as a person's 
vigorously pink complexion may alert the trained eye to a grave disease 
of the circulatory system, so too may a local celebration of the success 
and growth of science and technology turn out, on more thorough 
study, to mask a deep affliction in our culture. And indeed, anyone
committed to the view that science should be a basic part of our 
intellectual tradition will soon hnd grounds for concern. Even among 
educators, scholars, and commentators of our culture, one now hears 
all too often scientific research described as being an unpleasant, soul­
less activity, merely "logical," "linear," "hierarchical," and devoid of all 
human passion. Any practicing scientist knows this to be an absurd 
characterization, one that at best might be excused as an opinion 
formed while taking a bad science course—if any—in school.
Some of the major indicators of the relatively narrow place sci­
ence, as properly understood, occupies in the total culture are quantita­
tive. A nationwide survey found that nearly 40 percent of the men and 
women who had attended college in the United States confessed that 
they had not taken a single course in the physical and biological sci­
ences. Similarly, the mass media pay only negligible attention to the 
subject: the newspapers have been found to give less than 5 percent of 
their (nonadvertising) space to factual presentations of science, tech­
nology, and medicine; and television devotes even less. In short, all our 
voracious consumption of technological devices, all our talk about the 
threats or beauties of science, and all our money spent on engineering 
development should not draw attention away from the fact that the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge itself is not a strong component of the 
operative system of general values.
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TH E ATOMIZATION OF LOYALTIES
In the qualitative sense, and particularly among intellectuals, the indica­
tors are no better. One hears talk of the hope that the forces of science 
may be tamed and harnessed to the general advance of ideas, that the 
much deplored gap between scientists and humanists may be bridged. 
But the truth is that both the hopes and the bridges are illusory. The 
separation—which I shall examine further—between the work of the 
scientist on the one hand and that of the intellectual outside science on 
the other is increasing, and the genuine acceptance of science as a valid 
part of culture is becoming less rather than more likely.
Moreover, there appears at present no force in our cultural dy­
namics strong enough to change this trend. This is due mainly to the 
atrophy of two mechanisms by which the schism was averted in the
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past. First, the common core of their early education and the wide 
range of their interests were apt to bring scholars and scientists to­
gether at some level where there could be mutual communication on 
the subjects of their individual competence; and second, the concepts 
and attitudes of contemporary science were made a part of the general 
humanistic concerns of the time. In this way a reasonable equilibrium 
of compatible interpretations was felt to exist, during the last century, 
between the concepts and problems of science on the one hand and of 
intelligent common sense on the other; this was also true with respect 
to the scientific and nonscientihc aspects of the training of intellectuals. 
Specialists, of course, have always complained of being inadequately 
appreciated; what is more, they are usually right. But although there 
were some large blind spots and some bitter quarrels, the two sides 
were not, as they are now in danger of coming to be, separated by a gulf 
of ignorance and indifference.
It is not my purpose here to urge better science education at the 
expense of humanistic and social studies. On the contrary, the latter do 
not fare much better than science does, and the shabby effort devoted 
to science is merely the symptom of a more extensive sickness of our 
educational systems. Nor do I want to place all blame on educators and 
publicists. Too many scientists have forgotten that, especially at a time 
of rapid expansion of knowledge, they have a special obligation and 
opportunity with respect to the wider public, and that some of the 
foremost researchers took great pains to write expositions of the es­
sence of their discoveries in a form intended to be accessible to the 
nonscientist. In the humanities, too many contributors and interpreters 
seem to scoff at Shelley's contention in his o/"Poefyy that one of
the artist's tasks is to "absorb the new knowledge of the sciences and 
assimilate it to human needs, color it with human passions, transform it 
into the blood and bone of human nature."
It is through the accumulation of such neglects, just as much as 
through deterioration in the quantity and quality of instruction, that 
the place of science as a meaningful component of our culture has been 
so easily shaken again by the Romantic Rebellion discussed in Chap­
ter 1. Again, this process is to a large extent one aspect of the increas­
ing atomization of loyalties within the intelligentsia. The writer, the 
scholar, the scientist, the engineer, the teacher, the lawyer, the politi­
cian, the physician—each now regards himself or herself hrst of all as a
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member of a separate, special group of fellow professionals to which 
almost all allegiance and energy are given; only very rarely does the 
professional feel a sense of responsibility toward, or of belonging to, a 
larger intellectual community. This loss of cohesive links is perhaps the 
most relevant symptom of the disease of our culture, for it points 
directly to one of the disease's specihc causes: a failure of image.
P U R E  T H O U G H T  A N D  P R A C T IC A L  P O W E R
Each person's image of science may differ in detail from that of the 
next, but all public images are in the main based on one or more of 
seven general positions. The first of these goes back to Plato and 
portrays science as an activity with double benefits: science as pure 
thought helps the mind find truth, and science as power provides tools 
for effective action. In book 7 of the jRrpMMr, Socrates tells Glaucon 
why the young rulers in the ideal state should study mathematics: 
"This, then, is knowledge of the kind we are seeking, having a double 
use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of 
number, or he will not know how to array his troops; and the philoso­
pher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of 
true being.. . .  This will be the easiest way for the soul to pass from 
becoming to truth and being."
The main Haw in this image is that it omits a third vital aspect. 
Science has always had in addition a metaphoric function—that is, it 
generates an important part of a culture's symbolic vocabulary and 
provides some of the metaphysical bases and philosophical orientations 
of our ideology. As a consequence the methods of argument of science, 
its conceptions and its models, have permeated first the intellectual life 
of the time, then the tenets and usages of everyday life. All philosophies 
share with science the need to work with concepts such as space, time, 
quantity, matter, order, law, causality, verification, reality. Our language 
of ideas, for example, owes a great debt to statistics, hydraulics, and the 
model of the solar system. These have furnished powerful analogies in 
many fields of study. Guiding ideas—such as conditions of equilibrium, 
centrifugal and centripetal forces, conservation laws, feedback, invari­
ance, complementarity—enrich the general storehouse of imaginative 
tools of thought. Ideas emerging from science are, and will continue to
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be as they have been since the seventeenth century, a central part of 
modern culture—through pure thought, through practical power, and 
through metaphoric influence. A sound image of science must embrace 
each of the three functions; but usually only one of the three is recog­
nized. For example, folklore often depicts the life of the scientist either 
as one of pure thought—isolated from practical matters and from its 
metaphoric meaning—or, at another extreme, as dedicated chiefly to 
technological improvements.
IC O N O C L A S M
A second image of long standing is that of the scientist as iconoclast. 
Indeed, almost every major scientific advance has been interpreted— 
either triumphantly or with apprehension—as a blow against religion. 
To some extent this position was fostered by the ancient tendency to 
prove the existence of God by pointing to problems which science 
could not solve at the time. Newton thought that the regularities and 
stability of the solar system proved it "could only proceed from the 
counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being," and the 
same attitude governed thought concerning the earth's formation be­
fore the theory of geological evolution, concerning the descent of man 
before the theory of biological evolution, and concerning the origin of 
our galaxy before modern cosmology. The advance of knowledge 
therefore made inevitable an apparent conflict between science and 
religion. It is now clear how large a price had to be paid for a misunder­
standing of both science and religion: to base religious beliefs on an 
estimate of what science ozMwot do is as foolhardy as it is blasphemous.
The iconoclastic image of science has, however, other components 
not ascribable to a misconception of its function. For example, the 
historian Arnold Toynbee charged science and technology with usurp­
ing the place of Christianity as the main source of new cultural symbols. 
Neo-orthodox theologians have called science the "self-estrangement" 
of man because it carries him with idolatrous zeal along a dimension 
where no ultimate—that is, religious—concerns prevail. Similarly, 
T. S. Eliot proclaimed that culture and religion are "different aspects of 
the same thing," and defined culture and religion in such a way that
science, when mentioned at all, would become identihable with idola­
try.* It is evident that these views fail to recognize the multitude of 
divergent influences that shape a culture, or a person. And on the other 
hand there is, of course, a group of scientists, though not a large one, 
which really does support the view that science is an iconoclastic 
activity. Ideologically they are descendants of Lucretius, who wrote on 
the first pages of Dc PcrMTM "The terror and darkness of mind
must be dispelled not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, 
but by the aspect and the law of nature; whose first principle we shall 
begin by thus stating, nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine 
power."
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ETHICAL PERVERSION
The third image of science is that of a force which can invade, possess, 
pervert, and destroy a person. The current stereotype of the soulless, 
evil scientist is the psychopathic investigator in science fiction, or the 
nuclear destroyer—immoral if he develops the weapons the govern­
ment asks to be produced, almost traitorous if he refuses that request. 
According to this view, scientific morality is inherently negative. It 
causes the arts to languish, it blights culture, and when applied to 
human affairs, it leads to regimentation and to the impoverishment of 
life. Science is the serpent seducing us into eating the fruits of the tree 
of knowledge—thereby dooming us.
The fear behind this attitude is not confined to science; it is 
directed against all thinkers and innovators. Society has always found it 
hard to deal with creativity, innovation, and new knowledge. And since 
science assures a particularly rapid, and therefore particularly disturb­
ing, turnover of ideas, it remains a prime target of suspicion. Factors 
peculiar to our time intensify this suspicion. The discoveries of "pure" 
science often lend themselves readily to widespread exploitation 
through technology. The products of technology—whether they are 
better vaccines, better gadgets, or better weapons—have the charac­
teristics of frequently being very effective, easily made in large quan­
tities, easily distributed, and very appealing to the masses. Thus we are 
in an inescapable dilemma—irresistibly tempted to reach for the fruits
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of science, yet, deep inside, aware that our metabolism may not be able 
to cope with this ever increasing appetite.
The fear that this dilemma can no longer be resolved increases the 
anxiety and confusion concerning science. A symptom is the popular 
identification of science with the technology of weapons. Efforts to 
convince people that science offers us chiefly knowledge about our­
selves and our environment, and occasionally a choice of action, have 
been rather ineffective. On their side, scientists rnrwhrtr feel they can 
take little credit or responsibility either for the facts they discover—for 
they did not create them—or for the uses others make of their discov­
eries, for they generally are neither permitted nor specially fitted to 
make these decisions. Those are controlled by considerations of ethics, 
economics, or politics, and therefore are shaped by the values and 
historical circumstances of the whole society. It is, however, also appro­
priate to say that there has been at least a moderate success in persuad­
ing the average scientists, engaged in basic research, of the proposition 
that the privilege of pursuing a held of knowledge with few restraints 
imposes on them, in their capacity as citizens, a proportionately larger 
burden of civic responsibility.
There are other evidences of the widespread notion that science 
itself cannot contribute positively to culture. Toynbee, for example, 
gave a long list of "creative individuals," from Xenophon to Hinden- 
burg and from Dante to Lenin, in which he did not include a single 
scientist. In casual conversation among educated people, it is not fash­
ionable to confess to a lack of acquaintance with the latest ephemera in 
literature or the arts; but one may even exhibit a touch of pride in 
professing ignorance of science, of the structure of the universe or one's 
own body, of the behavior of matter or one's own mind.
THE SORCERER'S APPRENTICE
The last two views hold that man is inherently good and science evil. 
The next image is based on the opposite assumption—that man cannot 
be trusted with scientific and technical knowledge. We have survived 
only because we lacked sufficiently destructive weapons; now we can 
immolate our world. Science, indirectly responsible for this new power,
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is here considered ethically neutral. But man, like the sorcerer's appren­
tice, can neither understand this tool nor control it. Unavoidably he 
will bring catastrophe on himself, partly through his natural sinfulness 
and partly through his lust for power, of which the pursuit of knowl­
edge is a manifestation. It was in this mood that Pliny deplored the 
development of projectiles of iron for purposes of war as "the most 
criminal artifice that has been devised by the human mind; for, as if to 
bring death upon man with still greater rapidity, we have given wings to 
iron and taught it to Ay. Let us, therefore, acquit Nature of a charge 
that belongs to man himself."
When a science is viewed in this plane—as a temptation for the 
mischievous savage—it becomes easy to suggest a moratorium on sci­
ence, a period of abstinence during which humanity somehow will 
develop adequate spiritual or social resources for coping with the possi­
bilities of inhuman uses of modern technical results. Here I need point 
out only the two main misunderstandings implied in recurrent calls for 
a moratorium.
First, science of course is not an occupation, such as working on an 
assembly line, that one may pursue or abandon at will. For creative 
scientists, it is in large part not a matter of free choice what they shall 
do. Indeed it is erroneous to think of them as advancing toward knowl­
edge; it is, rather, knowledge which advances toward them, grasps 
them, and overwhelms them. Even the most superhcial glance at the 
life and work of a major scientist would clarily this point. It would be 
well if in his or her education each person were shown by example that 
the driving power of creativity is no less strong and sacred for the 
scientist than for the artist.
The second point can be put equally brieAy. In order to survive 
and to progress, mankind cannot know too much. Salvation can hardly 
be thought of as the reward for ignorance. Mankind has been given its 
mind in order that it may And out where it is, what it is, and who it is, 
and how it may assume the responsibility for itself which is the chief 
obligation incurred in gaining knowledge. For example, in the search 
for the causes and prevention of aggression among people and nations, 
we shall And the natural and social sciences to be main sources of 
understanding.
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ECOLOGICAL DISASTER
A change in the average temperature of a pond or in the salinity of an 
ocean may shift the ecological balance and cause the death of a large 
number of plants and animals. The hfth prevalent image of science 
similarly holds that while neither science nor man may be inherently 
evil, the rise of science happened, as if by accident, to initiate a change 
in the balance of beliefs and ideas that now corrodes the only conceiv­
able basis for a stable society. Jacques Maritain held that the "deadly 
disease" science set off in society is "the denial of eternal truth and 
absolute values." Vaclav Havel's remarks (Chapter 1) echoed this fear.
The main events leading to this state are usually presented as 
follows: the abandonment of geocentric astronomy implied the aban­
donment of the conception of the earth as the center of creation and of 
mankind as its ultimate purpose. Then the idea of purposive creation 
gave way to blind evolution. Space, time, and certainty were shown to 
have no absolute meaning. All a priori axioms were discovered to be 
merely arbitrary conveniences. Modern psychology and anthropology 
led to cultural relativism. Truth itself has been dissolved into proba­
bilistic and indeterministic statements. Drawing upon analogy with the 
sciences, other scholars have become increasingly relativistic, denying 
either the necessity or the possibility of postulating immutable verities, 
and so have undermined the old foundations of moral and social au­
thority on which a stable society must be built.
However, many applications of recent scientific concepts outside 
science merely reveal an ignorance about science. For example, rela­
tivism in nonscientihc fields is generally based on far-fetched analo­
gies. Relativity theory, of course, does not find that truth depends on 
the point of view of the observer but, on the contrary, reformulates 
the laws of physics so that they hold good for all observers, no matter 
how they move or where they stand. Its central meaning is that 
the most valued truths in science are independent of the point of 
view. Ignorance of science may also be the excuse for adopting rapid 
changes within science as models for antitraditional attitudes out­
side science. In a sense, no field of thought is more conservative than 
science. Each change necessarily encompasses previous knowledge. 
Science grows like a tree, ring by ring. Einstein did not prove the 
work of Newton wrong; he provided a larger setting within which
some limitations, contradictions, and asymmetries in the earlier physics 
disappeared.
But the image of science as an ecological disaster can be subjected 
to a more severe critique. Regardless of science's part in the corrosion 
of absolute values, have those values really given us a safe anchor? 
A priori absolutes abound all over the globe in completely contradic­
tory varieties. Most of the horrors of history have been carried out 
under the banner of some absolutist philosophy, from the Aztec mass 
sacrifices to the auto-da-fe of the Inquisition, from the massacre of the 
Huguenots to the Nazi gas chambers. Few would argue that any society 
of past centuries provided a meaningful and dignihed life for more than 
a small fraction of its members. If, therefore, some of the new philoso­
phies, inspired rightly or wrongly by science, point out that absolutes 
have a habit of changing in time and of contradicting one another, if 
they invite a reexamination of the bases of social authority and reject 
them when those bases prove false (as did the original colonists in 
North America), then one must not blame a "relativistic" philosophy 
for bringing out these faults. They were there all the time.
In the search for a new and sounder basis on which to build a stable 
world, science will be an indispensable partner. We can hope to match 
the resources and structure of society to the needs and potentialities of 
people only if we know more about humans. Already science has much 
to say that is valuable and important about human relationships and 
problems. By far the largest part of the total research and development 
effort in science and engineering today is concerned, indirectly or 
directly, with human needs, relationships, health, and comforts. Be­
cause of the large gap between continuing needs and what has been 
accomplished so far, and also because of the often slanted and unfair 
distribution of the fruits of advances, giving credit for real achieve­
ments in alleviating human misery is often lagging. Here I am thinking, 
for example, of the role of science in the expansion of the idea of human 
rights, especially in the disproving of the old pseudoscientific bases for 
racism, which were exposed as a sham by the work of anthropologists 
during the twentieth century. One tends to forget that not all the 
desirable "applications of science" look like VCRs or pills. Insofar as 
absolutes are to help guide mankind safely on the dangerous journey 
ahead, they surely should be at least strong enough to stand scrutiny 
against the background of developing factual knowledge.
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SCIENTISM
While the last four images imply a revulsion from science, scientism 
may be described as an addiction to science. Among the signs of 
scientism—which affticts a small part of the general population but also 
some scientists^—are the habit of dividing all thought into two catego­
ries, up-to-date scientific knowledge and nonsense; the view that the 
theoretical sciences and the large laboratory offer the best models for 
successfully employing the mind or organizing any effort; and the 
identification of science with technology, to which reference was made 
above.
One main source for this attitude is evidently the persuasive suc­
cess of recent technical work. Another resides in the fact that we are 
passing through a period of fundamental change in the nature of 
scientific activity—a change triggered by the perfecting and dissem­
inating of the methods of basic research by teams of specialists with 
widely different training and interests. Until World War II, the typical 
scientist worked alone or with a few students and colleagues. Today he 
or she often belongs to a sizable group. Science has increasingly be­
come a large-scale operation with a potential for rapid and worldwide 
effects. The result is often a splendid advancement in knowledge, but 
with side effects which are analogous to those of sudden urbanization— 
a strain on communication, the rise of an administrative bureaucracy, 
the depersonalization of human relationships.
To a large degree, this may be unavoidable. The new style of doing 
science will justify itself by the flow of new knowledge and of material 
benefits. A danger—and this is the point where scientism enters—is 
that the fascination with the mechanism of this successful enterprise 
may change the scientists and society around them. For example, the 
unorthodox, often withdrawn individual, on whom many great scien­
tific advances have depended in the past, does not fit well into the new 
system. And society will be increasingly faced with the seductive urging 
of scientism to adopt generally what is regarded—often erroneously— 
as the pattern of organization of "Big Science."
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MAGIC
Few nonscientists would suspect a hoax if it were suddenly announced 
that a stable chemical element lighter than hydrogen had been synthe­
sized, or that a manned observation platform had been established at 
the surface of the sun. To most people it appears that science knows no 
inherent limitations. Thus, the seventh image depicts science as magic, 
and the scientist as wizard, deus ex machina, or oracle. The attitude 
toward scientists on this plane ranges from terror to sentimental sub­
servience, depending on what motives one ascribes to them.
TH E IMPOTENCE OF THE MODERN INTELLECTUAL
The prevalence of these images of science is a source of the alienation 
between the scientific and nonscientihc elements in our culture and 
therefore is important business for all of us. We must consider the full 
implications of the fact that not only the man and woman in the street 
but almost all of our intellectual and political leaders today know at 
most very little about science. And here we come to the central point 
underlying the analysis made above: the chilling realization that our 
intellectuals, for the first time in history, are losing their hold on an 
adequate understanding of the world. Adherence to erroneous images 
would be impossible were those images not anchored in two kinds of 
ignorance. One kind is ignorance on the basic level, that o f —what 
biology says about life, what chemistry and physics say about matter, 
what astronomy says about the development and structure of our 
galaxy, and so forth. Most nonscientists realize that the old, common- 
sense foundations of thought about the world of nature have become 
obsolete. The simple interpretations of solidity, permanence, and real­
ity have been washed away, and they are plunged into what appears to 
be a nightmarish ocean of four-dimensional continua, probability am­
plitudes, indeterminacies, and so forth. They know only two things 
about the basic conceptions of modern science: that they do not under­
stand them, and that they are now so far separated from them that they 
may never find out their meaning.
On the second level of ignorance, contemporary intellectuals 
know just as little about the way in which the different sciences fit
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together in a world picture. They have had to leave behind them, one 
by one, those great syntheses which used to represent our intellectual 
and moral home—the worldview of the book of Genesis, of Homer, of 
Dante, of Milton, of Goethe. All too many hnd themselves abandoned 
in a universe which seems a puzzle on either the factual or the philo­
sophical level. Of all the effects of the separation of culture and scien­
tific knowledge, this feeling of bewilderment and basic homelessness is 
the most terrifying. Here is one reason, it seems to me, for the frequent 
self-denigration of contemporary intellectuals. Nor are the scientists 
themselves unaffected, for it has always been, and must always be, the 
job of the humanist to construct and disseminate a meaningful picture 
of the world.3
To illustrate this point concretely, and show how it is thought by 
some to apply since the beginning of modern science, we may turn to a 
long-respected work by E. A. Burtt, a scholar who understood both the 
science and the philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
The reader is carried along by Burtt's authority and enthusiasm. And 
then, suddenly, one encounters a passage unlike any other in the book, 
an anguished cry from the heart:
It was of the greatest consequence for succeeding thought that now 
the great Newton's authority was squarely behind that view of the 
cosmos which saw in man a puny, irrelevant spectator (so far as a 
being, wholly imprisoned in a dark room, can be called such) of the 
vast mechanical system whose regular motions according to me­
chanical principles constituted the world of nature. The gloriously 
romantic universe of Dante and Milton, that set no bounds to the 
imagination of man as it played over space and time, had now been 
swept away. Space was identified with the realm of geometry, time 
with the continuity of number. The world that people had thought 
themselves living in—a world rich with color and sound, redolent 
with fragrance, filled with gladness, love and beauty, speaking every­
where of purposive harmony and creative ideals—was crowded now 
into minute corners in the brains of scattered organic beings. The 
really important world outside was a world hard, cold, colorless, 
silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically 
computable motions in mechanical regularity. The world of qualities 
as immediately perceived by man became just a curious and quite
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minor effect of that infinite machine beyond. In Newton, the Carte­
sian metaphysics, ambiguously interpreted and stripped of its dis- 
dnctive claim for serious philosophical consideration, finally over­
threw Aristotelianism and became the predominant world-view of 
modern times.*
For once, the curtain usually covering the dark fears modern 
science engenders is pulled away. This view of modern man as a "puny, 
irrelevant spectator" lost in a vast mathematical system—how far this is 
from the exaltation that Kepler found through scientific discovery: 
"Now man will at last measure the power of his mind on a true scale, 
and will realize that God, who founded everything in the world on the 
norm of quantity, also has endowed man with a mind which can com­
prehend these norms!" Was not the universe of Dante and Milton so 
powerful and "gloriously romantic" precisely because it incorporated, 
and thereby rendered meaningful, the contemporary scientific cosmol­
ogy alongside the moral and aesthetic conceptions? Leaving aside the 
question of whether Dante's and Milton's contemporaries by and large 
were living in a rich and fragrant world of gladness, love, and beauty, it 
is fair to speculate that if our new cosmos is felt to be cold, inglorious, 
and unromantic, it is not the new cosmology which may be at fault, but 
the absence of new Dantes and Miltons.
To take another concrete example, consider the still widely read 
book by Arthur Koestler entitled 7Fe In it, Koestler tried
to trace the rise of modern physics (and, with it, of modern philosophi­
cal thought), stemming from the work of Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and 
some of their contemporaries. This is indeed a useful task to set oneself. 
Koestler worked with devotion on his material. And, most important, 
he was of course the intelligent layman par excellence whom any 
scientist would be pleased and proud to have as a colleague and fellow 
student in an evidently earnest search for an understanding of modern 
science.
And yet, something terrifying happened as Koestler came to the 
end of his book. He had been able to see meaning and order in the 
physics of the seventeenth century. When he turned to modern 
physics in the epilogue, however, all sense of understanding and 
coherence disappeared, and the incomprehensible modern concep­
54 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
tions seemed to rise around him on every side as threats to his sanity. 
As he summarized his work, he found that to a large degree "the story 
outlined in this book will be recognized as a story of the splitting-off, 
and subsequent isolated development, of various branches of knowl­
edge and endeavour—sky-geometry, terrestrial physics, Platonic, and 
scholastic theology—each leading to rigid orthodoxies, one-sided 
specializations, collective obsessions, whose mutual incompatibility 
was reflected in the symptoms of double-think and 'controlled schizo­
phrenia.' "5
I believe it is important to consider this case as sympathetically as 
we can—to listen to the anguish of an intelligent man who has discov­
ered that he cannot cope with the modern conceptions of physical 
reality. For what he is saying is what most people would say—if they 
were eloquent enough and interested enough in knowledge to be 
deeply disturbed by a state of threatening ignorance:
Each of the 'ultimate' and 'irreducible' primary qualities of the world 
of physics proved in its turn to be an illusion. The hard atoms of 
matter went up in fireworks; the concepts of substance, force, of 
effects determined by causes, and ultimately the very framework 
of space and time turned out to be as illusory as the "tastes, odours 
and colours" which Galileo had treated so contemptuously. Each 
advance in physical theory, with its rich technological harvest, was 
bought by a loss in intelligibility....
Compared to the modern physicist's picture of the world, the 
Ptolemaic universe of epicycles and crystal spheres was a model of 
sanity. The chair on which I sit seems a hard fact, but I know that I sit 
on a nearly perfect vacuum.... A room with a few specks of dust 
floating in the air is overcrowded compared to the emptiness which I 
call a chair and on which my fundaments rest.. ..
The list of these paradoxa could be continued indefinitely; in 
fact the new quantum-mechanics consist of nothing but paradoxa, 
for it has become an accepted truism among physicists that the sub­
atomic structure of any object, including the chair I sit on, cannot be 
fitted into a framework of space and time. Words like 'substance' or 
'matter' have become void of meaning, or invested with simul­
taneous contradictory meanings. ...
These waves, then, on which I sit, coming out of nothing,
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travelling through a non-medium in multidimensional non-space, 
are the ultimate answer modern physics has to offer to man's ques­
tion after the nature of reality. 6
At the very end of the book, in its last, agitated paragraph, I cannot 
but hear the cry of a drowning man, a cry for help that cannot leave one 
unconcerned if one believes that science can and must be shown to play 
a valid, creative part within our culture:
The muddle of inspiration and delusion, of visionary insight and 
dogmatic blindness, of millennial obsessions and disciplined double­
think, which this narrative has tried to retrace, may serve as a 
cautionary tale against the of science—or rather of the philo­
sophical outlook based on it. The dials on our laboratory panels are 
turning into another version of the shadows in the cave. Our hyp­
notic enslavement to the numerical aspects of reality has dulled our 
perception of non-quantitative moral values; the resultant end- 
justihes-the-means ethics may be a major factor in our undoing. 
Conversely, the example of Plato's obsession with perfect spheres, of 
Aristotle's arrow propelled by the surrounding air, the forty-eight 
epicycles of Copernicus and his moral cowardice, Tycho's mania of 
grandeur, Kepler's sunspots, Galileo's conhdence tricks, and Des­
cartes' pituitary soul, may have some sobering effect on the worship­
pers of the new Baal, lording it over the moral vacuum with his 
electronic brain.?
Burtt and Koestler correctly reflect the dilemma continuing to this 
day—and I could have chosen equally vivid examples from the more 
recent avalanche of books with the same animus. What their outbursts 
tell us, in starkest and simplest form, is this: By having let the intellec­
tuals remain in terrified ignorance of modern science, we have forced 
them into a position of tragic impotence; they are, as it were, blind­
folded in a maze through which they feel they cannot traverse. They 
are caught between their irrepressible desire to understand this uni­
verse and, on the other hand, their clearly recognized inability to make 
any sense out of modern science. The great literary critic and historian 
Lionel Trilling testified to this problem frankly in a lecture entitled 
"The Mind in the Modern World."
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The operative conceptions [of science] are alien to the mass of 
educated persons. They generate no cosmic speculation, they do not 
engage emotion or challenge imagination. Our poets are indifferent 
to them....
This exclusion of most of us from the mode of thought which is 
habitually said to be the characteristic achievement of the modern 
age is bound to be experienced as a wound given to our intellectual 
self-esteem. About this humiliation we all agree to be silent, but can 
we doubt that it has its consequences, that it introduced into the life 
of mind a significant element of dubiety and alienation which must 
be taken into account in any estimate that is made of the present 
fortunes of mind?s
Once the alienation of today's nonscientihc intellectual is under­
stood, the consequence also becomes plain. The intellectual of tomor­
row will probably have an even more distorted image and fearful 
response with regard to science, for there is at present no countercycli­
cal mechanism at work. Hardly anything being done or planned now is 
adequate to deal with the possibility of a cultural psychosis engendered 
by the separation of science and the rest of culture.
Better education cannot be the only remedy; the uses and abuses 
of science also need reexamination. But making science again a part 
of every intelligent person's educational resource is the minimum 
requirement—not because science is more important than other fields, 
but because it is an integral part of a sound contemporary worldview. A 
plausible program would include thorough work at every level of 
education—imaginative new programs and curricula; strengthened 
standards of achievement; extended college work in science, and expan­
sion of opportunity for adult education. Few people have faced the real 
magnitude of the problem. Moreover, while some time lag between 
new discoveries and their wider dissemination has always existed, the 
increase in degree of abstraction, and in tempo, of present-day science, 
coming precisely at a time of inadequate educational effort, has begun 
to change a lag into a discontinuity.
This lapse, it must be repeated, is not the fault of the ordinary 
citizen, who can only take his cue from the intellectuals—the scholars, 
writers, and teachers who deal professionally in ideas. Every great age 
has been shaped by intellectuals who would have been horrified by the 
proposition that cultivated men and women could dispense with a good
grasp of the scientific aspect of the contemporary world picture. This 
tradition is broken; very few are now able to act as informed mediators. 
To restore science to reciprocal contact with the concerns of most 
persons—to bring science into an orbit about us instead of letting it 
escape from our intellectual tradition—that is the challenge which 
scientists and all other intellectuals must now face.
77?e PziMr 57
" D O I N G  O N E ' S  
D A M N E D E S T " :  T H E
E V O L U T I O N  O F  T R U S T  I N  
S C I E N T I F I C  F I N D I N G S
To TH IS POINT, we have dealt with the forces trying to reshape the 
scientific profession's external relations, the part it is thought to play in 
our culture. But over the past four centuries, the concepts, theories, and 
practice of science have themselves also undergone an evolutionary 
development that needs to be understood. It will be shown that the 
scientists' own for finding trustworthy research results are the
result of a historic progression through stages, each with its own pitfalls 
and limits, and that here too we have no reason to think our ways will be 
adequate for tomorrow's needs.
Our mental and physical tools have to develop constantly, if only 
because it usually becomes more difficult to take the next step as a field 
evolves. There is within science a marked difference from one end of a 
century to the other in what it takes to trust one's own data or to trust 
the results of others. The same evolutionary process has external 
effects—among them how research is trusted by those outside the 
scientific community. Today's standards have been assembled from a 
steady stream of historically identifiable intellectual and social inven­
tions; by the same token, we should expect the tools of science in the 
future to be in many ways quite different from today's. It will be wise to 
let the historical view prepare the mind for the next phase. To this end, I
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shall select a few telling episodes that illustrate the cvo/Mhow of tr^yt in 
scientific research results.
TH E AESTHETICS OF NECESSITY
An appropriate beginning is an example taken from the start of the 
modern period, which is usually associated with the work of Nicolaus 
Copernicus. Until some years ago, the reigning opinion in the history 
of science was that the Copernican system was the very model of a new 
theory arising from a crisis brought about by the accumulation of data 
contradicting the old and overly complex theory of Ptolemy and his 
followers. Copernicus's book on the revolutions of the celestial objects, 
it was said, used more trustworthy observational data, yielded a better 
theory, and so rescued the practitioners of the time by giving them at 
last a calculational method of greater accuracy for astronomical predic­
tions.
But this interpretation is now seen by scholars in the held to be an 
ahistorical imposition of today's criteria of good behavior at the lab 
bench. On the contrary, Copernicus is chiehy an exemplar of the early 
introduction into science of essentially prcn/ppoy/hoTM—that is,
of deep convictions about nature on which the initial proposal and 
eventual acceptance of some of the most powerful scientific theories are 
still based.* Even if Copernicus's main goal had been to help the 
calculators of ephemerides, which was not the case, he gravely disap­
pointed them. They were no better off after the publication of his great 
work, Dr Rfuo/z^ zom'pMy, and in fact they continued to use the Ptolemaic 
system in essentially the form Ptolemy himself had set forth. For 
example, Copernicus's system of 1543 gave the same large errors for the 
predicted location of Mars—up to five degrees—as did the ephem­
erides of Regiomontanes in the 1470s.
Like Ptolemy, Copernicus selected just enough data (among them 
many with worse errors than he realized) to get his orbits, even bending 
some of them by a few minutes of arc as needed. But one must remem­
ber what he really wanted to achieve. This he made quite plain near the 
very beginning of his great book: "To perceive nothing less than the 
design of the universe and the fixed symmetry of its parts. "2 What is 
more, he wanted to do so by sticking to what he called "the first
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principle of uniform motion" (that is to say, Aristotelian circular mo­
tion), instead of employing nonuniformity and nonconstancies, as the 
Ptolemaics had allowed. What convinced him to make this the cor­
nerstone of his argument, and eventually persuaded his followers, was 
that he thereby produced a model of the planetary system in which the 
relative locations and order of orbits were no longer arbitrary but 
followed by necessity. In short, Copernicus is a case study of the 
privileging of an aesthetically based theory—above all, the aesthetics of 
necessity—and even of the temporary disbelief in "data" that would 
appear to disprove a favored theory.
That daring approach has remained to this day, at least during the 
individual scientist's private, early considerations; and with all its dan­
gers, the glorious thing discovered later was that it often works, and 
works without bending any data. Indeed, as we shall examine in more 
detailed discussions about the role of thematic presuppositions, it can 
turn out that when a thematically and intellectually compelling theory 
is given a chance, better data, gathered with its aid, will eventually 
reinforce the theory. That is the meaning behind a remark Einstein 
made before the test of General Relativity: "Now, I am fully satisfied, 
and I do not doubt any more the correctness of the whole system, may 
the observation of the eclipse succeed or not. The sense of the thing is 
too evident." When a discrepancy of up to 10 percent remained be­
tween the first set of measured deviations of light and the correspond­
ing calculations based on his theory, he responded, "For the expert this 
thing is not particularly important, because the main significance of the 
theory doesn't lie in the verification of little effects, but rather in the 
great simplification of the theoretical basis of physics as a whole. "3 And 
even before more data came in, which decreased the discrepancies, 
other scientists joined Einstein's camp, persuaded, in the words of 
H. A. Lorentz, that his grand scheme had "the highest degree of 
aesthetic merit; every lover of the beautiful must wish it to be true."4 
While this kind of procedure in science is of course much more risky 
for ordinary mortals, what characterizes giants like Copernicus and 
Einstein most as they struggle with problems too vast to be solved by 
the standard procedure—induction from good data—is their intuition 
of where science will go next. Scientific intuition, when it works, is a 
gift for which Hans Christian Oersted provided us the happy term 
"anticipatory consonance with nature."5
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Yet even the giants of science can't count on their sense of "what's 
right." When Einstein asked himself what caused him to be so obsti­
nately against a belief in the fundamentality of probabilism in physics, 
which the success of quantum mechanics forced on most others, he 
admitted to Max Born that he could not provide logical arguments for 
his conviction, but could only call on his "little finger as witness." By 
now we know with fair certainty that in this instance the "little finger" 
test failed.
INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF REASON'S CLAIM
But I am getting ahead of my story. On the next stage along the line of 
the evolution of trust in one's results we find Galileo. Galileo's invention 
amounted to secularizing science, submerging the qualitative in favor of 
the quantitative as the earmark of truth, and elevating experimental 
checks from illustrations of the value of a theory to the test of its 
proEpMity. In a famous passage in the Tzro AW .S'cnwrcr of 163 8, Galileo's 
spokesman, Salviati, goes to such lengths to describe one of these experi­
ments in detail—the accelerated motion of a bronze ball down an in­
clined plane, including his claim to have "repeated it a full hundred 
times"—that his supposedly skeptical listener Simplicio is made to 
confess why he trusts Salviati's account: "I would have liked to be present 
at these experiments; but feeling confidence in the care with which you 
perform them, and in the fidelity with which you relate them, I am 
satisfied and accept them as true and valid." To which Salviati quickly 
and eagerly responds, "Then we can proceed with our discussion."*^  
This is still uncomfortably close to Aristotle's advice, in his EW0 7 - 
;o7, on how to persuade one's listener. Proof provided by the speaker is 
only part of it. Equally important, persuasion "depends on the personal 
character of the speaker, and on putting the audience in a right frame of 
mind." A few decades ago, the science historian Alexandre Koyre, 
unlike the more pliable Simplicio, found Galileo's account of the de­
tailed care he took in conducting his experiments to be so overblown 
and unconvincing that he questioned whether Galileo had made any 
experimental checks at all. Instead, he argued, Galileo had presented 
only Gf J%72%c7!expf7*?772f73tc, or thought experiments; he was not describ­
ing real ones at all.?
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Fortunately for Galileo's reputation, some pages of his experimen­
tal tests have been found and analyzed, and they show that he—who 
once upon a time had been called the Father of Experimentation—did 
in fact do experiments. But modern analyses of his lab notes show why 
Galileo's private test results remained unpublished, and why he could 
not fully trust them to do more than, in his phrase, "zMcrMrc proAz- 
Mzhy" of "what reason tells me."s At that early stage of the evolution of 
trust, Galileo's private calculations were largely limited to proportions, 
and his published work was still narrative. Not until three decades later, 
in Newton's PrmrzpM, does the parsimonious style and axiomatic pre­
sentation, modeled on Euclid's geometry, take over—the sparse style of 
public science to which we are accustomed today. In Galileo's books 
there was still no use of algebra. Galileo does not announce his famous 
law of free fall as we do in elementary physics, r — ki Rather, he 
makes the mathematically equivalent, but seemingly quite mysterious, 
statement: "So far as I know, no one has yet pointed out that the 
distances traversed, during equal intervals of time, by a body falling 
from rest, stand to one another in the same ratio as the odd numbers 
beginning with unity. "9
To have put it this way means that what counted most for Galileo 
was after all not the limited and perhaps rather silly case of a falling 
stone or a rolling ball, but the demonstration that terrestrial phenom­
ena, of which these are examples, can be explained by the operation of 
zMtegcrr—just as the Pythagoreans had dreamed (and as quantum physi­
cists have proved for atomic behavior). Galileo, too, was still engaged in 
a search for cosmic truths, a tendency which, for better or worse, had to 
be reined in as science evolved further.
WITNESSING AND PEER REVIEW
The next steps in the evolution of trust were two. They came quickly, 
and both had to do with the ontological status of a "fact." While 
Galileo and Newton—a much better experimenter—could still regard 
their activities in the laboratory mostly as a private affair, others from 
the middle of the seventeenth century on struggled with the recogni­
tion that the door of the lab had to be unlocked; that Simplicio, so to 
speak, had to be invited to be present while the experiment was being
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performed. Fact had to be democratized. The academies and the Royal 
Society devoted much of their energies to the public elicitation of facts, 
the demonstrations of new phenomena carried out before an audience 
of interested fellow amateurs, acting as witnesses.
This practice can still be found a century and a half later, in the 
work of Oersted, who is most remembered for his publication of 21 July 
1820 describing the discovery of the interaction of current-carrying 
conductors and magnets. * * His hasty and perfunctory laboratory notes 
of findings, which changed all of physical science, would not be ac­
cepted now from a beginning student in an introductory physics 
course. Nor do they fit the new rules of explicitness that lawyers are 
busily writing today for government agencies to issue and for us to 
obey. And Oersted, a true Romantic, was still frank and personal in his 
publications; he did not know, as Louis Pasteur later told his students, 
that in their publications scientists have to try to make the results "look 
inevitable."
Few modern researchers are likely to admit, as Oersted gladly did, 
that he had been completely convinced many years earlier of the 
existence of the effect he eventually discovered. Oersted had been 
persuaded of a connection existing between electricity and magnetism 
by reading Immanuel Kant, who on metaphysical grounds proposed 
that all the different forces of nature are only different exemplifications 
of one fundamental force, a
Oersted is also an example of a scientist still on the early rungs of 
the evolutionary ladder of trustworthy methods, as is demonstrated by 
his choice of procedure for what we now would call peer review. There 
being no other physicists of note available in Copenhagen at the time, 
the peers he selected to vouch for the truthfulness of his report were 
brought in more for their presumed moral authority than for their 
scientific acumen: He assured his readers that the experiments he 
reported were conducted in the presence of his friend Esmarck, the 
king's minister of justice, Wleugel, knight of the Order of Danneborg 
and president of the Board of Pilots, and several other gentlemen 
whose word, one could assume, was to be trusted. *2
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DECIDING WHAT Is A FACT
In the meantime, between Newton and Oersted, another enormously 
important problem was being wrestled with: how to determine which 
of all possible demonstrable events are indications of scientifically 
usable phenomena; which of them are connected to the fixed regu­
larities of nature and which are merely passing phantoms, clouds with 
ever-changing form never twice the same, and thus reflecting only 
ephemeral concatenations? We might call it the problem of telling the 
difference between signal and noise.
The matter can be summarized by contrasting the styles of re­
search of Robert Boyle, of the second half of the seventeenth century, 
and of Charles DuFay, of the early decades of the eighteenth. Boyle, 
while still proclaiming the superiority of reason over authority and 
even over experience, argues forcefully in his "Proemial Essay" for the 
inclusion in scientific reports of as many readings and as much detail of 
the experimentation as possible. He sounds quite modern when he 
favors "information of sense assisted and heightened by instruments" 
or argues that "artificial and designed experiments are usually more 
instructive than observations of nature's spontaneous acting." And he 
tries to respond to the complaint of Francis Bacon: "Nothing duly 
investigated, nothing verified, nothing counted, weighed or measured 
is to be found in natural history; and what in observation is loose and 
vague is in information deceptive and treacherous."
But Boyle doesn't yet know the difference between mere readings 
and reliable data. His method of measurement is still quite primitive. 
For example, in his famous experiments on the compressibility of air, 
he quietly assumes that the tube in which the gas column is being 
compressed is of uniform diameter, that the mercury in it is sufficiently 
degassed, and also that he can make, with high accuracy, naked-eye 
readings of its level with reference to a paper scale pasted on the outside 
of the glass tube.
Among Boyle's contemporaries there were a number of fellow 
amateurs of science and instrument makers who in fact dedicated 
themselves to increasing the range and accuracy of basic measure­
ments. They typified the sort of person who, from the sixteenth century 
to our day, has reveled in the invention of more and more ingenious 
devices for measuring time, distance, angle, or mass. Their achieve-
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ments have made it possible to obtain more accurate and useful values 
both of derived quantities (e.g., force, pressure, electric charge) and of 
the physical constants of nature. That quest is itself a rather heroic 
chapter in the history of science and technology. It recounts such 
triumphs as the nearly logarithmic rates of JcrrMrc in the uncertainties 
of weighing (three orders of magnitude, from about 1550 to 1950); 
decrease in the error, in seconds per day, of time measurement (eight 
orders of magnitude in three centuries, from about 1650); and decrease 
in the error of astronomical angular measure (live orders of magnitude, 
from 1600 to the 1920s). The same story is told in the nearly log­
arithmic rate of wrrMre of the resolving power of microscopes (from 0.9 
to 0.2 microns, between 1840 and 1880) and of the energy reached for 
initiating elementary particle reactions (ten orders of magnitude, from 
about 200 KeVin 1930 to over 1,000 TeVin the mid-1980s). Spectacu­
lar feats in improved accuracy are being achieved with increasing fre­
quency. For example, the measured comparison of the charge-to-mass 
ratios of the proton and antiproton are now known to one part in a 
billion, the result of an increase in accuracy by eight orders of magni­
tude between 1950 and 1995.*3
Taking that route toward greater reliability of results was not in 
the forefront of Boyle's thought. But more significant for us here is that 
he was still wide open to anything that might happen before his eyes, 
and was apt to count everything observable as a fact to be used in his 
research. In his desire to find the gold of trustworthy detail, he was 
smothered by slag and mere sand. And that is of course one reason why 
not he but Richard Townley, while reading Boyle's publication, discov­
ered among Boyle's data what we now call Boyle's law.
With Charles DuFay, as the historian of science Lorraine Daston has 
pointed out, we see a representative of a new stage of development. 
In his researches on electricity, DuFay alters his experimental condi­
tions constantly, with the aim of isolating the relevant variable. He is 
interested only in those "facts" that, he says, are "characteristic of a 
large class of bodies, not of isolated species," and can therefore be 
organized into some scheme or simple rule. In short, he intuits the 
modern characteristic of facticity: that fact is consensual, invariant, and 
universal. And he signals the necessary next step toward the modern
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base of trust in experimental reports: He takes on a collaborator, not 
merely to witness but to try to repeat what DuFay has observed. DuFay 
realizes that experiments are very difficult to do correctly at an early 
stage of a science. More generally, he insists that phenomena do not 
assume the status of fact until other investigators go over the same 
ground, repeat the observations, and give their consent. This practice 
was a key invention along the path of increasing trust in research 
results.
THE EMERGENCE OF TEAMS
If we had enough space, we would now look at the next contributions to 
the development of trust as seen in the work of Oersted's followers, 
particularly Faraday and Maxwell. But let me go on to one of Maxwell's 
successors at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, England, J. J. 
Thomson, usually identified as the discoverer of the electron in the 
1890s, and to his student and successor, Ernest Rutherford. They 
exemplify something new in the evolving tale of trust within the lab.
With then still in his mid-thirties, as the new professor, the 
Cavendish Laboratory officially became a graduate school in 1895. 
Ernest Rutherford was among the first advanced students to arrive at 
the lab, soon to be followed by others of great talent, including a few 
guests from the United States. What occurred there was another step 
toward the modern phase of science: the forging of a group identity 
among the participant scientists.
Even before J. J. established himself as a major charismatic leader, 
he had his students assist him in his experimental researches and left it 
to them to chase down the details once he himself was satisfied he had 
obtained the right order of magnitude from theory. But in addition to 
his natural way of mentoring his assistants and being interested in each 
student's work, he had another, rather English weapon: regular after­
noon tea in his room for all researchers. That was an occasion to 
develop the sense of community among the researchers, who not only 
shared the same interests but also depended on one another in their 
work. By and by, there emerged a core research group around the 
professor, though only rarely was the collaboration with J.J. so close as 
to merit, in his view, joint authorship of resulting papers. *s
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The operation, though successful, was still a hand-to-mouth affair, 
financed largely by student fees and scholarships. Only inexpensive 
materials, such as glassware blown by the students themselves, were 
likely to be used. The sociology of the modern laboratory was begin­
ning to come into view, but not its economics. However, the combina­
tion of the selection of the advanced students and the socialization of 
the group as a whole around the more and more famous central figure 
was so effective that it gave rise to a kind of moral imperative, a 
bonding. These individuals would mind no hardship and, I should 
imagine, would rather have committed ritual suicide than betray the 
scientific norms of the group and of the times. They were not separate, 
career-oriented passers-through but "citizens" of a community who 
shared a common spirit.
Rutherford built on this system with a vengeance when he started 
his own operations at McGill, then at Manchester, and finally at the 
Cavendish Laboratory. Lab work was now planned more carefully, 
progress was discussed with each student at least weekly, and a list of 
research tasks that Rutherford thought could be completed with reason­
able success was given to each student annually. Almost as a by-product 
of his campaign to understand the atomic nucleus, Rutherford's ap­
proach was an early example of a style that would soon lead to real team 
research. Each student still had to make the most of his or her own 
equipment, and each had been selected by Rutherford with an eye to 
being "first class," willing to work hard as if in a constant race and with 
only the most minimal funds. But despite the fact that they all labored on 
different projects that were linked together only in Rutherford's mind, 
he expected full loyalty to himself and to the laboratory. He was ever 
present. Some of his students later reported they felt he had adopted 
them. Not for nothing was he known to his students as "Papa," accord­
ing to J. C. Crowther. Trust in each other and in the quality of their data 
was assured as automatically as it would have been in a healthy family or 
an isolated tribe of hungry hunters.
Still, the organization of the laboratory by no means reflected 
modern team research, that is, research in which the participants of a 
large laboratory work together on a shared project. Nor was the Caven­
dish operation, while magnificent in its production of major results, 
"modern" in terms of its understanding of the cost to science of inade­
quate funding. I once asked James Chadwick, who had discovered the
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neutron in 1932 after a painstakingly long search at the Cavendish with 
the most primitive equipment, to describe the atmosphere there at the 
time. He wrote back that his hope had been to build a small accelerator 
to settle the question of whether the neutron existed. However,
no suitable transformer was available and, although Rutherford was 
mildly interested, there was no money to spend on such a wild 
scheme. I might mention that the research grant was about E2000 a 
year, little even in those days for the amount of work which had to be 
supported. I persisted with the idea for a year or two.... I had quite 
inadequate facilities, and no experience in such matters. I wasted my 
time—but no money.
Wasting a year or two of a scientist like Chadwick for lack of 
budgeted funds was soon to become unacceptable, and so would a style 
of research that failed to take full advantage of the combined talents of a 
group. The earliest exemplar of that new style in physics was the 
"family" of young researchers that Enrico Fermi educated and assem­
bled around himself with spectacular results from about 1929 to the 
mid-193Os. Here, again, group loyalty was extraordinary. This being 
Rome, and Fermi being thought infallible in quantum physics, his 
students called him "11 Papa." Money was no real problem; with excel­
lent political instinct, Fermi had secured the patronage of the Italian 
state for his laboratory needs. And with equally good managerial in­
stinct he designed methods for deciding on promising research lines 
and then pursuing them fiercely, with a division of labor within the 
group that could be a model even now.
All this is implied even in Fermi's decision to list as authors of his 
laboratory's publications every one of the various members of that 
team—at least in physics a hitherto unheard-of public assignment of 
credit and sharing of responsibility for the results. Consider the paper 
reporting the startling discovery of the artificial radioactivity produced 
with beams of slow neutrons, sent to the Rhrc7T% SneMh/MY? on 22 
October 1934. This paper can be said to have effectively opened the 
nuclear age by announcing the discovery of resonance and introducing 
the concept of the moderator for nuclear reactions, and it figured in the 
award to Fermi of the Nobel Prize for physics four years later, t?
There were five authors, given in this order: Fermi, Amaldi, Pon-
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tecorvo, Rasetti, and Segre. We know from their various biographical 
statements that the young associates of Fermi worked closely under his 
inspiration, and the listing of authors, with the name of Fermi put first, 
is an indicator of their relationship. But I must add that when I looked 
in the archives in Pisa at the lab notebooks the group kept during that 
project, I found it difficult to disentangle from those laconic entries 
who did what, and when. Fermi's innovations, in that more innocent 
age, did not go so far as to foresee the kind of self-protective bookkeep­
ing forced upon labs in our time by the expectation that (as in the case 
of a researcher in the laboratory of David Baltimore) even the Secret 
Service might be called in by eager congressional investigators who 
doubt the trustworthiness of reported scientific results.
As we know, the invention of publicly assigning and distributing 
responsibility in works that have multiple authorship has been success­
ful beyond all reasonable expectations. Records are being broken year 
by year as larger and larger groups launch themselves against harder 
and harder problems. A paper in the Physio?/ Review D of 1 June 1992 
listed some 365 authors from thirty-three institutions on three conti­
nents, and on 3 April 1995 the Pkguo?/ Review Letterr carried two 
articles, by different groups, on the observation of the Top Quark, 
each with a similarly large number of members spread throughout the 
w o rld . Such indicators signal a kind of phase change in the social 
matrix of science, to which we shall have to turn in closing. Before that, 
however, we must at least briefly note another crucial milestone on 
the road to greater reliability of findings: the adoption of statistical 
methods for the analysis of data.
THE STATISTICAL TREATMENT OF DATA
An example from the first decade of the twentieth century will under­
line how recent, from a historical perspective, are the details of data 
processing. These issues, such as the use of statistics and even of 
significant figures, are now so common that many assume they have 
been with us since the beginning of time. For this example I return to 
Robert A. Millikan, a scientist whose use of data in his unpublished lab 
notes I have had occasion to write about; ^  I found it a revealing case 
study of the way a creative researcher often exercises judgments during
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the nascent, private phase of experimental work that may look imper­
missibly arbitrary when examined with the benefit of hindsight. This 
time I want to look briefly at Millikan's publication of February 1910 in 
the prestigious P/zz/oro^ z^rzz/ Aizzgzzxzzzr, his earliest "big" paper on the 
road to what two years later turned into his triumphant "oil drop" 
method for measuring the charge on the electron, epo
In 1910, at age forty-two, Millikan was still essentially unknown, 
and he was near despair about his chances of breaking through to 
scientific prominence. He had no way of knowing that the February 
1910 paper, on a "new modification" of a well-established method 
of using the motion of water droplets in electric fields to find e, was 
to point him soon in the right direction. But the paper allows us to 
glimpse how, at that point in early twentieth-century history, a scientist 
treated his or her data.
In the section entitled "Results," Millikan frankly confesses to 
having eliminated all observations on seven of the water drops—these, 
for various reasons, he decided had to be "discarded." A typical com­
ment of his, on three of the drops, was "Although all of these obser­
vations gave values of e within 2 percent of the final mean, the 
uncertainties of the observations were such that I would have discarded 
them had they not agreed with the results of the other observations, 
and consequently I felt obliged to discard them as it was."2* Today one 
would not treat data thus.
Millikan then presented his results in tables, in each of which he 
had gathered the data from one of six series of experiments, and gave 
also the raw calculations they yielded. Almost every detail there is 
astounding from our present point of view. Each observation carries 
Millikan's opinion of its likely reliability: "The observations marked 
with a triple star are those marked 'best' in my notebook. . . . The 
double-starred observations were marked in my notebook 'very good.' 
Those marked with single stars were marked 'good' and the others 
'fair.' " 2 2  Correspondingly, he assigns to each of the six series a weight 
to be used in averaging all results to obtain a final value; no details are 
given, but by inspection one sees that in Millikan's mind he correlates 
nine or ten stars in a series with a weight of seven, seven stars with a 
weight of six, five stars with a weight of four, three with three, and zero 
with a weight of one.
Within each of the six series in the tables, there are more surprises.
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There is little attempt to keep the significant figures straight during 
calculations. No reason is given why the readings are clumped the way 
they are, except that each clump corresponds to a set of drops that are 
guessed to carry the same number of electron charges. To find a value 
for e within a clump of observations, Millikan uses the average of all the 
individual data for the voltages needed to balance the various drops and 
of the times of fall when the electric field is off—instead of calculating 
the charges drop by drop and then applying statistical data reduction 
for a final result. Throughout, an air of utter self-confidence pervades 
the paper. But one must add one more fact: Despite all these "pecu­
liarities," the final result obtained with the new method for the charge 
of the electron was excellent for its day and could not be improved for 
many years. Oersted's phrase, "the anticipatory consonance with na­
ture," comes again to mind.
Statistics had entered theory in the eighteenth century, and experimen­
tal science by the mid-nineteenth century. But it took much longer to 
get general agreement on the proper use of statistical analysis—e.g., to 
deal with such bothersome problems as outriders in lab data, and when 
or how to "reject" observations; for in the real world of the laboratory, 
unlike its idealization by many nonscientists, one must be prepared to 
find even that "at some level, things will happen that we cannot under­
stand, and for which we cannot make corrections, and these 'things' 
will cause data to appear where statistically no data should exist. . .. 
The moral is, be aware and do not trust statistics in the tails of the 
distributions."^ Only in the mid-twentieth century did good practice 
on those points become general at the level of the ordinary lab worker. 
When excellent books such as E. Bright Wilson's fMtro^ Mrtz'ow to &zozz- 
fz/zr Rerezzrr^  (1952)24 became available, every student could read what 
"reasonable procedures" for data acquisition and reduction might be, 
including under extreme or difficult conditions.
"BIG SCIENCE"
But of course the landscape has changed immensely in the decades 
since then. Our journey brings us now to the latest and most difficult 
stage, that of the gigantic thought- and work-collectives in science.
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The story is told well in Peter Galison's book, Now Ev^ eAzveMti E/NT 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the discovery in the 1970s of so-called neutral- 
current events, such as the observation of neutrino-electron scattering. 
The detection of these events led to the confirmation of the theory of 
the unification of the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces by 
Glashow, Weinberg, and Salam—a modern triumph in the 
program of Kant and Oersted.
The theoretical questions and fierce debates concerning the possi­
bility of such a unification took an entirely new turn when, at the big 
accelerator in CERN, the research institution on the French-Swiss 
border, a photograph of a single electron event was found by a group 
from Aachen in January 1973. The detecting instrument they used had 
been given the name Gargamelle, after the mother of Gargantua. It was 
a monstrous bubble-chamber device, holding twelve cubic meters of 
liquid propane—a major engineering project of its own, and a symbol 
of the interpenetration of engineering and science in the twentieth 
century. Thousands upon thousands of pictures are exposed in the 
course of an experiment and then are given to the team trained to scan 
the negatives. In this run, one exposure was recognized as being strange 
and new by one of the scanners. She passed it into the hands of a 
research student, who identified the traces as those of electrons. The 
following day the student carried it up along the complex hierarchy of 
the big group to the next rung on the ladder, to the deputy group 
leader. Thinking it of considerable interest, he in turn brought it to the 
institute director, who later called it a picture-book example of what 
they had been expecting for months: a candidate for neutrino-electron 
scattering.
The crucial point now was to assess the background, i.e., the 
probability of a masking event. The director took the picture to En­
gland, to a fellow expert. And so on, and so on. The circle of belief 
expanded constantly. But still, this was only one picture, a single event, 
and not even an event one could immediately reproduce. What a huge 
difference from the days of DuFay and his followers, all the way to 
Fermi's group! Yet, as Galison writes: "Experienced bubble chamber 
experimentalists found the Aachen electron particularly compelling. 
Their specialty was famous for several critical discoveries grounded on 
a few well-defined instances. The omega-minus [particle] had been 
accepted on the basis of one picture, as had the cascade zero. Emulsion
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and cloud chamber groups had also compiled arguments based on such 
'golden events,' including the hrst strange particles, and a host ofkaon 
decays."26
Still, too much was at stake to publish immediately. One might like 
to believe the evidence, but one could not yet believe 27? it, trust it to be 
reproducible in principle. One now had to calculate the probabilities of 
all kinds of other reactions that could masquerade as the one assumed 
to be happening. Background events had to be ruled out; if one of those 
was what the exposure was about, it wouldn't test the Glashow- 
Weinberg-Salam theory at all.
There ensued an agonizing set of discussions within the large 
collective, as drafts of publications were being debated. We see here the 
next step in the evolution we are tracing: the internalization within a 
large group of fellow workers of the array of old but public methods of 
arriving at trustworthy results—debates among fellow specialists, 
preparation of publications and refereeing, and all the other safeguards 
of standards of demonstration. It is as if a new, large organism were 
doing science within its own boundaries. Finally, Galison concludes, 
"the members of the collaboration persuaded themselves that they 
were looking at a real effect. So it was that no single argument drove the 
experiment to completion. . . .  It was a community that ultimately 
assembled the full argument. " 2  7
The brief publication of the hnal result in P/Tyncr Eettery announc­
ing the find boiled down years of work into a few sentences and neat 
graphs—a far cry from the extensive documentation of Kepler and 
Boyle.28 A heterogeneous group of subcollectives from Belgium, Brit­
ain, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States had 
decided to stake their reputations on a new kind of physics. And it is 
worth noting that the new hnding had been distributed to the network 
of fellow specialists long before the mailing of the 19 July 1973 issue of 
the journal, through prepublication "preprints." Over the past few 
decades preprints have become in some branches of science by far the 
preferred method of "publishing" and of keeping up with the "litera­
ture"; the physics department library at Harvard alone receives over 
four thousand preprints per year from more than five hundred univer­
sities and other institutions worldwide. These in turn are now made 
quickly available through an electronically accessible database specially 
designed for them. Here, too, we catch a glimpse of the immense rate
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of change in the way science is being done. The next frontier is aiready 
in view: A debate is in progress among physicists at large colliders as to 
whether "outsiders" should have access to as yet unpublished data, even 
before the preprint staged
But to return to the CERN result. The story did not quite end 
there. By November 1973, an American group at Fermilab, the re­
search center in Illinois, had gathered enough evidence that all this 
work at CERN was a mistake—that no neutral current existed. They 
were almost ready to announce their finding. But then they found 
traces of the effect that "would not go away," and in April 1974 they too 
published their evidence in favor of the neutral current. 3 o
One lesson of this story is that just as one can trace the influence of 
Bach and Beethoven in some of Schoenberg's music of the early twen­
tieth century, so can one find some habits, methods, and standards of 
the old days in the megateams of modern science. But the new con­
glomeration is also a transformed entity, and it deals with a transformed 
science. In many branches, the more difficult it is to find credible access 
to the phenomenon, the more dependent the scientist is on apparatus 
built by others, on data gathered by still others, and on calculations 
carried through by yet others. When one is immersed in a large group, 
some members of which might change from month to month, it is not 
easy to know whom to believe, when to believe it, and how well to 
believe it. And the ground is shifting once again before our eyes. More 
than nine hundred physicists had signed on to a single experiment on 
the planned superconducting collider in Texas before its cancellation, 
and the number of collaborators on the Human Genome Project is 
greater still. 3 3
All these changes raise a vexing.question. Where lies the source of 
trust—for a participant in the research as well as for the reader of the 
publication—when most individuals within a team of widely diversified 
competences cannot vouch for every aspect of the published results, 
when perhaps not even one person in the whole group can be expected 
to be fully conversant with every element? A bitter rule of thumb has 
evolved: whereas credit for success tends to be parceled out unequally 
(those close to the field usually feel they "know" who in a long list of 
authors had the best ideas or most novel techniques), an embarrassing 
error or misconduct by even a single participant is likely to bring 
discredit to all the members of the team. Thus there is now a big
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incentive to invent ways to distribute partial responsibility early and 
proportional justice, when necessary, later. For example, some research 
papers identify the contributions of individual contributors to a com­
plex group effort. But because of the differences in location, or the wide 
spectrum of subspecialties involved, or the styles of leadership, etc., 
there is such a variety in the way teams are run that no single set of rules 
is likely to emerge. We are watching an experiment in self-governance, 
analogous perhaps in some ways to the transition that took place when 
the Pilgrims arrived in the New World and set about the task of 
forming a new society.
DOING ONE'S DAMNEDEST, REVISITED
Still, some fundamental things apply as time goes by. It was my luck to 
have known, and to have learned my trade under, one of the last of the 
physicist-philosophers, P. W  Bridgman—a Nobel Prize winner (1946) 
for establishing the held of experimental high-pressure physics almost 
single-handedly, and also the father of the movement in philosophy of 
science known as operationalism. Operationalism centers on the posi­
tion that the meaning of a concept is in its measurement or other test. 
In the 1930s Bridgman made a famous, useful, and very operational 
statement, usually remembered as:
The scientific method is doing your damnedest, no holds b arred .32
For him personally, doing one's damnedest meant total absorp­
tion, from 8:00 A.M., when he arrived at the lab by bicycle, rain or shine. 
It meant incredible productivity: Bridgman published some 230 sub­
stantial scientific papers that came to seven volumes of his collected 
scientific w o rk s , 3 3 as well as several books on the philosophy of science. 
It meant unceasing dedication to the process of getting things clear in 
his own mind. His style was completely hands-on, every datum taken 
by him or by his one dedicated long-term assistant. Most apparatus was 
built with his own hands. Only two or three joint papers (one with a 
young chemist named James B. Conant). Very few thesis students— 
only those whom he could not persuade otherwise. Only a few hundred
dollars a year needed for materials. No overhead. No paperwork. 
Paradise!
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NEW  DEMANDS ON SCIENTISTS
Bridgman's statement is still a great definition of how to get at trust­
worthy scientihc results. But in the intervening decades the milieu has 
so evolved that we need to supplement that advice, to bring it into our 
time. At the very least we must add a few words:
While doing your damnedest, watch how your presuppositions are 
holding up; make sure you understand the results of other people 
along the chain on whose work you are relying; and keep in view that 
more and more of the findings of science, resonating through soci­
ety, may have additional results far from those sought initially.
Bridgman himself discovered that last point in his own way. He 
once thought that science is essentially "value free"; but with the rise of 
Nazism in the 1930s, he saw that German scientists were no longer able 
to act as free intellectuals, and were in many cases co-opted as servants 
of a fascist state. Therefore he published a "Manifesto" in 1939, to the 
effect that he was closing his lab to visiting scientists from totalitarian 
countries.34 The act served as an early, widely noted reminder for 
scientists in the United States that their work has ethical dimensions 
even beyond what Jacob Bronowski identified as the principle that 
binds society together, in science as well as outside, the "principle of 
truthfulness."
Most scientists today face not only new conditions, such as their 
complex relationships with sophisticated instruments and their collab­
orators. They also face a different kind of fact, one that increasingly 
asserts itself: By obtaining the necessary support from government or 
industry, they have new obligations, not least the responsibility that 
their results be shareable far beyond their own labs. For reasons having 
little to do with the relatively rare case of scientihc error, tnisjudgment, 
or misbehavior, new pressures for accountability are jostling them from 
all directions. All parties involved are still fumbling around a bit—the 
National Institutes of Health, the Congress, the universities, the scien-
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tide societies. They are struggling to invent new methods for prevent­
ing and defending against charges of misconduct, real or imagined— 
just as, at an earlier stage of evolution, they had to learn about facticity 
and significant figures.
This new task, too, is one which history has thrown their way. 
Scientists cannot let others create the new realities for them. The next 
phase in the continuing evolution and transformation of the methods 
of science will depend on the actions of today's researchers. At stake are 
the problem choices for tomorrow's scientists, their rights to respect 
and support, the attraction of their fields for future scientists—and 
even the ancient hope that scientific thought itself is an exemplar for 
attaining trustworthy conclusions.
I M A G I N A T I O N  I N  S C I E N C E
THE ARTS AND the sciences are typically thought to belong to two 
different worlds, but in some respects they are close cousins. For while 
the aims, tools, and products differ, the ingenuity and passion behind 
the two endeavors are similar. There is also a long history of mutual 
stimulation between art and science, beginning with Pythagoras, who 
held that both music and the phenomena of nature are governed by 
relations among whole numbers. And as we shall see, historians of art 
have given us key insights into problems in the history of science.
But if we wish to watch the imagination of scientists at work, we 
shall have to catch them unawares. For quite good reasons—to arrive 
more dispassionately at consensus—modern scientists try to keep their 
personal struggles out of their published research results and out of 
their textbooks. It is therefore chiefly through private records and 
laboratory notebooks that historians of science discover what scientists 
themselves do not care to reveal. For while logic, experimental skill, 
and mathematics are constant guides, they are by no means adequate to 
the task of scientific investigation—otherwise a computer could do 
original research unaided. When you listen at the keyhole of the 
laboratory door, you find that the scientist uses a variety of other tools 
as well. I shall give examples of three such tools, three closely related 
companions that are rarely acknowledged: vfsw/
277%%g;7Mf3072. My examples will 
be drawn mostly from physics, but one could harvest similar instances 
from other branches.
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THE VISUAL IMAGINATION
One must start with the visual imagination, if only because early West­
ern science made its debut through the eye—through watching the 
puzzling motions of the planets, the wanderers among the fixed stars. 
So it is not surprising that entities that could be imagined but were 
hidden from direct visibility were often regarded with great suspicion. 
For example, the elusive ether seemed a necessary base for understand­
ing the propagation of light, which consists of transverse electromag­
netic waves; but in order to replicate the supposed motions within such 
an ether one had to think up ever more fantastic mechanical models. 
Finally the physicist Heinrich Hertz cried a halt to it, saying that the 
mathematical equations describing light are all that we can imagine 
when we think of the motion of light waves.
Similarly, the ancient notion of the atom as a tiny, uncuttable, 
discontinuous entity became more and more inadequate as new elec­
trical, chemical, and other properties of matter had to be explained. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, scientists such as Ernst Mach 
threw up their hands at the very idea of the atom; Mach asked sar­
castically: "Have you ever yeezz one?"
In fact, it would not have been impossible to have some sort of 
physics and chemistry without postulating the existence of atoms (as 
the chemist Wilhem Ostwald did in the hrst edition of his text,
?72f;72e C/7C7Mze); but it would have been a much more complex, less 
beautiful science. Luckily, the eye came to the rescue. In 1912, the 
physicist C. T. R. Wilson put on display a set of photographs (Figure 1) 
that settled the matter for most people. He had directed a beam of 
alpha particles from a radioactive source into a cloud chamber, a small 
glass box containing moist air at a low temperature. Along the path of 
each of the alpha particles, which are themselves of course invisible, 
there settled out a streak of fog, a thin cloud. That gave away the path of 
the alphas, somewhat as vapor trails in the sky are indirect evidence of 
the flight of an aircraft.
This was spectacular enough; but the real excitement was in the 
discontinuities of some tracks, their sudden changes of direction (e.g., 
the one shown in the lower left corner). There the alpha particle had hit 
something and scattered off in a new direction. In one case, the obstacle 
with which it had collided—namely a nucleus in one of the gas
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molecules—had been given enough of a push to leave its own tiny vapor 
trail. These pictures are simple, silent, and still; there is no evidence of 
motion. By itself, each is an inscrutable hieroglyph. But to the properly 
prepared mind connected to an alert eye, the photographs presented an 
overwhelming drama—the first, irrefutable evidence of the existence of 
atomic discreteness far below the level of direct perception. Scattering 
of particle beams became way to "see" subatomic events.
Among the next generation of tools that enabled such events to be 
glimpsed was the bubble chamber—similar to a cloud chamber but 
filled with a liquid. Now the particles* tracks are traced out in a liquid 
and become visible as rows of tiny bubbles. Figure 2 is a famous 
example. The photograph looks again more or less like graffiti, but one 
learns to neglect in this case the unimportant scratches and curlicues 
and to focus only on five lines. They reveal that a life-cycle story had 
taken place on this tiny stage. As drawn in Figure 3, which interprets 
the raw observations in Figure 2, an elementary particle called a pion 
came into the view field from the bottom edge. It encountered an
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Figure 2
unsuspecting proton in the chamber and interacted with it to form two 
so-called strange particles (labeled K° and A°—"strange" because they 
survived unexpectedly long for such created particles, namely of the 
order of one ten-billionth of a second). But these, being neutral, left no 
traces to look at, until they too decayed. The result of each strange 
particle's decay was one negative and one positive particle, producing in 
our view held, as it were, a third generation, each again having its own 
characteristic lifetime.
lh)u notice that in such a technical description the physicist is 
using the rhetoric of a familiar, primordial type of drama or folktale, 
acted out in space and time; a story of birth, adventure, and death. This 
anticipates a point to be made later: The power of many useful scien­
tific concepts rests at least in part on the fact that they are anthro­
pomorphic projections from the world of human affairs, and to that 
extent are metaphors.
Next let us look at another bubble-chamber photograph, one first 
encountered in 1973. By that time the bubble chamber had grown 
into a monster containing twelve cubic meters of liquid propane and 
was nicknamed Gargamelle. As noted in Chapter 3, among the thou­
sands upon thousands of pictures taken at CERN, where invisible,
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accelerator-created neutrino particles were beamed into the bubble 
chamber, one of the scanners noticed the frame shown in Figure 4, a 
photograph unlike any other. On analysis, what she had found turned 
out to be what is referred to as a "golden event"—a glimpse at a rare but 
very revealing interaction.
The naive eye must be told to neglect almost everything in that 
photograph and to focus on the limp curlicue on the left; it is a typical 
signature of an electron. The interpretation of this event helped hnally 
to conhrm the theory of the unification of the electromagnetic and the 
weak force, called the electroweak force. For that achievement, Shel­
don Glashow and Steven Weinberg in the United States and Abdus 
Salam at Trieste shared a Nobel Prize. I shall come back to this picture 
shortly to indicate how the scientific imagination dealt with it.
Before we are ready for that exercise, we must go back to the 
beginning of modern science, to the seventeenth century, to under­
stand better the immense power of the iconic imagination—the ability 
to form successful mental pictures out of elusive optical images and so 
to convert vague perceptions into solid knowledge. My example of this 
process of conversion from optical to mental imagery concerns Galileo 
Galilei, in a case investigated by the art historian Samuel Edgerton, 
whose extensive analysis I shall outline.
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This is the story. In 1609, two men looked at our moon through a 
new invention, the telescope. The first one to do so was the mathemati­
cian, cartographer, and astronomer Thomas Harriot in London, who 
used a six-powered telescope, starting in late July 1609. The other was 
Galileo, then a professor of mathematics at the University of Padua; he 
had taught himself how to grind lenses and made a twenty-powered 
telescope, with which he observed the moon in late autumn of the same 
year. Luckily we have a record of what each of these two men thought 
he saw. It is instructive to compare their private notes, and to under­
stand the reasons for the great differences between them.
Since Aristotle, the moon had widely been thought to be a per­
fectly smooth, unchanging sphere, the symbol for the incorruptible 
universe beyond Earth. Also, in paintings since the Middle Ages the 
moon had been a sign of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin 
Mary; Figure $ (from the painting by Bartolome Murillo) is an exam­
ple. But there were two problems with the "perfect" moon. One—of 
much concern to the religious—was that some areas on the real moon 
are obviously darker than others, so it couldn't be perfect and uniform 
throughout. Thomas Harriot called it "that strange spottedness"; and 
Dante, in canto 2 of the Paradiso section of his Divide Gwzczfy, wor­
riedly asked his inspired guide on their journey through the heavens
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what the "dusky marks" on the moon portend. (Beatrice put him at ease 
with an eloquent lecture.)
The second problem was that if the moon were truly a mirror in 
the shape of a perfect sphere, it would rehect to us at any time the image 
of the sun on only one small region of it, like a brilliant spot on a ball 
bearing, leaving the rest dark. But as always, suitable ad hoc theories 
sprung up to deal with these problems. For example, some said that the 
moon's surface was ethereal, or like alabaster it reemitted the light in a 
diffused way, allowing different internal materials to show through.
Harriot's hrst observation has been preserved among his papers 
(Figure 6). It is a rough sketch showing the "terminator," the divider 
between the dark area and the brightly illuminated portion of the 
moon. But the important thing to note is that evidently Harriot didn't 
know, and he made no comment on, why it was ay%gge^  line instead of
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the smoothly curved one which one would expect if the moon were 
indeed a perfect sphere. He wzr, but the current theories of the moon's 
perfection made it difficult for him to understand what he saw.
Enter Galileo. Starting in late November 1609, Galileo carefully 
follows the moon's phases through his telescope and made several 
skilled sepia drawings of his observations (Figure 7). Galileo evidently 
also saw the jagged lines along the terminator. But he interpreted them 
as irregularities of the surface, as mountains and craters, and he used 
the chiaroscuro technique of drawing and painting to manipulate dark 
and light, so as to emphasize the protuberances and depressions.
What Galileo had seen was soon beautifully described in his book 
of 1610, the Figure 8 shows one of the illustrations in
the book; it exaggerates the moonscape for further effect. Galileo 
writes that the surface of the moon, contrary to current philosophy, "is 
not smooth, uniform, and precisely spherical . . . but uneven, rough, 
and full of cavities and prominences, not unlike the face of the earth, 
relieved by chains of mountains and deep valleys." Galileo teer that 
there is no qualitative difference between earth and moon. He even 
calculates from the shadows cast by the peaks that the mountains must 
be four miles high from the baseline—higher than the Alps on earth!
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His voice is cairn; but he knows that the ancient Aristotelian worldview 
is crumbling under his blows.
The news of Galileo's sensational findings spread throughout Eu­
rope and transformed what people saw—an example of how the meaning
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conveyed by objective data depends on the presuppositions held by the 
viewer. Thomas Harriot himself, having read Galileo's book, raised his 
telescope again in July 1610, just a year after his hrst try, and made a sketch 
of his new observation (Figure 9). Now he too saw mountains and shaded 
craters—even more of them than were in Galileo's published sketch. Hav­
ing been converted to a new way of looking, having abandoned his old 
presuppositions, he now saw something quite different in the same old 
moon. I am reminded here of that wonderful passage in Tolstoy's zf7272% 
A/27T72272%, where Anna, hopelessly in love with Count Vronsky, explains to 
a friend that she cannot love a man like her husband Karenin, because 
Karenin has such big ears. To this the friend wisely replies that what has 
changed are not the ears of Anna's husband but the heart of Anna.
Now we must ask what it was that gave Galileo and Harriot such 
different eyes initially, when they hrst observed the same object. Part of 
the answer lies of course in Galileo's greater readiness to consider a 
Copernican universe, in which planets and satellites can all be similar. 
Also, by watching the changes in the moon's appearance owing to 
different illuminations from the sun at different times, Galileo's idea of 
the analogy between the earth and the moon was bolstered. But much 
of the answer lies also in their training in visualization, in how they had 
learned to use their eyes as a tool of imagination. In Harriot's England 
of 1609, the peak of artistic achievement was the ttwJ, for example that 
of Shakespeare, rather than anything in the visual arts. Indeed, visually
*^f* - F?gM7Y y
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England was far behind—one might almost say in the Middle Ages— 
with respect to understanding perspective renditions. In Galileo's Italy, 
however, Renaissance painting had captured the attention of alert 
intellectuals. In 1562, under Cosimo I of Florence, Vasari had founded 
the great Academy of Design, a center for visual arts and architecture 
for the benefit of all, not only the practitioners. It is not an accident that 
Galileo's first job application, made at age twenty-five, was for a posi­
tion as professor of mathematics at the academy, to teach geometry and 
perspective. And in 1613 he was elected to membership of that distin­
guished institution.
So it is very likely that Galileo, like all the students at the Academy 
of Design, had studied the problem of how bodies cast shadows on 
different surfaces. The typical, well-thumbed texts used in the academy 
show how the raised protuberances and depressions on reticulated 
spheres appear in light and shade (Figure 10). The art of perspective 
rendering in chiaroscuro was a tool and an ability which Galileo had 
learned as a young man. It came suddenly to good use when the old 
shadow-casting problems reappeared before his eyes in 1609 in the 
entirely different context of the telescopic view-held. One may say he 
was able to fTzutMgf, through this still rather poor optical tube, how 
scientists everywhere would soon come to see and understand the 
phenomena in the solar system.
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This case was an exemplar of scientihc research: hard data plus solid 
skills of mathematics and praxis, plus theoretical preconceptions, all 
working together in the theater of the mind. And in this mix, the visual 
imagination has often been crucial. In a letter to the mathematician 
Jacques Hadamard, Einstein confessed as follows: "The words or lan­
guage, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my 
mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as 
elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images 
which can be voluntarily produced and combined." It was as if, in 
thought, Einstein played with the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. And to the 
psychologist Max Wertheimer, Einstein reported, "I very rarely think 
in words at all. . . .  I have it in a sort of survey, in a way visually." We shall 
later look more deeply into this fascinating ability. But of course it came 
in handy when Einstein, as a young man in Bern, became a patent ofHce 
examiner. His job was to study the descriptions, and particularly the 
drawings, submitted by inventors, and to reconstruct those proposed 
machines in his mind to see whether they could function. That task 
came easily to him. And in his physics, too, he could visualize without 
effort processes which others found uncomfortably complex.
Let me give you a simple example of visualization. If you have stud­
ied physics as far as the introduction of special relativity theory, your 
textbook no doubt asked you to imagine a train traveling at high speed 
past a station platform on a stormy day. You were asked to visualize an 
observer standing on the platform and another seated in the middle of 
the train. Suddenly two lightning bolts hit the moving train; one strikes 
in front, and the other one in back. The important question was: How 
will these events look to each of the two observers, the one who is station­
ary on the platform and the other traveling at high speed?
You will remember what the answer was: To the Hrst observer the 
lightning bolts appeared to crash down simultaneously; to the other 
one (who is moving toward one of the Hashes and away from the other), 
they appeared to have been separated in time. This proves that the 
simultaneity of two events is not absolute for everyone but depends on 
the state of motion of the observers; it is "relative" to the framework of 
the particular observer.
Much of physics follows directly from visualizing this scene in 
your thoughts, correctly doing this "thought experiment." And that 
visually dramatic example really does come directly from Einstein's
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own writings. (A diagram in his 1917 book on relativity contains a 
typically parsimonious sketch of the situation.) All this was child's play 
for him, but not so easy for others. It took them time to learn how to 
see, to imagine it.
Nowadays it has become perhaps too easy. Einstein's imagery has 
found its way even onto the theater stage. In the hve-hour opera by 
Robert Wilson and Philip Glass titled EAstrA ow Ae Aw A there is a 
prominent depiction of that train; but in the opera it is creeping across 
the stage very slowly for two long acts, and something that represents 
the lightning bolt is also moving very slowly from above. Einstein 
would have been amazed to see this, since in his example everything 
depends on the train moving very fast.
At any rate, Einstein's visual imagination served him superbly again 
and again. Some time ago I found in the Einstein Archives one of his 
manuscripts from about 1920, in which he tells how he came to invent 
the theory of relativity. The key here was to realize that the
effects of accelerated motion and of gravity can be considered equiva­
lent. As Einstein described it in the manuscript: One day in 1907 "there 
came to me the happiest thought of my life," namely that "the gravita­
tional held has only a relative existence. For if one considers an observer 
who is falling freely from the roof of his house, there exists for him 
during his fall no gravitational held." For example, any object he releases 
while falling will fall at the same rate he falls, and therefore, just stay near 
him. That was a breathtakingly simple, visualizable scientihc "thought 
experiment," the basis of the equivalence principle of general relativity.'
In the early part of the twentieth century, the iconic imagination 
continued to lead from one scientihc triumph to another. For example, 
Niels Bohr's atomic model of 1913 adopted the imagery of the Coper- 
nican solar system. It was of course a great breakthrough. But by the 
mid-192 Os it became clear how dangerous it was to think about atomic 
processes in terms originally invented for large-scale events such as the 
motion of planets. A new way was needed to imagine phenomena such 
as the "spin" of the electron, or light being considered both as a wave 
and a particle. The easily visualized, model-based intuitions, as op­
posed to conceptual abstraction, had become an obstacle. One does not
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need to know much about Heisenberg's uncertainty principie to realize 
that those precisely drawn orbits in Bohr's atomic models cannot exist 
in nature.
This problem led Heisenberg to propose a necessary but drastic 
solution, one which to this day makes it difficult for laymen to feel at 
home in modern physics. Heisenberg totally eliminated the use of pic- 
turable models of the atom. A typical Heisenberg dictum was: "The pro­
gram of quantum mechanics has to free itself first of all from these 
intuitive pictures.. . .  The new theory ought, above all, to give up visu- 
alizability totally." Or as the physicist Dirac wrote in 193 0: "The classical 
tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observ­
able objects. . . .It has become increasingly evident in recent times, how­
ever, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not 
govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct 
way, but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a 
mental picture without introducing irrelevancies."
In most other sciences today, the iconic imagination remains alive 
and well. But the quantum scientists of today have gained a new kind of 
visualizability, though largely through mathematical rather than physi­
cal constructs, through symmetries and abstract diagrams. In Figure 1 f 
we have at least a hint of how the new way of thinking differs from the 
older one. At the top is pictured the traditional visceral picture one 
employed to talk about what happens when two equally charged elec­
trons are brought near each other. It is a kind of snapshot of a situation 
in space; the two electrons mutually exert forces of repulsion across the
Fz'gMTT 11
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gap between them. But it is now found much more meaningful to think 
of this phenomenon as caused by the mutual exchange between these 
two particles of a photon, an entity that mediates the interaction. The 
lower part of the figure represents this new way of "picturing," by 
means of a Feynman diagram (named after its inventor, Richard Feyn­
man) that provides a representation in space-time of the scattering of 
two electrons.
Similarly for the beta decay of the neutron, which was first ex­
plained by Enrico Fermi. In the old way of picturing beta decay (top of 
Figure 12), the interaction between the original neutron and the result­
ing proton, electron, and neutrino, everything takes place at a single 
space-time point H. By contrast, and as diagrammed in the lower half 
of Figure 12, the modern understanding of beta decay imagines the 
interaction between the particles to be "spread out" in space-time and 
mediated by the exchange of a W-boson. The two presentations give 
the same predictions at low energies, but the results are quite different 
at high energies.
Thus as the simple mental models have withered away, new dia­
grammatic helpers for our thought processes have taken their place— 
diagrams in which each part stands for a mathematical expression 
needed to calculate forces or scattering probabilities. Figure H is 
another example. As my colleague Howard Georgi described it: "An 
important test of the modern theory of the electroweak force is the 
existence of neutral currents. This means that weak [i.e., rare, improb­
able] processes of the type shown can occur, in which an electrically 
neutral virtual quantum (Z°) is exchanged between a neutrino [repre­
sented by the curved line on the left] and a quark [curved line on the 
right], leaving their identities [e.g., their charges] unchanged."^
And this brings us back, as I promised, to the "golden event" I 
spoke of earlier. For this quote is precisely the description of the 
underlying text of what happened in the photograph that was given in 
Figure 4. Our "naked eyes" would see only an unconvincing curlicue in 
the bubble-chamber picture. But the mind's eye sees, through the use of 
a Feynman-diagram version of the same phenomenon, that a neutrino 
scatters an electron without any change of charge; therefore a "neutral 
current" rxhtf; therefore the electroweak theory is right; therefore if 
you happen to be Glashow, Weinberg, or Salam, who thought of this
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possibility first, you wiil have reason to be very satisfied with this 
experimental result.
T H E  M E T A P H O R IC  IM A G IN A T IO N
Let us now watch another conceptual tool at work, one that some 
scientists use with great mastery in the genesis of their ideas. It is the 
and its close cousin, the zzwzz/ogy.
This might surprise you. After all, some philosophers have gone 
on record to say that the metaphoric imagination has no place in 
science. The Dzrtzozzzzzy o/"AMeryz TEozzg^ t still says of metaphor and 
analogy that they are "a form of reasoning that is particularly liable to 
yield false conclusions from true premises." Metaphor has been called 
the "essence of poetry"; it works through illusion. And, surely, the 
business of scientists is precisely the opposite. Metaphor and analogy 
might therefore seem to be what scientists should most assiduously 
zwozJ.
Nevertheless, scientists do use analogies all the time, though they 
do so quietly. The nineteenth-century physicist Thomas Young is a 
good example of how one can get chastised if one does it openly. His 
fame rests chiefly on arguing for the idea that light is fundamentally a 
wave phenomenon, contrary to the quasi-corpuscular theory that was 
widely preferred at the time. In one of his first published papers, Young 
writes: "Light is a propagation of an impulse communicated to [the] 
aether by luminous bodies." He reminds his reader that "it has already 
been conjectured by Euler that the colors of light consist of the differ­
ent frequency of the vibrations of the luminous aether." But this has 
so far been only a speculation. Now, Young says, he has rozz/zzwzzztMzz: 
The idea that light is a propagation of an impulse in the aether "is 
strongly confirmed . . ." (by what? how?) "by the zzzzzz/ogy between the 
ro/ozr of a thin plate and the rozzzzJr of a series of organ pipes" (two 
entirely different phenomena).^
Even without stopping to study the details of this curious and, as it 
turned out, very fruitful analogy between light and sound—this sur­
prising extension of the concept of wave motion from one field to 
another, seemingly quite unrelated one—we sense the remarkable 
daring of this transference of meaning. Indeed, making this connec-
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tion, and so launching on the experimental proof of the wave nature of 
light, seemed very ill-advised even to George Peacock, a devoted friend 
of Young's and himself a scientist at Trinity College, Cambridge. When 
Peacock published a gathering of Young's articles in 1855—twenty-six 
years after Young had died, and long after the hrm establishment of the 
wave theory—Peacock still felt he must save his reader from some 
dreadful mistake on this point; and so he added an asterisk after the 
crucial sentence just quoted from Young's paper and provided a stern 
footnote that is perhaps unique in the literature: "This analogy is 
fanciful and altogether unfounded. Note by the Editor."
Thomas Young's case is an exemplar of the creative but risky 
function of metaphor or analogy during the nascent phase of the 
scientific imagination. For Enrico Fermi it was part of his scientific 
credo to use and reuse the same idea in quite different settings. To him, 
any physical phenomenon could be understood in terms of an analogy 
with one of only about a dozen primitive, primary physical situations. 
For example, he effectively launched modern elementary particle 
physics with a paper on beta decay in 1954, in which he said the 
puzzling emission by a nucleus of low-mass particles, such as electrons, 
should be understood by analogy with the well-established theory of 
the emission of light quanta (photons) from a decaying atom. In this 
way he avoided the trap of having to think of the electron as already 
existing in the nucleus before its emission; after all, no one had felt a 
need to think of the photon as existing full-blown in the atom before it 
is radiated away.
And again, soon after writing a paper dealing with the effect that 
slow e/fct7*07M have on colliding with an atom, Fermi was uniquely able 
to understand the effect of slow weMtroMr on the nucleus. This happened 
in October 1954, when he and his team, largely by accident, came upon 
the miraculously enhanced artificial radioactivity of silver, which 
turned out to have been caused by scattered, that is, slowed-down, 
neutrons. The laboratory notebook pages that recorded this discovery 
are quite laconic, and the resulting paper was very short, less than two 
pages. But one could say that his use of analogy launched Fermi on 
what turned out to be the necessary first step toward the nuclear 
reactor, and hence to the so-called nuclear age.
T H E  T H E M A T IC  IM A G IN A T IO N
With this example, I come to the third type of imaginative tool used by 
scientists during the nascent phase of research. As noted in Chapter 3, 
it is the thematic imagination. It is even more risky than those discussed 
so far: I am referring to the practice of quietly letting a fundamental 
presupposition—what I have called a —act for a time as a guide
in one's own research when there is not yet good proof for it, and 
sometimes even in the face of seemingly contrary evidence. This can 
amount to a willing suspension of disbelief, the very opposite of what 
one usually takes to be the skeptical scientihc attitude.
Indeed, the phrase "willing suspension of disbelief" comes from a 
discussion of poetry in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's ZjtenzrM.
He saw his task, as he put it, to imbue his poetic writings with "a 
semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of the 
imagination that o/ /or 7%0773e72f which
constitutes poetic faith."
On the face of it, this surely can have nothing whatever to do with 
science. On the authority of the philosopher of science Karl Popper, we 
are told that the demarcation criterion of all truly scientihc activities is 
the suspension of belief, not of disbelief. According to Popper, we must 
subject our rational constructs to a curative purging regime so as to 
look for a fatal haw even in our own most treasured brain children. We 
must try hard to falsify, i.e., disprove them, and therefore to disown 
them.
And yet, when we stand there at the keyhole of the laboratory 
door, we observe many of our scientists paying no heed to this well- 
meant advice. Indeed, sometimes they let their best work grow and 
mature out of an unlikely idea that they prevent from being destroyed 
at the hand of iron rationality. Of course, eventually, after this private 
and nascent phase is over, the results obtained with maturer technique 
and the guide of maturer theory must stand up to experimental check. 
Nature cannot be fooled. The graveyard of science is crowded with the 
victims of some obstinate belief in an idea that proved unworthy. But 
we must face the strange fact that there genial spirits who can take 
the risk, and persevere for long periods without the comfort of con­
firmatory support, and survive to collect their prizes. By studying their 
private notes we now know that Isaac Newton, John Dalton, and
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Gregor Mendel, among many others, refused to accept "data" that 
contradicted their thematic presuppositions, and were proven right in 
the end.
Because this concept is still relatively new and yet crucial for fully 
understanding how science and scientists progress, we shall further 
elaborate on it in later chapters (Chapters 5 and 7). But for our purposes 
here we need only highlight one aspect of the adoption of ardently held 
themata, and the suspension of disbelief in them: while necessary at 
some points and often successful, they ow ultimately mislead terribly. 
And to conclude with an example of a failure after having spoken of so 
many scientific successes, let me return to Galileo, and to a long­
standing mystery surrounding one of his few but grand errors.
The climax of the scientific revolution for the physical sciences in 
the seventeenth century was Newton's PriMnpM, which combined the 
imaginative breakthroughs of Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler. As 
Newton confessed, he saw further than others because he had raised 
himself onto the shoulders of giants such as these. Kepler, at the court 
of the mad and magnificent emperor Rudolf II in Prague, and Galileo, 
in Venice and Florence, were two very different personalities; but they 
had a great deal in common, above all their passionate devotion to the 
Copernican theory of the planetary system. Each braved the dangers 
which espousing this heretical notion entailed, and Kepler, the younger 
by some eight years, an extravagant admirer of Galileo's, tried in every 
way to get his attention and moral support.
Now it would have been very logical for Galileo to reciprocate, 
because Kepler's laws clearly showed the superiority of the Copernican 
way of imagining the system of the world. But contrary to every 
reasonable expectation, Galileo kept his distance from Kepler, always 
tried to brush him off, and never accepted Kepler's laws of planetary 
motion. And that, for a long time, was a maddening puzzle in the 
history of science. How could Galileo avoid using Kepler's supportive 
findings as a weapon, when he was so beleaguered by his enemies? 
What caused this failure of imagination? Galileo never tried to explain 
his strange rejection of Kepler, and even this shows that it must have 
had a deep-seated cause. As the historian of science Giorgio de San- 
tillana once said, the ideas of Kepler "must have set in motion a 
protective mechanism in [Galileo's] mind." What did he want to pro­
tect?
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The explanation was finally found in a most unexpected way— 
again by an art historian, the magisterial Erwin PanofskyA His brilliant 
analysis started from the fact to which I alluded earlier, that Galileo, 
like so many Italian intellectuals at the time, rightly regarded himself 
not only as a scientist but also as an admirer and critic of the arts. 
Moreover, to Galileo, a chief criterion for sound scientific thinking was 
to use in his science only those thought elements that passed muster on 
aesthetic grounds. And it was on aesthetic grounds that Galileo found 
Kepler's ideas unacceptable and even repulsive.
Let me develop Panofsky's argument. Galileo, the son of a re­
nowned musician and theorist of music, grew up in a humanistic rather 
than a scientific environment. It is well known, for example, that he 
devoted many months of patient labor to a comparison of the poets 
Ariosto and Tasso, extolling the former and tearing the latter to pieces. 
Galileo also threw himself gladly into controversies in the visual arts. 
For example, he was very close to Lodovico Cardi, called Cigoli, 
considered perhaps the most important Florentine painter of his time. 
In fact, Cigoli even collaborated with Galileo in astronomical observa­
tions; he also called Galileo his "master" in the art of perspective 
drawing. Cigoli indicated his admiration for Galileo when, in his last 
work, the frescoes in Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome, he showed the 
ascending Virgin Mary standing on a moon that matched exactly what 
Galileo had recorded in one of his illustrations in the Nz/wnMy
(Figures 14 and 15).
In June 1612, Cigoli asked Galileo for help in arguing against 
those who held that sculpture was superior to painting. Strangely 
enough, a key to Galileo's rejection of Keplerian astronomy can be 
found in Galileo's resulting letter on the superiority of painting. The 
trouble with sculpture, Galileo says, is that it is too closely akin to the 
"natural things," the objects with which it shares "the quality of three- 
dimensionality." The painter deserves greater credit for his work pre­
cisely because he has available only two dimensions to create the 
appearance of three-dimensionality. For, as Galileo put it, "The farther 
removed the of imitation are from the to & the
more admirable the imitation will be." And he adds for emphasis that 
we admire a musician if he "moves us to sympathy with a lover by 
representing his sorrows and passions in song," but not if the musician 
simply cries and sobs; and we should admire this musician even more if
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he didn't sing at all but used only musical instruments to act on our 
emotions. ^
Galileo's point is that we must adhere to "critical purism"; we must 
keep the distinct from the subject matter. It is the same
sharp knife Galileo used to separate quantity from quality, and science 
from religion. As Panofsky put it, Galileo objected to any blurring of 
borderlines. That is precisely why Galileo found Tasso's fanciful allego­
ries so distasteful (for example, in the poem "Gerusalemme Liberata"); 
and above all why Galileo, like Cigoli, also was opposed to artistic 
distortions that demeaned the medium of painting, as in "trick pic­
tures." Galileo was particularly scathing of the then widely admired 
Giuseppe Arcimboldo, court painter to Rudolf II (to make things 
worse), a painter who had specialized in personilying concepts or 
seasons by arrangements of implements or of fruits and dowers (see 
Figure 16, representing summer). This style, now referred to as man­
nerism, arose as an "anti-classic" tendency, which, Panofsky pointed 
out, stood opposed "to the ideals of rationality. . . , simplicity, and 
balance" and instead favored "a taste for the irrational, the fanciful, the 
complex and the dissonant.
Now there is one element in particular that was as emphatically 
rejected by high Renaissance art, which Galileo adored, as it was 
cherished in mannerism, which Galileo abominated. And that is the
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ellipse. In painting and sculpture the depiction of an ellipse was intro­
duced as a significant element by Correggio and Gian-Maria Fal- 
conetto, respectively; in architecture, Michelangelo had briefly toyed 
with the idea, in designing the shape of the tomb of Pope Julius II, but it 
was to be only an interior feature, safely invisible from outside. For 
Galileo, the fight against mannerism, against unnecessary complexity, 
distortion, imbalance, was a serious duty whether he dealt with music 
or poetry or painting.
And now we are ready to ask, with Panofsky, "If Galileo's scientific 
attitude is held to have influenced his aesthetic judgment, might not his 
aesthetic attitude have influenced his scientific theories?" More specifi­
cally, could it be that "both as a scientist and as a critic of the arts [he 
obeyed] the same controlling tendencies?"? We begin to see why Gal­
ileo thought Kepler was entirely on the wrong track. On the most 
obvious level, Kepler's writings, as in his Myrferz'Mzzz 
and the H%7772072zre MMwJz, are such uncontrolled outpourings of differ­
ent ideas and subjects that it is difficult to see what is valuable under all 
this seeming fantasy. The three laws of planetary motion of Kepler, 
without which Newton could not have succeeded, are so deeply buried
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under mountains of debris that even Newton found it difficult to 
acknowledge his indebtedness explicitly.
But quite apart from the indigestibility of Kepler's style of trrhmg, 
Kepler's style of seemed to Galileo to enthrone mannerism in
the solar system. To Galileo, as to Aristotle and also to Copernicus, 
all motion in the heavens had to proceed in terms of the superposition 
of circles, for example in a circular epicycle carried along a circular 
deferent. The circle, and uniform motion along the circle, were the 
very signatures of uniformity, perfection, eternity. Kepler had initially 
thought so, too, but then he had been driven by the data and against his 
better instincts to announce, as his first law, that the planets are in 
elliptical motions around the sun. Therefore they were not in what 
Galileo regarded as "natural" motion but were continually changing 
their speed as they moved.
To Galileo, who was still completely under the spell of circularity, 
the ellipse was a distorted circle—a form unworthy of celestial bodies. 
To accept such an abomination was to give the victory to the Correg­
gios and Arcimboldos of this world. That he would never do. Rather, 
the primacy of the circle was to Galileo what I have called one of those 
irresistible thematic presuppositions, without which his scientific 
imagination could not operate. And not only in the sky but on earth, 
too. As Galileo put it, "All human or animal movements are circular." 
Running, jumping, walking, and so on, are, he says, only secondary 
movements depending on the primary one, which takes place at the 
joints: "It is from the bending of the leg at the knee, and of the thigh at 
the hip, which are circular movements, that the jump or the run 
results."s
The enchantment with the circle did not, in the end, undermine 
Galileo's cosmology in any serious way. But it did harm his physics, for 
it prevented him from coming to the realization that rectilinear rather 
than circular movement is the most natural one. Instead, Galileo 
held—as he put it in book 1 of the Df^ /ogo—that Nature allows 
straight-line motion only temporarily and only for the reestablishment 
of an order that has been disturbed. Once a piece of matter has reached 
its proper place, "it has to rest immovable or, if movable, to move only 
circularly." So Galileo missed the insight that is the very basis of 
modern mechanics and that we now refer to as Newton's first law, 
namely, that in the absence of forces, bodies proceed with uniform
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speed in a straight line. It is truly ironic that the honor of discovering 
this principle of inertia had to go to the Englishman, who by no stretch 
of the imagination could have considered himself an admirer or a critic 
of any of the arts.
We have now seen how some of the best scientists avail themselves of 
three of the chief tools of the scientihc imagination. These examples 
show again what a caricature is the more common notion of scientihc 
thinking as an almost irresistible, machine-like process of induction. 
Historians of science and other scholars the world over have been 
piecing together this more complex and chaotic but more realistic and 
interesting understanding of how scientists have used their minds while 
pursuing harder and harder problems during the past four centuries.
But I wish to hnish on a cautionary note. By naming the varieties 
of imagination, we of course shall not have "explained" a Galileo or a 
Fermi, any more than a Mozart or a Verdi. We shall never fully solve 
the puzzle of some gifted scientists gain their foreknowledge of the 
coming state of science, how it is possible for our minds to discover the 
order of things at all. On this point, Albert Einstein again has to have 
the last word: "Here lies the sense of wonder, which increases ever 
more—precisely as the development of knowledge itself increases."9
U N D E R S T A N D I N G  T H E  
H I S T O R Y  O F  S C I E N C E
W H A T  DOES IT  mean to "understand" the history of science—or at 
least to understand the history of % science? To prepare for an answer, 
let us think of what might be meant by saying that somebody under­
stands a science, for example, physics, and see how that differs from 
understanding its history. On that question we have some guidance. 
Albert Einstein, for example, thought that the highest task of a scientist 
is to achieve an integrated picture of the physical world (a MU/AAf). 
This can be understood in terms of an analogy: If one stands on a high 
mountain, one sees at a glance the varied landscape below, and espe­
cially evident are connections in the topography that would be hidden 
if one looked about from within one of the valleys. Similarly, from an 
integrated scientific view of nature one should be able to deduce in 
principle, and in this sense "understand," the detailed phenomena of 
nature.
We are of course a long way from attaining such a synoptic 
understanding. Still, a few scientists do have a remarkable comprehen­
sion of this sort at least in their own branch of science; we have met 
some examples. Even when a person of that caliber does not know fairly 
quickly how to solve a particular problem, he or she will make a good 
start on it—and is likely to go more or less in the same direction as 
another scientist of that level. This is probably because of four condi­
tions: First, a problem in one of the exact sciences usually turns out to
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have one right answer. (That is of course very different from the 
situation in the history of science.) Next, most such problems are 
understood in about the same way everywhere; only rarely are there 
long-lived fundamentally different schools of thought in the exact 
sciences. (Again, this is quite different in the history of science.) Third, 
most experts in a given held share more or less the same scientific 
epistemology and ideology. And lastly, the raw material, the database 
for most problems in an exact science, is or can be made relatively 
certain, because it can usually be reproduced or at least reexamined at 
will in a suitably equipped laboratory. (These last two conditions, also, 
do not apply to the history of science. For example, a documentary base 
is much less easily shareable.)
So the hrst condition for understanding the history of science— 
and I shall include in it the history of mathematics, technology, and 
medicine—is that there is little general agreement on procedures or 
answers. Instead, there are markedly different, competing schools of 
thought. This has been true since the early period in the held. For 
example, George Sarton and his followers in the hrst decades of the 
twentieth century believed that the main task is the encyclopedic accu­
mulation of precise knowledge of all innovators, throughout all history, 
and throughout all branches of science and technology. Joseph 
Needham and his school, on the other hand, approached the history of 
science through the development of science and technology of one 
great civilization (China), from its earliest beginnings. Herbert Butter- 
held felt that the important task was to understand the history of one 
great period—the rise of science in the seventeenth century. To others, 
the history of science is chiehy a tool for supplying the "proof" of 
an ideological or epistemological position (e.g., to hnd demarcations 
between "progressive" and "degenerating" research programs). Still 
others use the history of science to illustrate their theories of the 
sociology of science (e.g., social construction), or to develop an evolu­
tionary model of scientific progress; and yet another school of thought 
uses—often the same—cases to support a revolutionary model and the 
impossibility of scientific progress.*
Against this background of competing positions, I shall summarize 
my own point of view. The history of science is a vigorous and rapidly 
rising discipline, but unlike the exact sciences it does not have a well- 
developed theory. I am not at all convinced that any of the theories of
history can be applied to the history of science. From the perspective of 
science itself, the history of science is a young held of scholarship, still 
in a pre-Newtonian, largely inductive stage. But that does not have to 
be a handicap for understanding the history of science in a profound 
way. To that end, we need hrst of all to do two things: (a) to "under­
stand" thoroughly many of the individual main ewwfr in the history of a 
science (events, not speculative constructs such as the "Einsteinian 
Revolution" or the "synthesis"); and (b) to gee roMwerhoMr between many 
of these main events.
What is meant by "event"? Examples of events in the history of 
science would include the preparation or publication of a scientific 
paper, or the delivery of an influential speech (such as Niels Bohr's 
first pronouncement on complementarity at Como in 1927) and tran­
scripts of discussions in the heat of battle, or the documented assur­
ance of a specific discovery (such as the discovery of artificial 
radioactivity with slow neutrons on a certain day in October 1934 in 
Fermi's laboratory), or the preparation of an instrument, a letter, or a 
laboratory photograph (such as C. T. R. Wilson's in 1912), or a page 
of theoretical manuscript or a laboratory notebook (e.g., Millikan's), 
or the recording of an oral history interview conducted by a well- 
prepared historian of science. Each artifact is rooted in the act of 
doing science and is the preferably unself-conscious physical residue 
of an action at a given time; it is something that can be studied at a 
later time and may lend itself to a consensus among competent ob­
servers and interpreters who come to the case from different direc­
tions. An event in the history of science is in this sense analogous to 
what an elementary particle physicist calls an event, i.e., a trace on a 
photograph taken of a bubble chamber or spark chamber. The term is 
also related to the insistent use of the word epewf in Einstein's rela­
tivity paper of 1905; mentioning the word eleven times in a few 
paragraphs, Einstein implies that science should concern itself in the 
first place not with fundamentally metaphysically laden notions such 
as "matter" or "forces" but with what are now called intersections of 
world lines in space-time.
Focusing on the events helps one avoid the mistake of attempting 
to impose umbrella conceptions on the raw material, far removed 
from the underlying factual base in the present state of the held. I 
would rather try to enter into the belief system inductively, from the
LMfn%7!J;wg Nhtoyy 105
106 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
shareable evidence of events that involved the personal struggle of 
ideas.
Different scholars will have different preferences for events that 
interest and excite them. For example, some opt for paradoxes or incon­
gruities surrounding the event. Others may look for evidence of the 
operation of institutions, or whole professions, or social movements. 
Others still, afraid of being charged with "psychologizing," make do 
only with the final printed product of a scientist and avoid documentary 
evidence of its context or motivation. My own preference has often been 
to start with an artifactual residue of an individual's speculative attempts 
to understand a problem during the nascent phase, which Einstein 
called "the personal struggle." That is the period the new work has
come to some fruition, has been rationalized, pruned of all personal 
content, published, and absorbed in the mainstream of science through 
the mechanism of justification. This is, however, the earliest and 
rarely documentable stirrings of the scientist's new idea. Insofar as I can 
find the necessary evidence, I tend to focus as much on the state of 
disorder that precedes the neat conclusion as on the conclusion itself. To 
study and describe the mind of the scientist in its nascent phase, I look 
for events that might be observed through a keyhole in the door to the 
laboratory, to use the metaphor of Chapter 4. In this spirit, Peter 
Medawar, in asked: "What sort of person is a
scientist, and what kind of act of reasoning leads to scientific discovery 
and the enlargement of the understanding? He found the usual ap­
proaches too limited and issued a challenge: "What scientists do has 
never been the subject of scientific, that is, an ethological inquiry. . . .  It 
is no use looking to scientific 'papers,' for they not merely conceal but 
actively misrepresent the reasoning that goes into the work they de­
scribe. . . . Only unstudied evidence will do—and that means listening 
at a keyhole."3
Often the event that attracts my attention is the writing of a 
private letter that was not meant to be widely shared, for example, 
young Albert Einstein's letter of March 190$ to his friend Conrad 
Habicht. In it, Einstein says he is working on several papers at the 
same time. The first paper, he says, concerns light radiation, and he 
calls it "very revolutionary" (one of the very few times Einstein used 
the word, and he is using it in the sense that in his opinion that work
is not based on sound principles but only on a "heuristic" point of view). 
His second paper, he says, is on the size of the atom, determined from 
the diffusion phenomena. The third, he explains, is what we now re­
member as the paper on Brownian movement. And then he adds: "The 
fourth work is still in draff, and is an electrodynamics of moving bodies, 
using a modification of the teachings on space and time." (Note the 
word —announcing a work considered to be within the
existing tradition, the very opposite of a revolutionary act.)
This letter became important because it revealed the possibility of 
a connection among those four papers, each of which in its published 
form used to be seen as separate and of very different content. It 
suggested that one must reread those four publications and find the 
relationships among those seemingly isolated events. I shall come back 
to this point later.
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Now imagine that a particular letter or article or other artifact, indicat­
ing a puzzle or an entry into the nascent phase, has captured your 
attention and has become your chosen "event." You must next proceed 
to give the proper %nroM73t (in the sense of a descriptive portrait) of the 
event. To give the account of an event fully means to begin to under­
stand it. "Accounting" does not consist merely in providing a replica­
tion of the letter, article, etc. Rather, it consists of finding and providing 
as many as possible of the separate 77?.% 272 ro772po7ze77tr that produced the 
chosen event. (The list of such components, as you will see, is a 
metaphor not so very different from the list of active forces present in 
the creation of any work of scholarship, of literature, or of art.) Purely 
as a mnemonic device, let me represent the event E under study as a 
point in a plane, within orthogonal coordinates, the horizontal of 
which indicates time. E takes place at a given time t (or within an 
interval At) (Figure 1).
There are nine components which in principle make up the full 
account of any event E in the history of a science. It is unlikely that all 
nine can be described at once or by the same person engaged in the 
study of this case; but if an event becomes more fully understood by the 
profession as a whole, it is because more of the components have been 
brought in to contribute to the full account.
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time
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1. F in f  we TMM.st ertzti'/zyT? ztM ZMZzeMfory o/ti?e eowtempozwzeozzy ytztte o/* 
pMMe, yi?%?*rJ yeiezzti/ie zfzzow/ed^ 'e (itM J miyMM JerytztM Jmg or zgworztwee) o/t/ze 
yMiyeet ztt time t. What were the published "facts," data, theories, instru­
mental techniques, and widely believed laws and lore, whether or not 
they turned out later to have been correct? What did a scientist, or a 
group of them, believe to be the issue to be faced at a given time, the 
questions, the tools, indeed the scientihc challenges within which this 
documentary contribution was made? We can call it establishing the 
historical, publicly available state of science at t (as seen by the scientist 
in question at that time t).
If we do not do this hrst, we shall hnd it almost impossible to avoid 
the trap of ahistoricity. As a warning, consider the remark of a physicist, 
writing in a review in the journal MttMre, that it is an "old myth" that 
Boltzmann's constant and Avogadro's number were not reliably known 
before 1905. After all, the author says, Planck's published values in 1900 
for these constants, based on his theory of black-body radiation, dif­
fered by only 3 percent from today's value. But while this statement is 
true numerically, it is ahistorical, because in 1905, Planck's theory of 
radiation of 1900 was still widely ignored. A look at the handbooks 
of that day shows that these continued to print crude determinations of 
Avogadro's number while neglecting Planck's values.
2. N ext we tteeJ to eytztMiyi? ti?e roweeptMz?/ JeueicpmeMt q/"ti?e ptzMe 
^wow/ezige o/' % yrieMti/ir irzmti?, ti?e time trzt/eetozy o/ ti?e ytztte e /  pwMe
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("r/7Mre^ '^ ) yrwMt///r ^ Mow/r Jge /rM^ mg Mg to, %%J (/goyy/7/o go/wg we//^ eyoMt/, 
f/?e fzTMe t c/?oieM. The event E is now, as it were, seen to be a point on this 
line, in a plane in which the horizontal dimension signihes time and the 
vertical dimension, only quite qualitatively, indicates increasing under­
standing within a held of science (Figure 2).
This line is merely symbolic of the need to establish the concep­
tual antecedents. It is what Hans Reichenbach called the "context of 
justihcation" within which anything new will have to struggle for its 
place. Under this heading we would dehne the tradition or the area of 
controversy within which a scientist worked and expected his or her 
students to work. And we should also be able to trace the line beyond f, 
to get closer to the current scientihc interpretation of the encounter E 
at f. This tracing of "conceptual development" is one of the most 
frequent activities for historians of science and for historically inclined 
science educators.
This activity has the largest body of practitioners—it is relatively 
easy to do—and yet it harbors many dangers. Consider the example 
where the event E stands for the publication of Einstein's relativity 
paper of 190$ A Now the line going through E will have points that can 
be associated with the work of scientists before 1905, and for some 
years after 1905. Thus we would label one point on the line, corre­
sponding to 1873, as the publication of Maxwell's treatise. Higher on 
the curve and later in time would be points associated with Heinrich
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Hertz's experimental confirmation of Maxwell's electromagnetic 
theory, Michelson's experiment of 1881, Michelson and Morley's of 
1887, and the publications of H. A. Lorentz and Henri Poincare. 
And on points beyond 1905, we would place the publication of Walter 
Kaufmann of 1906, Max Planck's discussion of relativity in 1906, 
Minkowski's work of 1907, and so on.
This is how textbooks and some history of science courses deal 
with the development of relativity theory. But one must remember that 
this scheme is an artificial construction, one that imposes our current 
view of the "public" science during the period traced by the line. It has 
many flaws: First, it does not usually go back far enough—to be fair to 
the case, it should at least reach back to encompass the Galilean- 
Newtonian view on relativity, as well as Oersted's program of removing 
the didactic barriers between fields. Second, the usual tracing is in any 
case only a pedagogic, rationalized device, implying a linear, smoothed- 
out view of history, with one point or event on this curve seemingly 
influencing the next one in time causally and necessarily. In actual 
historic fact, nothing of this sort may have occurred. Rather, the inter­
esting question may sometimes be about the actual discontinuities 
between parts of the curve rather than the continuities from one point 
to the next.
But if one bewares the trap of believing such fallacies, a great 
usefulness emerges from this treatment: One is led to ask what an 
innovator in fact knew of the related, publicly available developments 
prior to time f.
3. With this we come to the third component or aspect of an 
event. What we have done above for the state of public scientific 
knowledge, we must now do for q/*
evr/zt E zzrwr t. That is to say, we must 
now study the less institutional, more ephemeral personal aspects of the 
scientific activity E at t. We are now looking, to the extent possible, at 
all material from the workshop and in the desk of a scientist at period 
f—the object that caught your attention in the first place, the surviving 
letters, drafts, personal laboratory notes, abandoned equipment, etc. 
For the sciences more than most other fields, these links to the past are 
fragile, making it difficult in many cases to provide the "context of 
discovery." In many of our universities, where every scrap of paper
from literary scholars seems welcome in the archives, it has been more 
difficult to find a home for scientific correspondence, laboratory rec­
ords, and apparatus.
Moreover, the need for documentation is not necessarily appreci­
ated or understood by the scientists themselves. Some are still at best 
impatient with such studies (as with the whole study of what they 
regard as the "merely personal"). There are evident sociological rea­
sons for that neglect and impatience. The very institutions of science, 
the selection and training of young scientists, and the internalized 
image of science are all designed to minimize attention to the personal 
scientific activity prior to publication. Indeed, the success of science as 
a shareable activity is connected with the conscious downplaying of the 
private struggle.
An example of a major scientist reconsidering the value of the 
past—now happily getting more common—is in the introductory 
paragraph of Richard P. Feynman's lecture on 11 December 1965, after 
having been awarded the Nobel Prize the previous dayA
We have a habit in writing articles published in scientific journals to 
make the work as finished as possible, to cover up all the tracks, to 
not worry about the blind alleys or to describe how you had the 
wrong idea first, and so on. So there isn't any place to publish, in a 
dignified manner, what you actually did in order to get to do the 
work, although there has been in these days some interest in this 
kind of thing. Since winning the prize is a personal thing, I thought I 
could be excused in this particular situation, if I were to talk per­
sonally about my relationship to quantum electrodynamics, rather 
than to discuss the subject itself in a refined and finished fashion. 
Furthermore, since there are three people who have won the prize in 
physics, if they are all going to be talking about quantum electro­
dynamics itself, one might become bored with the subject. So, what I 
would like to tell you about today is the sequence of events, really the 
sequence of ideas, which occurred, and by which I finally came out 
the other end with an unsolved problem for which I ultimately 
received a prize.
Another obstacle to ready access to documents that might reveal 
the "private" state of scientific knowledge, particularly in its nascent 
phase, is the apparent contradiction between the seemingly illogical
LMgnt<27!^27!{y o/"SocMcc Ml
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nature of actual personal discovery and the logical nature of well- 
developed scientific concepts. This opposition is perceived by some 
commentators as a threat to the very foundations of science and to 
rationality itself, whereas in fact one of the secrets of the success of the 
scientific method is the use of both of these tools during the formative 
phase of one's research.
In one of his interviews, Einstein urged historians of science to 
concentrate on comprehending what scientists were aiming at, "how 
they thought and wrestled with their problems." But he pointed out 
two difficulties. One was that the scholar would have to have sufficient 
insight and a kind of empathy (he called it a "FmgenpEze^g^^/"), 
both for the content of science and for the process of scientific 
research, the more so as solid facts about the creative phase are likely 
to be few. Second, Einstein advised that, as in physics itself, the 
solution to historical problems may have to come by very "indirect 
means," and the best outcome to be hoped for is not certainty but 
only a good probability of being "very likely correct anyway." Histo­
rians have come to see the arrogance of claiming that they can recon­
struct a historic event "as it really happened." We cannot attain 
absolute certainty, either in science or in the history of science. But in 
both cases one may succeed by taking informed, reasonable risks.
4. Hg%bz, rn'eMcg we TMMtf waxt hwe Irw/'er-
?07y o/* ge7T0M%/ Here we look for the
interests and accomplishments and failures of the persons involved over 
a large portion of their careers. It includes both the period of prepara­
tion, on one side of f, and the period of harvesting, on the other side. 
The work of an individual at t is seen with greater understanding if we 
have followed the development of his or her personal style prior to f. 
This second trajectory symbolizes the development of the private or 
personal science of the person responsible for the event F. Turning 
again to Einstein, we would identify a point for the year 1894-1895, 
when he wrote his first scientific essay (on the ether, based on reading 
Heinrich Hertz). Next we would follow his thought experiment at the 
age of about sixteen at school in Aarau in 1895-1896, then his reading 
of Ernst Mach and Hume and others, starting around 1897. Next, 
perhaps we would consider his confession of "despair" of trying to do
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fundamental physics from the experiential base upward, in 1900; and 
then the work leading to the publication of his various great papers in 
1905.
Now we can understand the event E as the intersection of tiro 
tr /^ortorier, one for what we call the private science, a line labeled , 
and one for the public science, to which trajectory we might give the 
symbol (Figure 3).
This point of view opens up immediately some new problems 
worth working on. One of these would be the acknowledged interac­
tion of and $2 , ^ th  the result that important new names would 
have to be added to the trajectory, such as the influence of August 
Foppl, who has usually been forgotten in the accounts of "conceptual 
development," but whose book greatly influenced Einstein as a young 
man. Another problem to consider would be the of much influ­
ence of a work that, while prominent on the profession's line, 
happened not to have been absorbed into the individual's S, line. This 
would apply to Lorentz's 1904 formulation of the theory of the elec­
tron, which Einstein hadn't read, and the Michelson-Morley experi­
ment, for which Einstein repeatedly, and consistently over many 
years, specified that it had at most an indirect, and certainly not a 
crucial, influence on him.
Now let me give an example of the importance of tracing the S', 
trajectory. When you read Einstein's early publications and the letters
t F?gK7*f 4
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in the archives, you see that the trajectory that brought him to the 
relativity theory in the miraculous spring of 1905 began in an appar­
ently unpromising way. Einstein's first published article (1901) was 
entitled "Consequences of the Capillarity Phenomena." For a very 
young man in need of a job and a career, this was a curious choice. At 
the time, all the excitement in physics lay in a quite different direction. 
It was just a few years after the discovery of X rays, radioactivity, and 
the electron. New experimental findings and new theories chased one 
another at a dizzying pace. In comparison, capillarity was an old and 
rather boring subject.
But if we study this paper more carefully, we discover something 
important. The problem to which Einstein is attending, in this first 
paper and in the next one, is "the problem of molecular forces." He 
starts with the promise to proceed from the simplest assumptions about 
the nature of molecular forces of attraction. In this work, he says, "I 
shall let myself be guided by analogy with gravitational forces." What 
interests him, as he writes in a letter to his friend Marcel Grossmann 
(14 April 1901), is "the question concerning the relationship of molecu­
lar forces with Newtonian forces at a distance." Now, that shows great 
ambition! Einstein's lifelong interest is making its first appearance here: 
the program of the unification of the various forces of nature. He felt he 
was working on an important problem. When he writes in that letter 
that "it is a magnificent feeling to recognize the unity of a complex of 
phenomena that to direct observation appear to be quite separate 
things," Einstein is but twenty-two years old; but it is already a familiar 
Einstein, here searching for bridges between the phenomena of micro­
physics and macrophysics.
Now let us look again at those major papers of 1905, which 
Einstein sent off to the at intervals of less than eight
weeks. When I first became interested in this case, it struck me that 
while the papers—on the quantum theory of light, on Brownian move­
ment, and on relativity theory—seemed to be in quite different fields, 
the letter to Conrad Habicht I referred to earlier shows that it may have 
been no accident that they were all done at about the same time. In fact, 
all can be traced in good part to the same general problem, namely, 
fluctuation phenomena. Indeed, in the archives I found a letter Einstein 
wrote to Max von Laue in 1952 in which the connection is indicated.
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Einstein discusses there the new edition of von Laue's old textbook on 
relativity theory and registers an objection:
When one goes through your account of verifications of the special 
relativity theory, one gets the impression Maxwell's theory was 
unchallengeable. But already in 1905 I knew with certainty that 
Maxwell's theory leads to wrong fluctuations in radiation pressure, 
and hence to an incorrect Brownian movement of a mirror [sus­
pended in] a Planckian radiation cavity. In my opinion, one cannot 
get around ascribing to radiation an objective atomistic structure, 
which of course does not fit into the framework of Maxwell's 
theory.
Here we see explicitly the chief connection between Einstein's 
work on Brownian motion of suspended particles, the quantum struc­
ture of radiation, and his more general reconsideration of "the electro­
magnetic foundations of physics" itself. In short, to understand the 
relativity event E, we need to understand it as part of a more extensive 
research program.
Moreover, the style of the separate papers, despite their seemingly 
diverse topics, is essentially the same. Contrary to the sequence one 
finds in many of the best essays of that time, for example, in H. A. 
Lorentz's publications on electromagnetic phenomena, Einstein does 
not start with a review of a puzzle posed by some new and difhcult-to- 
understand experimental fact. Rather, he begins in each case with a 
statement of his dissatisfaction with what he perceives to be formal 
asymmetries or other incongruities (which, to other eyes, must have 
seemed to be predominantly of an aesthetic nature rather than of sci­
entific importance). He then proposes a principle of great generality— 
one that applies to apparently different parts of physics. Third, he 
shows that this principle helps remove, as one of the deduced conse­
quences, his initial dissatisfaction. And fourth, at the end of each paper 
he proposes a small number of predictions that should be experimen­
tally verifiable.
To review: we have traced two lines, two trajectories, one for public 
science and one for private science; and the event that interests us at a
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given time begins to be understood as an onrMrrewf ;72te7Tftho72 &/*
tzro We now need to indicate at least briefly the tracing
of other strands, the first of which is intertwined with .
$. Here I refer to the Jevr/opTMCMt of the
scientist under study. The special case of psychobiography is a new and 
uncertain held, but we have begun to get good material, such as Frank 
Manuel's and R. S. Westfall's on Isaac Newton, and Erik Erikson's on 
young Einstein.
6. Another component of a scientific event is its jon'%/ yrtt/hg, for 
example, the effect of the educational system on the preparation of 
scientists in different countries. A case in point is the reception given to 
the relativity theory in its early years in Germany, Britain, France, and 
the United States. The differences were enormous during the first 
decade or two, and a large part of the explanation is found in the 
differences of the educational systems. For example, in Britain, the 
preparation of physicists concentrated heavily on the properties of 
the ether, making it difficult for many of them to break away from that 
concept. In France, the hierarchical and pyramidal structure of the 
profession was such that the opposition of Henri Poincare, the premier 
scientist in his time, to Einstein's relativity made it very unadvisable for 
anyone to publish in this field until after Poincare's death in 1912. In 
Germany, the fierce competition between autonomous universities 
(rather than, as in France, the primacy of one university in the country) 
assured a variety of lively responses. And in the United States, the 
pragmatic style of understanding the science permitted a surprisingly 
early acceptance of relativity (though many were under the impression 
that it was fully supported from the beginning by an experimental 
base).
Under the same heading of sociological setting, we should also 
look into the role played in a scientific advance by such effects as that of 
teamwork in science; the link between academic scientific research and 
research of interest to industry or the military; and the system for 
funding research. It would be difficult, for example, to understand the 
burgeoning of physics research in the United States in the 1920s
H7
without paying attention to the role which the grants and policies of 
private philanthropic foundations such as the Rockefeller and the Gug­
genheim played at that time. Foundations financed a large fraction of 
American (and indeed foreign) physicists studying and doing research 
during the explosive growth of quantum physics. By doing so they 
helped to create a "critical mass" of scientists whose choice and pace of 
research were quite different from what they would have been without 
their grants.
7. A seventh strand deals with the Jeue/opw^y out­
side science and the 2Jeo/ogrh?/ rKrreMty or po/zhh?/ fwwfy that influence 
the work of scientists. Obvious cases spring to mind: the link such 
scientists as Galileo, Kepler, and Newton saw between science and 
theology; the link between politics and science in such cases as that of 
Lysenko, or of the German physicists under the influence of fascism 
from the 1920s on. But the point is more general, and sometimes the 
subject of continuing debate. One of these is the case of quantum 
mechanics; some years ago, a science historian speculated whether 
developments in the German intellectual environment, including the 
vogue then enjoyed by Oswald Spengler's book 7%e Der/we 0 /^  
and the rise of revolutionary ideologies, may have prepared some 
German scientists to abandon the classical principle of causality in the 
1920s.
Both this strand and the previously noted influence of the social 
setting can be so attractive to some students of the history of science 
that they might be tempted to see all cases as the result of those 
components alone—an extreme form of the "constructivist" approach. 
This is as limited a view as its polar opposite—which is narrowly 
"internalist," focused only on the published product of a scientist's 
labors.
8 . In certain cases the work under study may well be illuminated 
by an analysis of the philosophical component, particularly of the 
yM^ poy/ho^ y /ogm?/ yfrMftMre. The philosophical
worldview of a scientist surely is as important as, for example, his 
understanding of the mathematical tools of his trade. I am thinking
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here of how Einstein confessed to having been influenced by his read­
ing of David Hume and Ernst Mach, or of R. A. Millikan's robust belief 
in the reality of atoms despite the anti-atomistic teaching of his doctor­
ate supervisor, Michael Pupin, and of others at the time. Or consider 
that in Germany, and practically nowhere else, the early discussions of 
quantum mechanics were heavily penetrated by quasi-metaphysical 
debates on —questions on how far scientific concepts
can depart from visualizable intuitions—which stemmed chiefly from 
the hold on German intellectuals of ideas derived from their early 
reading of Immanuel Kant.
9. So far, we have a list of eight components that in principle can 
be discerned in the activities from which a given event arises. Last but 
not least, I turn to the ninth tool for the analysis of a scientific work, 
which I have termed By this I refer to the often
unconfessed or unconscious guiding presupposition a scientist adopts 
being forced to do so by either data or current theory. An 
example is Heisenberg's decision to establish a physics built on the 
thema of discontinuity—thereby freeing physics from what he called, 
in a letter to Pauli of January 1925, the "swindle" of working with a 
mixture of quantum rules and classical physics, as Bohr and Sommer- 
feld still preferred. This decision of Heisenberg's led in turn to his 
abandoning the customary visualization by which phenomena were 
thought to be in principle continuous.
Another, and opposite, example of the role of a thematic presup­
position is found in Einstein's outburst to Max Born (3 December 
1947), briefly mentioned in Chapter 3. Despite the great initial success 
of quantum theory, Einstein was obstinately opposed to acceptance of 
the fundamentality of probability. And so he wrote:
I cannot substantiate my attitude of physics in such a manner that 
you would find it in any way rational. I see of course that the 
statistical interpretation. . .  has a considerable content of truth, [but]
I am absolutely convinced that one will eventually arrive at a theory 
in which the objects connected by law are not probabilities but facts 
processed by thought, as one took for granted only a short time ago. 
However, I cannot provide logical arguments for my conviction, but
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can only call on my little Anger as a witness, which cannot claim any 
authority to be respected outside my own skin.?
As we shall see in detail, a few such presuppositions guided Ein­
stein throughout his scientific life. The embrace of such themata ex­
plains in specific cases why a scientist will try to continue his or her 
work in a given direction even in the face of ambiguous or contradic­
tory evidence, or why one will refuse to accept theories that are well 
supported by correlation with phenomena but are based on opposing 
thematic presuppositions.
As shown by Einstein's reluctance to accept probability, and by 
Galileo's refusal to abandon the circle (Chapter 4), thematic presupposi­
tions, in themselves not verifiable or falsifiable, can lead one astray if 
they are held too long against mounting evidence against them. But at 
least in the nascent phase of scientific work, thematic presuppositions— 
which Einstein referred to as freely chosen "categories or schemes of 
thought"—are necessary for most scientists, whether they are used 
consciously or not. We shall elaborate on these important points in 
Chapter 7.
The realization of the thematic origins of scientific thought has 
corrected an appealing but simplistic notion about scientific method 
that was current in earlier times, and still infects some pedagogic 
presentations—the notion that the individual scientist always must, 
and can, start out utterly free from all preconceptions, somewhat as 
Thomas H. Huxley still thought possible:
Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner 
the great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of 
entire surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little 
child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow 
humbly wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall 
learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind 
since I have resolved at all risks to do this.8
What does save science from falling victim to inappropriate pre­
suppositions are of course the chastening roles both of the coordina­
tion with experiment and of the multiple cross-check of any finding 
by other scientists who may have started with quite different presup­
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positions. That is why it is now generally thought that Bohr, contrary 
to Einstein, was right in accepting the thema of fundamental proba- 
bilism at the base of atomic theory. Hence, as Dirac pungently put it, 
"At the present time, one must say that, according to Heisenberg's 
quantum mechanics, we must accept the Bohr interpretation. Any 
student who is working for an exam must adopt this interpretation if 
he is to be successful in his exams.But then Dirac added a warning 
that one cannot predict which of two antithetical themata will win out 
in the long run:
Once he has passed his exams, he may think more freely about it, 
and then he may be inclined to feel the force of Einstein's argu­
ment. . . .  It seems clear that the present quantum mechanics is not 
in its final form.. . .  Some day a new quantum mechanics, a rela­
tivistic one, will be discovered, in which we will not have these 
infinities occurring at all. It might very well be that the new 
quantum mechanics will have determinism in the way that Einstein 
wanted . . .  even though for the time being physicists have to accept 
the Bohr probability interpretation, especially if they have exam­
inations in front of them.
In sum, the full understanding of a significant event in the history 
of science requires, to start with, a description and analysis of the event 
in terms of the nine components laid out here. Since scholarship in the 
history of science is a communal, collaborative effort, as is science itself, 
each scholar may be privileged to contribute only a few of these compo­
nents to a few of the significant events. But in time, the depth of 
understanding grows by the overlap of these individual contributions. 
When a historian of science has achieved at least a partial "understand­
ing" of many events (E^ E2 , E3 . . .) scattered through time, it becomes 
possible for that person to achieve an understanding of the held at a 
second level, in a more profound way. between individual
events begin to appear, analogous to understanding connecting routes 
found on a map. One may learn, for example, that Ernest Rutherford 
and Enrico Fermi, working in different countries on rather different 
problems, nevertheless influenced each other's work at a crucial period. 
And of course an event E, in the life of a given scientist can have 
profound and complex relationships with the event E2  in the same
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scientist's later work. An instance is how Niels Bohr's papers of 1913 on 
the structure of atoms already contained the seed of his announcement 
of complementarity in 1927. Other examples of discovering strands in 
the dense network of connections that represent the living body of 
history of science will emerge from our study, focusing chiefly on the 
publications and influence of Albert Einstein, in what follows.

L E A R N I N G  
F R O M  E I N S T E I N

E I N S T  E I N ' S 
O N  T H E  C 
O U R
I N F L U E N C E  
U L T U R E  O F  
T I M E
A MAJOR SCIENTIFIC ADVANCE can have a transforming effect on an 
entire era, on ail aspects of a culture. There are excellent studies on the 
profound influence Newton's triumphs in mechanics and optics had on 
artists, scholars, and political thinkers for well over a century, ranging 
from British poets and French philosophers to the eighteenth-century 
American statesmen whose knowledge of ideas in Newton's PyiMnpM of 
1687 is reflected in the Constitution of the United States. A similar case 
of far-reaching transformation, felt to this day, is that of James Watt's 
critical improvement of the steam engine in the 1760s, and its role in 
helping to launch an industrial revolution which in turn changed the 
social, economic, intellectual, and ideological bases of life throughout 
much of the world.
Einstein's scientific publications, especially the early ones on rela­
tivity, statistical mechanics, and quantum physics in the first two dec­
ades of the twentieth century, also caused remarkable and sometimes 
quite unforeseen cultural transformations and resonances. As we turn 
to study this case example, we look first at Einstein's influence on the 
course of science itself, and then on the rest of the culture of our time.
SCIENCE
Within physics, there was no immediate recognition of the transform­
ing nature of Einstein's early papers. Six years elapsed after the hrst 
publication of the special theory of relativity before it had established 
itself sufficiently to merit a textbook (Max von Laue's
1911), and for some years after that the theory continued 
to be confused by most scientists with the electrodynamics of H. A. 
Lorentz. Einstein's ideas on quantum physics, published from 1905 
on, were also generally neglected or discounted for years. R. A. Milli­
kan, on accepting his Nobel Prize for 1925, confessed that the validity 
of Einstein's "bold, not to say reckless" explanation of the photo­
electric effect forced itself on him slowly, "after ten years of testing. . .  
[and] contrary to my own expectation." The transcripts of the ques­
tions raised in scientific meetings in the decade after 1905 demon­
strated the large intellectual effort required at the time to enter fully 
into the meaning of the new physics.
But in time, the modern mind opened itself to the counterintuitive 
ideas. Today, virtually every student who wishes to can learn at least the 
elements of relativity or quantum physics before leaving high school, 
and the imprint of Einstein's work on the different areas of physical 
science is so large and varied that a scientist who tries to trace it would 
be hard put to know where to start. A modern dictionary of scientific 
terms contains thirty-five entries bearing his name, from "Einstein: A 
unit of light energy used in photochemistry" and "Einstein-Bose statis­
tics" to "Einstein tensor" and "Einstein viscosity equation."* It is ironic 
that now, many decades after his death, there is in many branches of the 
physical sciences more awareness of his generative role than would 
have been credited during the last twenty years of his life. His ideas 
became essential for laying out conceptual paths for contemporary 
work in astronomy or cosmology, in unifying gravitation with the 
quantum field theory of gauge fields, or even for understanding new 
observations that were not possible in his time but were predicted by 
him (as in his 1956 paper which deduced that the gravitational effect of 
galaxies should act like optical lenses on light).
Apart from changing science itself, Einstein has reached into the 
daily life of virtually everyone in direct or indirect ways through the 
incorporation of his ideas on physics into a vast range of technical
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devices and processes. I need cite only some of the most obvious 
ones. Every photoelectric cell can be considered one of his intellectual 
grandchildren. Hence, we are in his debt whenever photo emission or 
absorption is used, in the home or on the job, to capture an image by 
means of a television camera, or to project the optical soundtrack of a 
motion picture, or to set the page of a book or newspaper by photo­
composition, or to make a telephone call over hber cable. In each of 
these cases, if a law required a label on every appliance giving its 
intellectual pedigree, such a display would list prominently: "Einstein, 
17 (1905), pp. 132-148; 20 (1906), pp. 199-206," 
etc.
One would find a label of this sort also on the laser, whose beam 
was used to lay out the highway on which one travels to the office, or 
to site the building itself, or to scan the bar code on a store pur­
chase ("Einstein, 18 (1917), pp. 121-28," etc.).
Or again, the same applies if one lists key ideas that helped to make 
possible modern electric machinery, such as power generators, or pre­
cision clocks that allow the course of planes and ships to be charted. 
Einstein appears also, if one looks for the ancestry of the ideas, in 
quantum and statistical physics, by which solid-state devices operate, 
from calculators and computers to the transistor radio and the car's 
ignition system; and once more, even when one takes one's vitamin pill 
or other pharmaceutical drug, for it is likely that its commercial pro­
duction involved diffusion processes, first explained in Einstein's papers 
on Brownian movement and statistical mechanics ("Einstein, 
JfrPPyr;* 17 (1905), pp. 549-560," etc.).
As Edward M. Purcell has remarked, since the magnetism set up 
by electric currents is a strictly relativistic effect, derivable from Cou­
lomb's law of electrostatics and the kinematics of relativity, and nothing 
more, it requires no elaboration to discuss "special relativity in engi­
neering": "This is the way the world it. And it does not really take 
gigavolts or nanoseconds to demonstrate it; stepping on the starter will 
do it! "2 It is not much to say that even in our most common experi­
ences, unworldly theoretician's publications help to explain what hap­
pens to us all day—indeed, from the moment we open our eyes to the 
light of the morning, since the act of seeing is initiated by a photo­
chemical reaction ("Einstein, /f7272%/cM 37 (1912), pp. 832-
838; 38 (1912), pp. 881-884," etc.).
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PHILOSOPHY
The proverbial man on the street is quite blissfully ignorant of all that, 
and has preferred to remain so, even while expecting fully that, myste­
riously yet automatically, a stream of practical, benign "spin-offs" con­
tinues from the pursuit of pure science. But the philosopher, the writer, 
the artist, and many others outside the scientific laboratories could not 
help but be caught up to some extent by the wave that spread beyond 
science and technology, at first slowly, then with astonishing intensity. 
As the best scientists were coming to understand what Einstein had 
done, the trumpets began to sound. Even Max Planck, a person conser­
vative in thought and expression, enthused by 1912: "This new way of 
thinking. .. well surpasses in daring everything that has been achieved 
in speculative scientific research, even in the theory of knowledge. .. . 
This revolution in the physical brought about by the
relativity principle, is to be compared in scope and depth only with that 
caused by the introduction of the Copernican system of the world. "3 At 
the same time, on the other end of the philosophical spectrum, the 
followers and heirs of Ernst Mach rushed to embrace relativity as a 
model triumph of positivistic philosophy. In the inaugural session of 
the Gesellschaft fur Positivistische Philosophic in Berlin (11 Novem­
ber 1912), relativity was interpreted as an antimetaphysical and instru­
mentalist conception, and was hailed as "a mighty impulse for the 
development of the philosophical point of view of our time." When in 
London on 6  November 1919 the result of the British eclipse expedi­
tion was revealed to bear out one of the predictions of general relativity 
theory, the discussion of implications rose to fever pitch among 
scholars and laymen, beginning with declarations such as that in T& 
of London ( 8  November 1919): the theory had served "to over­
throw the certainty of ages, and to require a new philosophy, a philoso­
phy that will sweep away nearly all that has hitherto been accepted as 
the axiomatic basis of physical thought." It became evident that, as 
Newton had "demanded the muse" after the PnMfipM, now it would be 
Einstein's turn.
In fact, Einstein did his best to defuse the euphoria and excess of 
attention that engulfed and puzzled him from that time on. WTen 
asked to explain the mass enthusiasm, his answer in 1921 was that "it 
seemed psychopathological." The essence of the theory was chiefly
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"the logical simplicity with which it explained apparently conRicting 
facts in the operation of natural law," freeing science of the burden of 
"many general assumptions of a complicated nature. "4 That was all. As 
for being labeled a great revolutionary by his friends and opponents 
alike, Einstein took every opportunity to disavow the designation. He 
saw himself essentially as a continuist, had specihc ideas on the way 
scientific theory developed by evolution/ and attempted to keep the 
discussion limited to work done and yet to be done in science. He did 
not get much help, however. Thus, the physicist J. J. Thomson re­
ported that the archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, had been 
told by Lord Haldane "that relativity was going to have a great effect 
upon theology, and that it was his duty as Head of the English Church 
to make himself acquainted with it . . .. The Archbishop, who is the 
most conscientious of men, has procured several books on the subject 
and has been trying to read them, and they have driven him to what it is 
not too much to say is a state of Jespenzfz'oM." On Einstein's
first visit to England in June 1921, the archbishop of Canterbury 
therefore sought him out to ask what effect relativity would have on 
religion. Einstein replied briefly and to the point: "None. Relativity is a 
purely scientific matter and has nothing to do with religion. " 6  But of 
course this did not dispose of the question. Later that year, even the 
scientific journal NzztMre felt it necessary to print opposing articles on 
whether "Einstein's space-time is the death knell of materialism."?
Although the crest of the Rood, and the worst excesses, have now 
passed, debates on Einstein's pervasive cultural inRuence continue. 
More constructively, since philosophy is concerned in good part with 
the nature of space and time, causality, and other conceptions to which 
relativity and quantum physics have contributed, Einstein has had to be 
dealt with in the pages of philosophers, from Henri Bergson and A. N. 
Whitehead to the latest issues of the professional journals. As John 
Passmore observed, it appeared in this century that "physics fell heir to 
the responsibility of metaphysics. " 8
Some philosophers have confessed that Einstein's work started 
them off on their speculations in the Rrst place, thus giving some 
direction to their very careers. One example was Karl Popper, who in 
his autobiography revealed that his "falsiRcation criterion" (as noted in
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Chapter 3) originated in his interpretation of a passage in Einstein's 
popular exposition of relativity, which Popper said he read with pro­
found effect when he was still in his teens.
Philosophy was no doubt destined to be the most obvious and 
often the earliest and most appropriate held, outside science itself, to 
show the influence of Einstein's work. But soon there were others, even 
though the connections made or asserted were not always valid. From 
Einstein's wide-ranging output, relativity was invoked most frequently. 
Cultural anthropology, in Claude Levi-Strauss's phrase, had evolved 
the doctrine of cultural relativism "out of a deep feeling of respect 
toward other cultures than our own"; but this doctrine often invited 
confusion with physical relativity. Much that has been written on 
"ethical relativity" and on "relativism" is based on a seductive but 
misleading play with words. And some art critics have helped to keep 
alive the idea of a connection between the visual arts and Einstein's 
1905 publication.
VISUAL ARTS
Here again, Einstein protested when he could and, as so often, without 
effect. One art historian submitted to him a draft of an essay entitled 
"Cubism and the Theory of Relativity," which argued for such a 
connection—for example, that in both fields "attention was paid to 
relationships, and allowance was made for the simultaneity of several 
views. "9 Politely but firmly, Einstein tried to put him straight, and he 
explained the difference between physical relativity and vulgar relativ­
ism so succinctly as to invite an extensive quotation:
The essence of the theory of relativity has been incorrectly under­
stood in [your paper], granted that this error is suggested by the 
attempts at popularization of the theory. For the description of a 
given state of facts one uses almost always only one system of 
coordinates. The theory says only that the general laws are such that 
their form does not depend on the choice of the system of coordi­
nates. This logical demand, however, has nothing to do with how the 
single, specific case is represented. A multiplicity of systems of 
coordinates is not needed for its representation. It is completely
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sufficient to describe the whole mathematically in relation to one 
system of coordinates.
This is quite different in the case of Picasso's painting, as I do 
not have to elaborate any further. Whether, in this case, the repre­
sentation is felt as artistic unity depends, of course, upon the artistic 
antecedents of the viewer. This new artistic "language" has nothing 
in common with the Theory of Relativity.
Einstein might well have added here, as he did elsewhere, that the 
existence of a multiplicity of frames, each one as good as the next for 
solving some problems in mechanics, went back to the seventeenth 
century (Galilean relativity). As to the superposition of different aspects 
of an object on a canvas, that had been done for a long time; thus the 
eighteenth-century Italian painter Canaletto drew various parts of a set 
of buildings from different places and merged them in a combined view 
on the painting (for example, in & & GiowMm c P%o/o).
It was therefore doubly wrong to invoke Einstein as authority in 
support of the widespread misunderstanding that physical relativity 
meant that all frameworks, points of view, narrators, fragments of plot, 
or thematic elements are created equal, that each of the polyphonic 
reports and contrasting perceptions is as valid or expedient as any other, 
and that all of these, when piled together or juxtaposed, P^owoM-like, 
somehow constitute the real truth. If anything, twentieth-century rela­
tivistic physics has taught the contrary: that under certain conditions 
we can extract from different reports, or even from the report originat­
ing in one frame properly identified, all the laws of physics, each 
applicable in any framework, each having therefore an invariant mean­
ing, one that does not depend on the accident of which frame one 
inhabits. It is for this reason that, by comparison with classical physics, 
modern relativity is simple, universal, and, one may even say, "abso­
lute." The cliche became, erroneously, "everything is relative"; whereas 
the point is that out of the vast flux one can distill the very opposite: 
"some things are invariant."
The cost of the terminological confusion has been so great that a 
brief elaboration on this point will be relevant. Partly because he saw 
himself as a continuist rather than as an iconoclast, Einstein was reluc­
tant to present this new work as a new theory. The term "relativity 
theory," which made the confusions in the long run more likely, was
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imposed on Einstein's early work by Planck and Abraham in 1906. For 
a time Einstein referred to it in print as the "so-called relativity theory," 
and until 1911 he avoided using the term altogether in the titles of his 
papers on the subject. In his correspondence Einstein seemed happier 
with the term , which is of course much more true to
its method and aim. How much nonsense we might have been spared 
if Einstein had adopted that term, even with all its shortcomings! To 
a correspondent who suggested just such a change, Einstein replied 
(letter to E. Zschimmer, 30 September 1921): "Now to the name rela­
tivity theory. I admit that it is unfortunate, and has given occasion to 
philosophical misunderstandings.. . .  The description you proposed 
would perhaps be better; but I believe it would cause confusion to 
change the generally accepted name after all this time."
LITERATURE
To come back to Einstein's careful disavowal of a substantive link be­
tween modern art and relativity: Far from abandoning the quest for it, 
his correspondent forged onward enthusiastically and published three 
such essays instead of one. Newton did not always fare better at the 
hands of eighteenth-century literati and divines who thought they were 
only following in his footsteps. Poets rush in where scientists fear to 
tread. And why not, if the apparent promises are so great? In April 
1921, at the height of what Einstein on his hrst journey to the United 
States all too easily diagnosed as a pathological mass reaction, William 
Carlos Williams published a poem entitled "St. Francis Einstein of the 
Daffodils,"'* containing such lines as "April Einstein /  . . . has come 
among the daffodils /  shouting /  that Rowers and men / were created /  
relatively equal. . . ." Furthermore, declaring simply that "relativity 
applies to everything"" and that "relativity gives us the clue. . . . So, 
again, mathematics comes to the rescue of the arts," Williams felt 
encouraged to adopt a new variable measure for his poems—calling it 
"a stable foot, not a rigid one""—that proved of considerable
inRuence on other poets.
Williams was of course not alone. Robert Frost, Archibald Mac- 
Leish, e. e. cummings, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, and some of their 
disciples (and outside the English-speaking world, others such as
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Thomas Mann and Hermann Broch) referred directly to Einstein or to 
his physics. Some were repelled by the vision thought to be opened by 
the new science, but there were at least as many who seemed to be in 
sympathy with Jean-Paul Sartre's remark that "the theory of relativity 
applies in full to the universe of fiction."^ Perhaps the most cheerful of 
the attempts to harness science and literature to common purpose is 
Lawrence Durrell's entertaining set of novels, vl/ejMyzJrM QzMvtft, 
of which its author says by way of preface: "Modern literature offers us 
no Unities, so I have turned to science and am trying to complete a 
four-decker novel whose form is based on the relativity proposition. 
Three sides of space and one of time constitute the soupmix recipe of a 
continuum."^ The intention is to use the properties of space and time 
as determining models for the structure of the book. Durrell says, "The 
first three parts .. . are to be deployed spatially. . . and are not linked in 
a serial form. . .. The fourth part alone will represent time and be a true 
sequel."
For that alone one would not have had to wait for Einstein. But 
more seems to be hoped for; that, and the level of understanding, is 
indicated by the sayings of the character Pursewarden in the novel. 
Pursewarden—meant to be one of the foremost writers in the English 
language, his death mask destined to be placed near those of Keats and 
Blake—is quoted as saying, "In the Space and Time marriage we have 
the greatest Boy meets Girl story of the age. To our great­
grandchildren this will be as poetical a union as the ancient Greek 
marriage of Cupid and Psyche seems to us." Moreover, "the Relativity 
proposition was directly responsible for abstract painting, atonal music, 
and formless . .. literature."^
Throughout the novel it is evident that Durrell has taken the 
trouble to read up on relativity, but chiefly out of impressionistic 
popularizations such as Mystcrzom* UTHL'ensY by James Jeans, even 
though Durrell readily confessed that "none of these attempts has been 
very successful." There is something touching and, from the point of 
view of an intellectual historian, even a bit tragic about the attempt. In 
his study yd Key to MoJorrz Frzttf/z Poetry, Durrell revealed his valid 
concern to show that as a result of "the far-reaching changes in man's 
ideas" about the outer and inner universe, "language has undergone a 
change in order to keep in line with cosmological inquiry (of which it 
forms a part)."is Yet on page after page the author demonstrates that he
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has been misled by the simplifications of H. V Routh and James Jeans; 
he believes that Rutherford and Soddy suggested that the "ultimate 
laws of nature were not simply causal at all," that "Einstein's theory 
joined up subject and object," that "sofar as phenomena are concerned 
. . .  the uniformity of nature disappears," and so forth.^ The terrible 
but clarifying remark of Wolfgang Pauli comes to mind, who said about 
a theory that seemed to him doomed: "It is not even wrong."
I have spelled out some of the misunderstandings by which Einstein's 
work, for better or worse, has been thought to have found its way into 
twentieth-century culture. But the examples of incorrect interpretation 
prepare us to appreciate the correct ones that much more. I should 
confess that my own favorite example of the successful transmutation of 
scientifically based conceptions in the writer's imagination is to be 
found in a novel, and a controversial one. William Faulkner's .SoMTiJ 
is more like an earthquake than a book. Immediately on 
publication in 1929 it caused universal scandal; for example, not until 
Judge Curtis Bok's decision in 1949 was this, among Faulkner's other 
novels, allowed to be sold in Philadelphia.
On the surface it seems unlikely that this book—even a friendly 
reviewer characterized it as "designedly a silo of compressed sin"— 
has any resonance with the ideas of modern physics, by intent or 
otherwise. At the time he poured himself into the book, Faulkner was 
still almost unknown, largely self-taught, eking out a living as a 
carpenter, hunter, and coal carrier on the night shift of a power 
station, using as his desk the upturned wheelbarrow on which he 
would write while kneeling on the floor. Yet even there he was not 
isolated, if he read only a small part of the flood of articles in news­
papers, periodicals, and popular books in the 1920s that dealt with the 
heady concepts of relativity theory—such as the time dilation a clock 
traveling through space undergoes, or the necessity of recognizing the 
meaninglessness of absolute time and space—and the recent quantum 
physics, with its denial of the comforts of classical causality. Partic­
ularly in America, Einstein was quoted down to the level of local 
evening papers and AiecFymA, resulting in wide circulation of
such haunting epigrams as his remark, made in exasperation to Max 
Born (1926), that "God does not throw dice."
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Could any of this have reached Faulkner?
In the second of the four chapters of 71?c Soz/Mj Fzzzy we
follow Quentin Compson of Jefferson, Mississippi, as he lives through 
a day in June 1910. It is the end of his freshman year at college and the 
culmination of a short life wrenched by the degeneration and guilt, the 
fixations and tribal racism, of his haunted family—from his father, 
Jason, drinking himself to death, to his feeble-minded brother Ben­
jamin, whose land has been sold to send Quentin to college. The only 
resource of human affection Quentin has known came from black 
laborers and servants, although they have been kept in a centuries- 
old state of terror, ignorance, and obeisance. But the Compsons are 
doomed. As the day unfolds, Quentin moves toward the suicide he 
knows he will commit at midnight.
It is all too easy to discover theological and Freudian motives 
woven into the text, and one must not without provocation drag an 
author into the physics laboratory for cross-examination when he has 
already suffered through interrogations at the altar and on the couch. 
But Faulkner asked for it. Let me select here from a much more 
extensive body of evidence in the novel itself.
Quentin's last day on earth is a struggle against the Bow of time. 
He attempts to stem the Bow, Brst by deliberately breaking the glass 
cover of the pocket watch passed down to him from grandfather and 
father, then twisting off the hands of the watch, and then launching on 
seemingly random travel, by streetcar and on foot, across the entire 
city. His odyssey brings him to the shop of an ominous, cyclopean 
watch repairer. Quentin forbids the man to tell him what time it is, but 
asks if any of the watches in the shop window "are right." The answer 
he gets is "No." But wherever he then turns, all day and into the night, 
he encounters chimes, bells ringing the quarter-hours, a factory whis­
tle, a clock in the Unitarian steeple, the long, mournful sound of a train 
tracing its trajectory in space and time, "dying away, as though it were 
running through another month." Even his stomach is a kind of space- 
time metronome: "The business of eating inside of you space too space 
and time confused stomach says noon brain says eat o'clock All right I 
wonder what time it is what of it." Throughout, Quentin carries the 
blinded watch with him, the watch that never knew how to tell real time 
and cannot even tell relative time. But it is not dead: "I took out my 
watch and listened to it clicking away, not knowing it could not even
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lie."2" And in the streetcar, the clicking away of time is audible to him 
only while the car has come to a stop.
Quentin has taken a physics course that freshman year and uses it 
to calculate the poundage of the weights he needs to buy to drown 
himself. It is, he says wryly to himself, "the only application of Har­
vard," and as he reflects on it: "The displacement of water is equal to 
the something of something. Reductio absurdum of all human experi­
ence, and two six-pound Hat-irons weigh more than one tailor's goose. 
What a sinful waste, Dilsey would say. Benjy knew it when Damuddy 
died. He cried."
As midnight approaches, before he is ready to put his "hand on the 
light switch" for the last time,2 1 Quentin is overcome by torment 
caused by the shameful memory of his incestuous love for his sister 
Candace, by her loss, and by his own sense of loss even of the mean- 
ingfnlness of that double betrayal. In anguish he remembers his father's 
terrible prediction after he had made his confession:
You cannot bear to think that some day it will no longer hurt you like 
this now were getting at i t . . .  you wont do it under these conditions 
it will be a gamble and the strange thing is that man who is conceived 
by accident and whose every breath is a fresh cast with dice already 
loaded against him will not face that final main which he knows 
beforehand he has assuredly to face without essaying expedients . . .  
that would not deceive a child until some day in very disgust he risks 
everything on a single blind turn of a card no man ever does that 
under the first fury of despair or remorse or bereavement he does it 
only when he has realized that even the despair or remorse or 
bereavement is not particularly important to the dark diceman . . .  it 
is hard believing to think that a love or a sorrow is a bond purchased 
without design and which matures willynilly and is recalled without 
warning to be replaced by whatever issue the gods happen to be 
floating at the time.
This was not the God Newton had given to his time—Newton, of 
whom, just two centuries before Faulkner's soaring outcry, the poet 
James Thomson had sung in 1729 that "the heavens are all his own, 
from the wide role of whirling vortices, and circling spheres, to their 
great simplicity restored." Nor, of course, was it Einstein's God, a God 
whose laws of nature are both the testimony of His presence in the
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universe and the proof of its saving rationality. But this, it seems to me, 
dehnes the dilemma precisely. If the poet neither settles for the relief of 
half-understood analogies nor can advance to an honest understanding 
of the rational structure of that modern world picture, and if he is 
sufhciently sensitive to this impotency, he must rage against what is left 
him: Time and space are then without meaning; so is the journey 
through them; so is grief itself, when the very gods are playing games of 
chance, and all the sound and the fury signify nothing. And this leads to 
recognizing the way out of the dilemma, at least for a few. At best, as in 
the case of Faulkner, this rage itself creates the energy needed for a 
grand fusion of the literary imagination with perhaps only dimly per­
ceived scientific ideas. There are writers and artists of such inherent 
power that the ideas of science they may be using are dissolved, like all 
other externals, and rearranged in their own glowing alchemical caul­
dron.
It should not, after all, surprise us; it has always happened this way. 
Dante and Milton did not use the cosmological ideas of their time as 
tools to demarcate the allowed outline or content of their imaginative 
constructs. Those students of ours who, year after year, write dutifully 
more or less the same essay, explaining the structure of the 
CwwJy or P%7*%J2re Lott by means of astronomy, geography, and the 
theory of optical phenomena—they may get the small points right, but 
they miss the big one, which is that the good poet is a poet surely 
because he can transcend rather than triangulate. In Faulkner, in Eliot's 
7%e L2272J, in Woolf's 77?r IUmcs*, in Mann's Ai%g2<r AT22 72222272, it is
futile to judge whether the traces of modern physics are good physics or 
bad, for these trace elements have been used in the making of a new 
alloy. It is one way of understanding Faulkner's remark on accepting his 
Nobel Prize in 1950: The task was "to make out of the material of the 
human spirit something which was not there before."^ And insofar as 
an author^A to produce the feat of novel crystallization, I suspect this 
lack would not be cured by more lessons on Minkowski's space-time, or 
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, or even thermodynamics, al­
though these lessons could occasionally have a prophylactic effect that 
might not be without value.
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THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION
Like gifted practitioners of the arts, gifted scientists do not build by 
patiently assembling blocks that have been precast by others and certi­
fied as sound. On the contrary, they too melt down the ready-made 
materials of science and recast them in a way that their contemporaries 
tend to think is outrageous. That is why Einstein's own work took many 
years to be appreciated even by his most notable fellow physicists. His 
physics looked to them like alchemy, not because they did not under­
stand it, but because, in one sense, they understood it all too well. From 
their thematic perspective, Einstein's work was anathema. Declaring, 
by simple postulation rather than by proof, Galilean relativity to be 
extended from mechanics to optics and all other branches of physics; 
dismissing the ether, the playground of most nineteenth-century physi­
cists, in a preemptory half-sentence; depriving time intervals of abso­
lute meaning; and other such outrages, all delivered in a casual, 
confident way in the first, short paper on relativity—those were violent 
and "illegitimate" distortions of science to almost every physicist. As 
for Einstein's new ideas on the quantum physics of light emission, Max 
Planck felt so embarrassed by it when he had to write a letter of 
recommendation for Einstein seven years later that he asked that this 
work be overlooked in judging the otherwise promising young man.
The process of transformation characterizes not only science and 
the flow of ideas from high science to high literature. It also works 
across the boundaries in other ways. It seems clear to me that without 
this process of transformation, willing or unwilling, of ideas from 
science and from philosophy, physics itself would not have come into its 
twentieth-century form. The case of Einstein suggests, therefore, that 
the accomplishments of the major innovators—and not only in 
science—depend on the ability to persevere in four ways: by being loyal 
primarily to one's own belief system rather than to the reigning faith; by 
perceiving and exploiting the man-made nature and plasticity of human 
conceptions; by demonstrating eventually that the new unity that has 
been promised can and does become lucid and convincing to lesser 
mortals active in the same held; and, in those rare cases, even by issuing 
ideas that lend themselves, quite apart from misuse and oversimplifica­
tion, to further adaptation and transformation in the imagination of
similarly exalted spirits who live on the other side of disciplinary 
boundaries.
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PERSONAL INFLUENCE
It remains to deal with one more, somewhat different mechanism by 
which Einstein's imprint came to be felt by society, far beyond his own 
held of primary attention: the power of his personal intervention on 
behalf of causes ranging from the establishment of a homeland for a 
persecuted people to his untiring efforts, over four decades, for peace 
and international security. In retrospect we can see that he had the skill, 
at strategic periods in history, to lend his ideas and prestige to the 
necessary work of the time. Even the most famous of these personal 
interventions, the letter to President Roosevelt in 1939 to initiate a 
study on whether the laws of nature allow anyone to produce an atomic 
weapon, was of that sort, although it has perhaps been misunderstood 
more widely than anything else Einstein did. He was, after all, correct 
in his perception that the Germans, who were pushing the world into a 
war, had all the skill and intention needed to start production of such a 
weapon if it was feasible. In fact, they had a head start, and but for some 
remarkable blunders and lack of means they might have fulfilled the 
justified fears, with incalculable consequences for the course of civiliza­
tion.
To highlight these personal interactions, I select one as more or 
less exemplary of the considerable effect Einstein had even on those 
who had merely brief or casual discussions with him. The Swiss psy­
chologist Jean Piaget's work entered its most important phase with the 
publication in 1946 of 71& LEEJ'r Cowcp&oM q/"7w%c. The book begins 
with a plain acknowledgment: "This work was promoted by a number 
of questions kindly suggested by Albert Einstein more than fifteen 
years ago (1928, at a meeting in Davos).. . .  Is our intuitive grasp of 
time primitive or derived? Is it identical with our intuitive grasp of 
velocity? What if any bearing do these questions have on the genesis 
and development of the child's conception of time? Every year since 
then we have made a point of looking into these questions. . . . The 
results (concerning time) are presented in this volume; those bearing
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on the child's conception of motion and speed are reserved for a later 
work. "2 3 Throughout his later writings, Piaget remarked on this debt: 
"It was the author of the theory of relativity who suggested to us our 
work,"24 or "Einstein once suggested we study the question from the 
psychological viewpoint and try to discover if there existed an intuition 
of speed independent of time. "2 s In addition, Piaget referred explicitly 
to notions of relativity and other aspects of Einstein's w ork.26 Einstein 
came to have an immense correspondence with leaders in virtually 
every type of endeavor, and exerted on many a seminal influence of the 
type that Piaget acknowledged^?
TH E SPECTRUM OF RESPONSES
Looking back at the variety of ways in which Einstein came to impress 
the imagination of his time and ours, we can discern some rough 
categories in the responses to him, spread out, as it were, in a spectrum 
from left to right. At the center of the spectrum, corresponding to the 
largest intensity, one finds a widespread but unfocused and mostly 
uninformed fascination with Einstein, manifested in a variety of ways, 
from enthusiastic mass gatherings to glimpse the man, to the outpour­
ing of popularizations with good intentions, to responses that betray 
the vague discomfort aroused by his ideas. A good example of the last is 
an editorial entitled "A Mystic Universe" in 7%e New 71wcs' of 28 
January 1928 (p. 14): "The new physics comes perilously close to 
proving what most of us cannot believe. . . .  Not even the old and much 
simpler Newtonian physics was comprehensible to the man on the 
street. To understand the new physics is apparently given only to the 
highest Right of mathematicians. . . . We cannot grasp it by sequential 
thinking. We can only hope for dim enlightenment." The editorial 
writer then notes that the ever-changing scene in physics does offer 
some "comfort":
Earnest people who have considered it their duty to keep abreast of 
science by readapting their lives to the new physics may now safely 
wait until the results of the new discoveries have been fully tested out 
by time, harmonized and sifted down to a formula that will hold for 
a fair term of years. It would be a pity to develop an electronic
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marriage moraiity and find that the universe is after ali ether, or to 
deveiop a wave code for fathers and children only to have it turn out 
that the family is determined not by waves but by particles. Arduous 
enough is the task of trying to understand the new physics, but there 
is no harm in trying. Reshaping life in accordance with the new 
physics is no use at all. Much better to wait for the new physics to 
reshape our lives for us as the Newtonian science did.
Similarly, in Tom Stoppard's p lay ^^c rr, a philosopher is heard 
to ask: "If one can no longer believe that a twelve-inch rule is always a 
foot long, how can one be sure of relatively less certain propositions?"
Near this position, as we said, are the enthusiastic misapplications, 
usually achieved by an illicit shortcut of meaning from, say the true 
statement that the operational definition of length is "framework"- 
dependent, to the invalid deduction that mental phenomena in a hu­
man observer have been introduced into the very definitions
of physical science. The irony here is that the first lessons we learned 
from relativity physics were that short circuits in signification must 
be avoided, for they were just what encumbered classical physics, and 
that attention must be paid as never before to the meanings of the terms 
we use.
When we now glance further toward the left, or blue, end of the 
spectrum, the expressions of resignation and futility become more 
explicit. Indeed, among some of the most serious intellectuals there 
seems to be, on this point, a sense of despair. By the very nature of their 
deep motivation they must feel most alienated from a universe whose 
scientific description they can hardly hope to understand except in a 
superficial way. The much-admired humanistic scholar Lionel Trilling 
spoke of the "exclusion" of nonscientihc intellectuals from "the charac­
teristic achievement of the modern age" as a "wound . . .  to [their] 
intellectual self-esteem," as quoted fully in Chapter 2.
Einstein, who had intended originally to become a science teacher, 
came to understand this syndrome, and the obligation it put on him. 
He devoted a good deal of time to popularization of his own. His 
avowed aim was to simplify short of distortion. In addition to a large 
number of essays and lectures, he wrote, and repeatedly updated, a 
short book on relativity that he promised in the very title to be grwrm- 
(commonly understandable).^ It is, however, overly con-
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densed for the most nonscientihc beginners. Later, Einstein collabo­
rated with Leopold Infeld in a second attempt to reach out to the 
population at large by means of a book-length treatment of modern 
physics. As the preface acknowledged, the authors no longer attempted 
"a systematic course in elementary facts and theories." Rather, they 
aimed at a historical account of how the ideas of relativity and quanta 
entered science, "to give some idea of the eternal struggle of the 
inventive human mind for a fuller understanding of the laws governing 
physical phenomena."^ In fact, there is to this day no generally agreed 
upon source, the of which by itself will bring a large fraction of
its nonscientihc audiences to a sound enough understanding of these 
ideas, even for those who truly want to attain it and are willing to pay 
close attention. I believe it is a fact of great consequence that it takes a 
much larger effort, and one starting earlier than most people assume. 
To make matters worse, so little has been found out about how scien- 
tihc literacy is achieved or resisted that not much blame can be spun off 
on the would-be students, young or old.
Going further along the spectrum in the same direction, we en­
counter outright hostility and opposition to Einstein's work, either on 
scientific or on ideological grounds. Almost all scientists, even those 
initially quite reluctant, became eventually at least reconciled to Ein­
stein's ideas, save (to this day) for his famous refusal to regard the 
statistical interpretation as fundamental. The opposition to Einstein's 
work on grounds other than scientific has had a longer history. Thus, a 
number of studies now exist that show the lengths to which various 
totalitarian groups, for various reasons, felt compelled to go in their 
attacks.
Turning now to the other, more "positive" half of the spectrum, we see 
there the gradual acceptance and elaboration of Einstein's work within 
the corpus of physical science; its penetration into technology (largely 
unmarked) and into the more thoughtful philosophies of science; Eins­
tein's effect through his personal intervention, causing some historic 
redirections of research; and its passage into the scientific world- 
picture of our time, as it tries to achieve a unification that eluded 
Einstein. And beyond that, at the end of the spectrum where the 
number of cases is small but the color deep and vibrant, we perceive the
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examples of creative transformation beyond science. Those are the 
works of the few who found that scientific ideas, or rather 7 7 7 0^ /^ 0 7 1 - 
embodying such ideas, released in them a fruitful response with an 
authenticity of its own, far removed from textbook physics.
This last is the oldest and surely still the most puzzling interplay 
between science and the nonscientihc aspects of culture. Evidently, the 
mediation occurs through a sharing of an analogy or metaphor— 
irresistible despite the dangers inherent in the obvious differences or 
discontinuities between respective disciplines. We know that such a 
process exists, because any major work of science itself, in its nascent 
phase, is connected not only logically, but also analogically both with 
the historic past in that science and with its supporting data. The 
scientist's proposal may fit the facts of nature as a glove fits a hand, but 
the glove does not uniquely imply the existence of the hand, nor the 
hand that of the glove.
Einstein spoke insistently over the decades about the need to 
recognize such a discontinuity, one that in his early scientific papers 
asserted itself first in his audacious method of postulation. In essay after 
essay, he tried to make the same point, even though it had little effect 
on the then reigning positivism. Typical are the passages in his Herbert 
Spencer Lecture of 1933,30 which we shall examine in some detail in 
the next chapter. The principles of a theory cannot be "deduced from 
experience" by "abstraction," that is, by logically complete claims of 
argument. The creative imagination has to intervene.
If this holds for the creative act in the individual's pursuit of 
science itself, we should hardly be surprised to find the claim to be 
extended to more humanistic enterprises. The test, in both instances, is 
of course whether experience bears out the suitability of the imagina­
tive act. The existence of both splendid scientific theories and splendid 
products of the humanistic imagination shows that despite all their 
other differences, they share the ability to build on concepts that, as 
Einstein put it, are initially of a "purely fictional character." And even 
the respective fundamentals, despite all their differences, can share a 
common origin. That is to say, at a given time the cultural pool contains 
a variety of themata and metaphors, and some of these have a plasticity 
and applicability far beyond their initial provenance. The innovator, 
whether a scientist or not, necessarily dips into this pool for his funda­
mental notions and in turn may occasionally deposit into it new or
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modified themata and metaphors of general power. Examples of such 
science-shaped metaphors, each of these by no means a "fact" of the 
external world yet revealing immense explanatory energy, are easy to 
find: Newton's "innate force of matter (tw and the Newtonian
clockwork universe; Faraday's space-filling electric and magnetic lines 
of force; Niels Bohr's examples of complementarity in physics and in 
daily life; Mendeleev's neat tableau setting for the families of elements 
and Rutherford's lengthy parent-daughter-granddaughter chains of de­
caying atoms; Minkowski's space-time "World," of which our percep­
tible space and time are like shadows playing on the wall of Plato's cave; 
and of course the imaginative scenes Einstein referred to—the traveler 
along the light beam, the calm experimenter in the freely falling eleva­
tor, the dark, dice-playing God, the closed but unbounded cosmos, the 
Holy Grail of complete unification of all forces of nature. So it con­
tinues in science.
The allegorical use of such conceptions may, as we have noted, 
help to shape works of authenticity outside the sciences. And the 
process works both ways. Thus Niels Bohr acknowledged that his 
reading in Kierkegaard and William James helped him to the imagina­
tive leap embodied in his physics; Einstein stressed the influence on his 
early scientific thinking of the philosophical tracts of that period; and 
Heisenberg noted the stimulus of Plato's read in his school
years. No matter if such "extraneous" elements are eventually sup­
pressed or forgotten—or even have to be overcome—at an early point 
they can encourage the mind's struggle along previously unforeseen 
ways.
We conclude, then, that in pursuing the evident and documentable 
cases of "impact" of one person or field—such as that of Einstein and 
his science—on others, we have been led to a more mysterious fact, 
namely, the mutual adaptation and resonance of the innovative mind 
with portions of the total set of themata and metaphors current at a 
given time. The philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset was one of those who 
struggled with this idea. In 1921-1922, evidently caught up by the rise 
of the new physics, he began an essay on "The Historical Significance 
of the Theory of Einstein."^ There he remarked quite correctly that 
the most relevant issue was not that
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the triumph of the theory will influence the spirit of mankind by 
imposing on it the adoption of a definite route.. . .  What is really 
interesting is the inverse proposition: the spirit of man has set out, of 
its own accord, upon a definite route, and it has therefore been 
possible for the theory of relativity to be born and to triumph. The 
more subtle and technical ideas are, the more remote they seem from 
the ordinary preoccupations of men, the more authentically they 
denote the profound variations produced in the historical mind of 
humanity. 3 2
To this day, attempts to go much beyond that point have not been 
successful. The tantalizing task of finding the detailed, hidden causal 
links between major works and the spirit of the time at its fruition 
remains for future scholars.
E I N S T E I N  A N D  T H E  G O A L  
O F  S C I E N C E
THE N O T IO N  OF scientific progress, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, is 
today being chaMenged by various factions outside the laboratories. As 
to the scientists themselves, they rarely take notice of these currents; 
and if pressed hard, they would tend to associate themselves with the 
assertion of George Sarton, the first of the modern historians of sci­
ence:
De/z?nt:o72: Science is systematized positive knowledge or what has 
been taken as such at different ages and in different places.
77?fo?v77%: The acquisition and systematization of positive knowl­
edge are the only human activities which are truly cumulative and 
progressive.
Coro//%7y: The history of science is the only history which can illus­
trate the progress of mankind. In fact, progress has no definite and 
unquestionable meaning in fields other than the fields of science.'
Apart from tending to sympathize with this sentiment, scientists 
are aware that scientific activity may be divided roughly into two kinds: 
that which is directed toward %72%/yw and and that which is
concerned with For work of the former kind—by far the
larger fraction—the French scientist, historian, and philosopher Pierre 
Duhem's description applies:
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Physics makes progress because experiment constantly causes new 
disagreements to break out between laws and facts, and because 
physicists constantly touch up and modify laws in order that they 
may more faithfully represent the facts.2
The second type of scientific activity, synthesis, is more transfor­
mative. Here progress is equivalent to an increase in inclusiveness (a 
wider range of phenomena is accounted for by the new theory) or an 
increase in parsimony or restrictiveness (fewer separate fundamental 
terms and assumptions are needed). An exemplar, as noted previously, is 
the heliocentric system of Copernicus. By virtue of its combination of 
inclusiveness and parsimony, Copernicus's system of planets had, as he 
explained, the great merit that "not only [do the] phenomena follow 
therefrom, but also the order and size of all the planets and spheres and 
heaven itself are so linked together that in no portion of it can anything 
be shifted without disrupting the remaining parts and the universe as a 
whole." In his system, nothing is arbitrary; there is no room for the ad 
hoc rearrangement of any orbit, as had been possible before his work.
The Galilean synthesis of celestial and terrestrial physics is an­
other example, as is Newton's PrmnpM, particularly in its theory of 
lunar motion. Newton's gravitational analysis allowed the prediction, 
from fundamentals, of the periods and magnitudes of known "inequal­
ities." His success put forward a vision that laws incorporating such 
concepts as force and mass and the use of the proper mathematical and 
observational techniques would suffice to discover an overwhelming 
unity of physical science (one which Newton privately thought would 
eventually encompass the sphere of moral philosophy).
In the twentieth century, the incorporation of Newtonian me­
chanics into the general theory of relativity was a further example of 
scientific progress by synthesis. Similarly, at the end of his Prwrip/cy o/' 
(?M%73tM77z TMwzics*, P. A. M. Dirac confidently declared that since 
"quantum mechanics may be defined as the application of equations of 
motion to atomic particles," the domain of applicability of that theory 
"includes most of low-energy physics and chemistry." These, he im­
plied, were now in principle solved problems.3
In almost every scientific research journal, this model of scientific 
progress by means of greater inclusiveness and parsimony can be 
found. For example, in an article in -Sticmv, Victor Weisskopf chose six
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physical constants—the mass of the proton, the mass of the electron 
and its electric charge, the velocity of light, Newton's gravitational 
constant, and the quantum of action of Planck—and a few fundamental 
laws (for example, de Broglie's relations connecting momentum and 
energy with wavelength and frequency, and the Pauli principle). Put­
ting these data and laws together, he JerweJ from them a host of 
predictions that correspond to facts of observation: the size and energy 
of nuclei, the mass and hardness of solids such as rocks, the height of 
mountains, and the size of our sun and similar starsA All these seemed 
at first unconnected, as they are spread over an enormous range of 
magnitudes. Now they are seen to be different consequences of a small 
number of fundamental posits.
This is indeed Newton's program, the search for omniscience 
triumphant. And if any one of the six physical constants on Weisskopf's 
list, now considered a separate entity, could be derived from the other 
five—for example, if the charge of the electron were found to be 
deducible from some of the other fundamental constants—that would 
mark further progress, indeed a great step forward.
A by-product of scientific progress achieved through the continual 
decrease in the number of fundamental axioms and, simultaneously, 
through the increase in the range of phenomena covered is an emerg­
ing synergism with respect to techniques and methods. Results in one 
held become useful in another, far distant one, and often in a surprising 
way. The theoretical tools of condensed-matter physics that handle 
macroscopic phenomena such as ferromagnetism, superconductivity, 
and superfluidity are now understood in terms of concepts and theories 
applicable at the submicroscopic level, where they connect with prob­
lems of the structure of stellar bodies, nuclear physics, particle physics, 
and held theories. Robert Sachs wrote:
Symmetry principles, and the concepts of gauge theories and spon­
taneously broken symmetries, turn out to play a common role so that 
theorists working in one such held may borrow methods from an­
other. Just as all helds have shared in common methods of solution 
of linear equations, it now appears that new approaches to the solu­
tion of non-linear equations, discovered first in connection with 
hydrodynamic problems, may be of great importance for the under­
standing of both condensed matter and elementary particles.s
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TH E TWO-DIMENSIONAL MODEL
Instead of attempting to amend the largely intuitive models current 
among most scientists, or the predominantly ahistorical models among 
scholars outside science, let us turn to the more useful task of examin­
ing a specific case, one which will allow us to obtain a more disciplined 
model of scientific progress from the practice of a scientist who was 
knowledgeable about and sensitive to the philosophical underpinnings 
of modern science. For this purpose there seems to be no better point 
of departure than the scientist whose work has determined the predom­
inant direction of scientific advance in his field from the early part of 
the twentieth century and whose approach has been absorbed, con­
sciously or not, by most current practitioners. I mean, of course, Albert 
Einstein. Einstein wrote extensively on the methods and direction of 
scientific development, and an appropriate entry for formulating a 
theory of scientific advance is his essay of 1933, "Zur Methodik der 
theoretischen Physik."^ Philipp Frank, Einstein's biographer and col­
league, called this the "finest formulation of his views on the nature of a 
physical theory."?
Einstein begins with an important warning, but one which, by 
itself, would seem to deny the possibility that scientific progress could 
be achieved on any model: He notes first of all to pay "special attention 
to the relation between the content of a theory," on the one hand, and 
"the totality of empirical facts," on the other. These constitute the two 
"components of our knowledge," the "rational" and the "empirical"; 
these two components are "inseparable"; but they stand also, Einstein 
warns, in "eternal antithesis." To support this conception, Einstein 
refers to a dichotomy built into Western science. The Greek 
philosopher-scientists provided a lasting reason for having confidence 
in the achievement of the human intellect by introducing into Western 
thought the "miracle of the logical system." Logic, as in Euclid's 
geometry, "proceeds from step to step with such precision that every 
single one of its propositions was absolutely indubitable." But "propo­
sitions arrived at by purely logical means are completely empty as 
regards reality"; "through purely logical thinking we can attain no 
knowledge whatsoever of the empirical world." Einstein tells us that it 
required the seventeenth-century scientists to show that scientific 
knowledge "starts from experience and ends with it."
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Up to this point, therefore, we are left with a thoroughly dualistic 
method for doing science. On the one hand, Einstein says, "the struc­
ture of the system is the work of reason"; on the other hand, "the 
empirical contents and their mutual relations must find their represen­
tation in the conclusions of the theory." Indeed, virtually all of Ein­
stein's commentators have followed him in stressing this dualism—and 
have left it at that. It is a common view of science.
I consider it a two-dimensional view. It can be defended up to a 
point and may be summarized as follows. Scientific discourse charac­
teristically deals with two types of meaningful statements, namely, 
propositions concerning empirical matters that ultimately boil down to 
meter readings and other public phenomena, and propositions con­
cerning logic and mathematics that ultimately boil down to tautologies. 
The first of these, the propositions concerning empirical matters of 
fact, can in principle be rendered in protocol sentences in ordinary 
language that command the general assent of the scientific community. 
I call these the propositions. The second type of proposi­
tions, meaningful insofar as they are consistent within the system of 
accepted axioms, I call %72%/yhf propositions. As a mnemonic device, and 
also to do justice to Einstein's warning about the "eternally antitheti­
cal" nature of these propositions, one may imagine them as arranged 
along one or the other of two orthogonal (say, x and y) axes which 
define the two dimensions of a plane within which scientific discourse 
usually takes place. A scientific statement, in this view, is therefore 
analogous to an element of area in the plane, and the projections of the 
statement onto the two axes are the aspects of the statement that can be 
rendered, respectively, as a protocol of observation (for example, "the 
needle swings to the left") and as a protocol of calculation (for example, 
"use vector calculus, not scalars").
Now, it has been the claim of most modern philosophies of science 
that trace their roots to empiricism or positivism that any scientific 
statement has "meaning" only insofar as it can be shown to have 
phenomenic and/or analytic components in this plane. And, indeed, in 
the past, this procrustean criterion has amputated from science notions 
such as innate properties, occult principles, and all kinds of tantalizing 
questions which cannot be expressed in terms of those two dimensions 
and for which the consensual mechanism consequently could not pro­
duce sufficiently satisfying answers. A good argument can be made that
HI
the silent but general agreement to keep the discourse consciously in 
the phenomenic-analytic plane, where statements and routines can be 
shared, is the main reason science has been able to grow so rapidly in 
modern times. While the degree of consensus at the developing edge of 
science is usually far less than most model makers of science realize, 
consensus about an area rises rapidly after the edge has moved on. 
Hence, the two-dimensional model is widely used to characterize what 
is "truly scientific" when writing for pedagogic purposes.
LIMITATIONS OF THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MODEL
The two-dimensional view has its costs. It overlooks or denies the 
existence of other active mechanisms at work in the day-to-day experi­
ence of those engaged in the pursuit of science; and it is of little help in 
handling questions every historian of science has to face consciously, 
even if the working scientist, happily, does not. To illustrate, let me 
mention two such problems. Both have to do with the direction of 
scientific advance, and both will seem more amenable to solution once 
the dualistic view is modified.
First, if sound scientific discourse is directed entirely by the dic­
tates of logic and of empirical findings, why is science not one great 
totalitarian engine, taking everyone relentlessly in the same way to the 
same inevitable goal? The laws of reason, the perception or detection 
of phenomena, and human skills to deal with both are presumably 
distributed equally over the globe; and yet the story of, say, the recep­
tion of Einstein's theories is strikingly different in Germany and En­
gland, in France and the United States. On the level of j)en-072%/ choice 
of a research topic, why were some of Einstein's contemporaries so 
fatally attracted to ether-drift experiments; whereas he himself, as he 
put it to his friend W  J. de Haas, thought such experiments as silly and 
doomed to failure as trying to study dreams in order to prove the 
existence of ghosts? As to skills for navigating in the two-dimensional 
plane, Einstein and Bohr were rather well matched, as were Schro- 
dinger and Heisenberg. And yet there were fundamental antagonisms 
in terms of programs, tastes, and beliefs, with occasional passionate 
outbursts among scientific opponents.
Or, again, how to understand the great variety of different per-
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sonal styles of scientists, all engaged in what they agree to be the 
"same" problem? If science were two-dimensional, the work of scien­
tists in a given held might sooner or later be governed by a rigid, 
uniformly accepted exemplar. The documented existence of pluralism 
at all times points to a fatal haw in the two-dimensional model—but 
also to its cure.
A second question that escapes the simple model, and to which I 
have referred in Chapters 4 and 5, is this: why are many scientists, 
particularly in the nascent phase of their work, willing to hold hrmly, 
and sometimes at great risk, to what can only be called a suspension of 
disbelief about the possibility of disconhrmation? Moreover, why do 
they sometimes do so at the early stages of the search without having 
any empirical evidence on their side, or even in the face of contradic­
tory evidence?
Among coundess examples of this sort, Max Planck, responsible 
for the idea of the quantum but one of the most outspoken opponents 
of its corpuscular implicadons, cried out as late as 1927: "Must we 
really ascribe to the light quanta a physical reality?"—this four years 
after the publicadon of Arthur H. Compton's hndings providing con­
clusive evidence. On the other hand, when it came to explaining the 
electron in terms of what Planck called "vibradons of a standing wave 
in a condnuous medium," along the lines proposed by de Broglie and 
Schrodinger, Planck gladly accepted the idea and added that "these 
principles have already [been] established on a solid foundadon"—this 
before Planck had heard of any experimental evidence for the wave 
aspect of matter, along the lines provided by Davisson and Germer.s
Einstein was even more daring. To select just one among many 
illustradons, in 1916, when he wrote his book L%er Jze J Jzf
%//ge7MfZ72e he had to acknowledge that his general
theory of reladvity so far had only one observable consequence, the 
precession of the orbit of Mercury; whereas the predicted bending of 
light and the red shift of spectral lines owing to the gravitadonal 
potendal were too small to then be observed. Nevertheless, Einstein 
readily proclaimed, in a daring sentence with which he ended his book 
in its first fifteen prindngs, from 1917 through 1919: "I do not doubt at 
all that these consequences of the theory will also hnd their confirma­
tion." It is an example of the suspension of disbelief, an important 
mechanism in the pracdce of experimental and theoredcal sciendsts.9
TH E ROLE OF PRESUPPOSITIONS
What, then, must one conclude from Planck's predisposition for the 
continuum and against discreteness, from Einstein's predisposition for 
a theory that encompasses a wide rather than a narrow range of phe­
nomena and so allows him to risk his reputation on a daring prediction, 
and from many other examples of suspension of disbelief in the face of 
missing tests and even (in the case of R. A. Millikan's oil-drop experi­
ment) contrary data? Such cases serve to indicate that some t/hrJ 
is present in determining the choices scientists make in the 
nascent phase of their work, in addition to the phenomenic and analyti­
cal mechanisms. Indeed, we can find it in Einstein's lecture on the 
method of theoretical physics: The two-dimensional model initially 
prominent in it gives way, on closer examination, to a more sophisti­
cated and appropriate one. In addition to the two inseparable but 
antithetical components, there is indeed a third one, directed away 
from the plane bounded by the empirical and logical dimensions of the 
theory.
Einstein launches his argument by reminding his audience, as he 
often did, that the principles of a theory cannot be "deduced from 
experience" by "abstraction"—that is to say, by logical means. "In the 
logical sense [the fundamental concepts and postulates of physics are] 
free inventions of the human mind," in themselves "completely empty 
as regards reality," and in that sense different from the unalterable 
Kantian categories. He repeats more than once that the "concepts with 
which scientific theories are built are necessarily the products of the 
human imagination, hence are initially 'purely fictitious' in charac­
ter."^ Or as he memorably put it soon afterward: the relationship 
between sense experience and concept "is analogous not to that of soup 
to beef [where the broth is simply a direct extract of the meat], but 
rather to that of check number to overcoat."**
This arbitrariness of reference, Einstein explains, "is perfectly 
evident from the fact that one can point to two essentially different 
foundations"—the general theory of relativity and Newtonian 
physics—"both of which correspond with experience to a large extent," 
namely, with much of mechanics. Moreover, the elementary experi­
ences do not provide a logical bridge to the basic concepts and postu­
lates of either relativity or Newtonian mechanics. Rather, "the
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axiomatic basis of theoretical physics . . . must be freely invented." (To 
be sure, eventually experience will decide whether the invention was a 
useful and appropriate one.)
With this declaration, Einstein has, of course, exposed the empti­
ness of attempts to impose external standards of correct thinking on the 
practice of scientists, or to condemn as "irrational" scientific work that 
fails to meet such criteria. Thus, he shows that good scientific reason­
ing follows the precepts of neither the Dionysians nor the Apollonians. 
Einstein is, however, quite aware that his insight leads immediately to a 
basic problem, and he spells it out: How "can we ever hope to find the 
right way? Nay, more, has this right way an existence outside our 
illusions? Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when 
there exist theories such as classical mechanics, which do justice to 
experience to a large extent, but without grasping the matter in a 
fundamental way?"
We have now left the earlier, confident portion of Einstein's lec­
ture far behind. But at this very point, Einstein issues a clarion call: "I 
answer with full confidence that there is, in my opinion, a right way, 
and that we are capable of finding it." Here, Einstein goes suddenly 
beyond his earlier categories of empirical and logical efficacy, and offers 
us a set of selection rules with which, as with a good map and compass, 
that "right way" may be found. Here, there, everywhere, guiding 
concepts emerge in his essay and beckon from above the previously 
defined plane to point us on the right path.
The first directing principle Einstein mentions is his personal 
belief in the efficacy of/or7?M/ rlrMttMrM. The "creative principle resides 
in mathematics"—not, for example, in mechanical models. Next there 
unfolds a veritable hymn to the guiding concept of h/Mp/inry. Einstein 
calls it "the principle of searching for the mathematically simplest 
concepts and their connections," and he cheers us on our way with 
many examples of how effective it has already proven to be:
If I assume a Riemannian metric [in the four-dimensional contin­
uum] and ask what are the wnp/est laws which such a metric can 
satisfy, I arrive at the relativistic theory of gravitation in empty space.
If in that moment I assume a vector held or antisymmetrical tensor 
field which can be derived from it, and ask what are the simplest laws
which such a held can satisfy, I arrive at Maxwell's equations for
empty space.
And so on, collecting victories everywhere under the banner of sim­
plicity.
Later in the lecture, we hnd two other guiding notions in tight 
embrace: the concept ofp^nwMMy or croMowy, and that of Mm'/iozhoM. As 
science progresses, Einstein tells us, "the logical edifice" is more and 
more "unified," the "smaller [is] the number of logically independent 
conceptual elements which are necessary to support the whole struc­
ture." Higher up on that same page, we encounter nothing less than 
what he calls "the noblest aim of all theory," which is "to make these 
irreducible elements as simple and as few in number as is possible, 
without having to renounce the adequate representation of any empiri­
cal content."
Yet another guiding concept to which Einstein gladly confesses is 
the f072f;72MM77%, the held. From 1905 on, when the introduction into 
physics of discontinuity in the form of light quanta forced itself on 
Einstein as a "heuristic" and therefore not fundamental point of view, 
he clung to the hope and program to keep the continuum as a funda­
mental conception, and he defended it with enthusiasm in his corre­
spondence. It was part of what he called his "Maxwellian program" to 
fashion a unified held theory. Atomistic discreteness and all it entails 
was not the solution but rather the problem. So here he again considers 
the conception of "the atomic structure of matter and energy" to be 
"the great stumbling block for a unified held theory."
One cannot, he thought, settle for a basic duality in nature, giving 
equal status both to the held and to its antithesis, discrete matter. To be 
sure, neither logic nor experience forbade it. Yet for him it was unthink­
able. As he wrote to his old friend, Michele Besso, "I consider it quite 
possible that physics might not, finally, be founded on the concept of 
held—that is to say, on continuous elements. But then out of my whole 
castle in the air—including the theory of gravitation, but also most of 
current physics—there would remain
We have by no means come to the end of the list of presupposi­
tions that guided Einstein. But it is worth pausing to note how plainly 
he seemed to have been aware of their operation in his own scientific
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work. In this too he was rare. Isaiah Berlin, in his book CoMceptr <?7z^ 
remarked: "The first step to the understanding of men is the 
bringing to consciousness of the model or models that dominate and 
penetrate their thought and action. Like all attempts to make men 
aware of the categories in which they think, it is a difficult and some­
times painful activity, likely to produce deeply disquieting results."'3 
This is generally true; but it was not so difficult for Einstein, for at least 
two reasons. It was he, after all, who first realized the "arbitrary charac­
ter" of what had for so long been accepted as "the axiom of the absolute 
character of time, viz., of simultaneity [which] unrecognizedly was 
anchored in the unconscious," as he put it in his "Autobiographical 
Notes." "Clearly to recognize this axiom and its arbitrary character 
really implies already the solution of the problem."^ Having to give up 
an explicitly or implicitly held presupposition has indeed often had the 
characteristic of the great sacrificial act of modern science. We find in 
the writings of Kepler, Planck, Bohr, and Heisenberg that such an act 
climaxes a period that in retrospect is characterized by the word "de­
spair."
Having recognized and overcome the negative, or enslaving, role 
of presuppositions, Einstein also saw their positive, emancipating po­
tential. In one of his earliest essays on epistemology, he wrote:
A quick look at the actual development teaches us that the great steps 
forward in scientific knowledge originated only to a small degree in 
this [inductive] manner. For if the researcher went about his work 
without any preconceived opinion, how should he be able at all to 
select out those facts from the immense abundance of the most 
complex experience, and just those which are simple enough to 
permit lawful connections to become evident? * s
Much later, in his "Reply to Criticisms," appended to his "Auto­
biographical Notes," he reverted to the "eternal antithesis" by way of 
acknowledging that the distinction between "sense impressions," on 
the one hand, and "mere ideas," on the other, is a basic conceptual tool 
for which he can adduce no convincing evidence. Yet he needs this 
distinction. His solution is simply to announce: "We regard the distinc­
tion as a category which we use in order that we might the better find
our way in the world of immediate sensation." As with other conceptual 
distinctions for which "there is also no logical-philosophical justifica­
tion," one has to accept it as "the presupposition of every kind of 
physical thinking," mindful that "the only justification lies in its useful­
ness. We are here concerned with 'categories' or schemes of thought, 
the selection of which is, in principle, entirely open to us and whose 
qualification can only be judged by the degree to which its use con­
tributes to making the totality of the contents of consciousness 'in­
telligible.' " Finally, he curtly dismisses an implied attack on these 
"categories" or "free conventions" with the remark: "Thinking without 
the positing of categories and concepts in general would be as impossi­
ble as is breathing in a vacuum."^
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FURTHER DETAILS ON THE USE OF THEMATA
Einstein's remarkable self-consciousness concerning his fundamental 
presuppositions throughout his scientific and epistemological writings 
allows one to assemble a list of about ten chief presuppositions underly­
ing his theory of construction throughout his long scientific career: 
primacy of formal (rather than materialistic or mechanistic) explana­
tion; unity or unification; cosmological scale in the applicability of laws; 
logical parsimony and necessity; symmetry (for as long as possible); 
simplicity; causality (in essentially the Newtonian sense); completeness 
and exhaustiveness; continuum; and, of course, constancy and invari­
ance.
These ideals, to which Einstein was fiercely devoted, explain why 
he would continue his work even when tests against experience were 
difficult or unavailable, or, conversely, why he refused to accept theo­
ries supported by the phenomena but, as in the case of Bohr's quantum 
mechanics, based on presuppositions opposite to his own. As has been 
touched on in earlier chapters, much of the same can be said of most 
major scientists, from Johannes Kepler and Galileo to our contempo­
raries. Each has his own, sometimes idiosyncratic, "map" of fundamen­
tal guiding notions that may be considered in principle separate, like 
the band structure of chromosomes in the nucleus of a cell.
With this finding, we must now reexamine our mnemonic device
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of the two-di tnensi on at plane. I remove its insufficiency by defining a 
third axis, rising perpendicularly out of it. This is the dimension or­
thogonal to and not resolvable onto the phenomenic or analytic axes. 
Along it are located those fundamental presuppositions, often stable, 
many widely shared, that show up in the motivation of the scientist's 
actual work, as well as in the end product for which he or she strives, 
and in the acceptance or rejection of scientific insights. A scientist's 
choices among the presuppositions, insofar as they are consciously 
made, are judgmental (rather than, as in the phenomenic-analytic 
plane, capable in principle of algorithmic decidability). Since these 
fundamental presuppositions are not directly derivable either from 
observation or from analytic ratiocination, they require a term of their 
own. I have called them (singular from the Greek 6ep(X:
meaning "that which is laid down, proposition, primary word").
On this view—and again purely as a mnemonic device—a scien­
tific statement is no longer, as it were, an element of area on the 
two-dimensional plane but a volume-element, an entity in three- 
dimensional space, with components along each of the three orthogo­
nal axes (x, y, and z, respectively the phenomenic, analytic, and thematic 
axes). The projection of the entity onto the two-dimensional, x-y plane 
continues to have the useful roles I stressed earlier; but for our analysis 
it is also necessary to consider the line element projected onto the third, 
or z axis, the dimension on which one may imagine the range of 
themata to be entered. The statements of differing scientists are there­
fore like two volume-elements that do not completely overlap and so 
have some differences in their projections.
A scientist's thematic attachment may favor one or the other of 
two (or sometimes three) antithetical themata (i.e., 8 or 8), and these 
are often traceable to very early speculations, such as those concerning 
constancy versus change in the traditions of Parmenides and Her­
aclitus. The historian of science trying to understand a specific case 
or event should therefore be alert to possible thematic choices made 
by the scientist: choices between experience and symbol formation, 
complexity and simplicity, reducdonism and holism, discontinuity 
and continuum, hierarchical levels and unity, evolution/devolution/ 
steady state, mechanistic/materialistic/mathematical models, causality/ 
probabilism, analysis/synthesis, and so on.
While scientists are generally not, and need not be, conscious of
the themata they use, the historian of science can chart the growth of a 
given thema in the work of an individual scientist over time and show 
its power upon the scientist's imagination. Thematic analysis, then, is 
in the hrst instance the identihcation of the particular map of the 
various themata which, like fingerprints, can characterize an individual 
scientist, or a part of the scientific community, at a given time.
Most themata are not only old but long-lived, and show up most 
strikingly during a conflict between individuals or groups that base 
their work on opposing presuppositions. I have been impressed by the 
rather small number of thematic couples, or triads. A relative few have 
sufficed us throughout the history of the physical sciences. Thematic 
analysis of the same sort has begun to be brought to bear also on 
significant cases in other fields, i?
With this conceptual tool we can return to some of the puzzles we 
mentioned earlier. Where does the conceptual and even emotional 
support come from which, for better or worse, stabilizes the individual 
scientist's risky speculation and confident suspensions of disbelief dur­
ing the nascent phase? The result of case studies is that choices and 
decisions of this sort are often made on the basis of loyal dedication to 
thematic presuppositions. Or again, if, as Einstein claimed, the princi­
ples are indeed initially free inventions of the human mind, should 
those not be an infinite set of possible axiom systems to which one 
could leap or cleave? Virtually every one of these would ordinarily be 
useless for constructing theories. How then could there be any hope of 
success, except by chance? The answer must be that the license implied 
in the leap to an axiom system of a theory by the freely inventing mind 
is the freedom to make such a leap, but not the freedom to make 
/Mp The freedom is narrowly circumscribed by a scientist's
particular set of themata that constrains and shapes the style, direction, 
and rate of advance on novel ground.
And insofar as the individual sets of themata overlap, the progress 
of the scientific community as a group is similarly constrained or 
directed. Otherwise, the inherently anarchic connotations of "free­
dom" could indeed disperse the total effort. Mendeleev wrote: "Since 
the scientific world view changes drastically not only from one period 
to another but also from one person to another, it is an expression of 
creativity.. . .  Each scientist endeavors to translate the world view of 
the school he belongs to into an indisputable principle of science." In
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practice, however, there is more coherence than this statement implies, 
and we shall presently look more closely at the mechanism responsible 
for it.
TH E "NEED TO GENERALIZE"
Of all the problems that invite investigation with these tools, the most 
fruitful example will be a return visit to that mysterious place, early in 
the 1933 essay, where Einstein speaks of the need to pay "special 
attention to the relations between the content of the theory and the 
totality of empirical fact." The fo&z/z'ty of empirical fact! It is a phrase 
that recurs in his writings and indicates the sweep of his ambition. But it 
does even more: It lays bare the most daring of all the themata of 
science and points to the holistic drive behind "scientific progress."
Einstein explicitly and frankly hoped for a theory that would 
ultimately be utterly comprehensive and completely unified. This vi­
sion drove him on from the special to the general theory, and then to 
the unified field theory. The search for one grand, architectonic struc­
ture itself was of course not Einstein's invention. On the contrary, it is 
an ancient dream. At its worst, it has sometimes produced authoritarian 
visions that are as empty in science as their equivalent is dangerous in 
politics. At its best, it has propelled the drive toward the various grand 
syntheses that rise above the more monotonous landscape of analytic 
science. This has certainly been the case in recent decades in the 
physical sciences. Today's defenders of the promise as applied to parti­
cle physics, who in the titles of their publications use the term "Grand 
Unification," are in a real sense the hopeful children of those earliest 
synthesis-seekers of physical phenomena, the Ionian philosophers.
To be sure, as Isaiah Berlin warned in Cowcptr Gztegorzaf, the 
quest for greater synthesis, successful so far, from Oersted to Maxwell 
and from Einstein to our day, may be a trap. Berlin has christened it the 
"Ionian Fallacy," defined as the search, from Aristotle to Bertrand 
Russell to our own day, for the ultimate constituents of the world. 
Superficially, the seekers of a unified physics, particularly in their 
monistic exhortations, may seem to have risked falling into that trap— 
from Copernicus, who confessed that the chief point of his work was to
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perceive nothing less than "the form of the world and the certain 
commensurability of its parts," to Max Planck, who exclaimed in 1915 
that "physical research cannot rest so long as mechanics and electro­
dynamics have not been welded together with thermodynamics and 
heat radiation,"is to today's theorists who seem to follow the founding 
father of science among the ancient Greeks, Thales himself, in their 
insistence that one entity will explain all.
A chief point in my view of science is that by the actual variety of 
the individual scientists' thematic commitments, the community of 
scientists is in practice rescued from the trap that devotion to a single 
thema might eventually lead to. The multiplicity of their views gives 
them as a group the flexibility that an authoritarian research program 
built on a single thema lacks. (There is an analogy here with the 
benehts of maintaining biodiversity among crop plants.)
Without doubt, something like an Ionian Enchantment, the com­
mitment to the theme of grand unification, was upon Einstein. Once 
alerted, we can find it in his work from the very beginning, in his first 
published paper (1901), where he tried to understand the contrary­
appearing forces of capillarity and gravitation. We noted in Chapter 5 
his revealing confession at that early stage that for him it was "a 
magnificent feeling to recognize the unity [Em&hArMez'f] of a complex 
of phenomena that to direct observation appear to be quite separate 
things"—in this case the physics of micro- and macro-regions. In each 
of his next papers we find some of the same drive, which he later called 
"my need to generalize." He examined whether the laws of mechanics 
provide a sufficient foundation for the general theory of heat and 
whether the fluctuation phenomena that turn up in statistical me­
chanics also explain the basic behavior of light beams and their inter­
ference, the Brownian motion of microscopic particles in fluids, and 
even the fluctuation of electric charges in conductors. And in his 
deepest work of those early years, in special relativity theory, the most 
powerful propellant was Einstein's drive toward unification. His clear 
motivation was to find a more general point of view that would sub­
sume the seemingly limited and contrary problems and methods of 
mechanics and of electrodynamics. In the process he showed that 
electric and magnetic fields are aspects of one commonality viewed 
from different reference frames: that space and time are not separate;
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that energy and mass are fused in one conservation law; and, soon after, 
that reference systems with gravitation and with acceleration are equiv­
alent. Again and again, previously separate notions were shown to be 
connected.
Following the same program obstinately to the end of his life, he 
tried to bring together, as he had put it once, "the gravitational held and 
the electromagnetic held into a unihed edifice," leaving "the whole 
physics" as a "closed system of thought."^ In his longing for a unihed 
world picture—a structure that would yield deductively the "totality" 
of empirical facts—one cannot help hearing an echo of Goethe's Faust, 
who exclaimed that he longed "to detect the inmost force that binds 
the world and guides its course." For that matter, one hears Newton 
himself, who wanted to build a unifying structure so tight that the most 
minute details would not escape it.
THE UNIFIED 1TEE71SILD AS "SUPREME TASK"
In its modern form, the Ionian Enchantment, expressing itself in the 
search for a unifying world picture, is usually traced to Alexander von 
Humboldt and Schleiermacher, Fichte and Schelling. The influence 
of the "Nature philosophers" on physicists such as Hans Christian 
Oersted—who was led by their ideas directly to the first experimental 
demonstration of the unification of electricity and magnetism—has 
been amply chronicled. At the end of the nineteenth century, in the 
Germany of Einstein's youth, the pursuit of a unified world picture as 
the scientist's highest task had become almost a cult activity. Looking 
on from the other side of the channel, J. T. Merz exclaimed in 1904 that 
the lives of the continental thinkers are
devoted to the realization of some great ideal.. . .  The English man 
of science would reply that it is unsafe to trust exclusively to the 
guidance of a pure idea, that the ideality of German research has 
frequendy been identical with unreality, that in no country has 
so much dme and power been frittered away in following phan­
toms, and in systemadzing empty notions, as in the Land of the
Idea. 2 0
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Einstein himself could not easily have escaped notice of these 
drives toward unification even as a young person. For example, we 
know that as a boy he was given Ludwig Buchner's widely popular book 
[Energy Matter], a work Einstein recollected having 
read with great interest. The little volume does talk about energy and 
matter; but chiefly it is a late-Enlightenment polemic. Buchner comes 
out explicitly and enthusiastically in favor of an empirical, almost 
Lucretian scientific materialism, which Buchner calls a "materialistic 
world view." Through this worldview, he declares, one can attain "the 
unity of energy and matter, and thereby banish forever the old dual­
ism.'^
But the books which Einstein himself credited as having been the 
most influential on him in his youth were Ernst Mach's TTeoyy o/* 
and o/ Afcrimes'. That author was motivated by the same En­
lightenment ideals and employed the same language. In the o/*
ATr/w/my Mach exclaims: "Science cannot settle for a ready-made 
world view. It must work toward a future one . . . that will not come to 
us as a gift. We must earn it! [At the end there beckons] the idea of a 
unified world view, the only one consistent with the economy of a 
healthy spirit."22
Indeed, in the early years of the twentieth century, German scien­
tists were thrashing about in a veritable flood of publications that called 
for the unification or reformation of the "world picture" in the very 
title of their books or essays. Planck and Mach carried on a bitter battle, 
publishing essays directly in the PEyMEtEsr^ f ZgAsYpyy/i with titles such 
as "The Unity of the Physical World Picture." Friedrich Adler, one of 
Einstein's close friends, wrote a book with the same title, attacking 
Planck. Max von Laue countered with an essay he called "The Physical 
World Picture." The applied scientist Aurel Stodola, Einstein's ad­
mired older colleague in Zurich, corresponded at length with Einstein 
on a book which finally appeared under the title TU/J Lzew 
Eygmggr. Similarly titled works were published by other collaborators 
and friends of Einstein, such as Ludwig Hopf and Philipp Frank.
Perhaps the most revealing document of this sort was the mani­
festo published in 1912 in the P/yy^/mPr ZeEs-fUi/t on behalf of the 
new Geyg/Pr^ /^i /h'?' poypmptpg^g PUPyoyUg; it had been composed in 
1911 at the height of the battle between Mach and Planck. Its
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declared aim was nothing less than "to develop a comprehensive 
P%/&?72.nr/7%MM73g," and thereby "to advance toward a noncontradictory, 
total conception The document was signed by,
among others, ErnstMach, Josef Petzoldt, David Hilbert, Felix Klein, 
George Helm, Albert Einstein (only just becoming more widely known 
at the time), and that embattled builder of another worldview, Sigmund 
Freud.^
It was perhaps the hrst time that Einstein signed a manifesto of 
any sort. That it was not a casual act is clear from his subsequent, 
persistent return to the same theme. His most telling essay was deliv­
ered in late 1918, possibly triggered in part by the publication of 
Oswald Spengler's Dec/bie q/ WTst, that polemic against what 
Spengler called "the scientihc world picture of the West." Einstein 
took the occasion of a presentation he made in honor of Planck (in 
Afchr Jet Forv^ cm*) to lay out in detail the method of constructing a 
valid world picture. He insisted that it was not only possible to form 
for oneself "a simplified world picture that permits an overview [h&T- 
Fz7<7 IH/t]," but that it was what he called the scientist's
"supreme task to do so." Specifically, the worldview of the theoretical 
physicist "deserves its proud name HkFF7<7 because the general laws 
upon which the conceptual structure of theoretical physics is based 
can assert the claim that they are valid for any natural event what­
soever. . . . The supreme task of the physicist is therefore to seek those 
most universal elementary laws from which, by pure deduction, the 
may be achieved."^
There is of course no doubt that Einstein's work during those 
years constituted great progress toward this self-appointed task. In the 
developing relativistic HkFMJ, a huge portion of the world of events 
and processes was being subsumed in a four-dimensional structure 
which Hermann Minkowski in "f&Mw 7r/!<7 Zrh" (1908) named simply 
"Jie Hk/t"—the world conceived as a Parmenidean crystal made of 
world lines, in which changes, such as motions, are largely suspended. 
In this world, the main themata are those of constancy and invariance, 
determinism, necessity, and completeness.
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LEAVING O UT N O T  A SINGLE EVENT
Typically, it was Einstein himself who knew best, and recorded fre­
quently, the limitations of his work. Even as special relativity began to 
make converts, he announced that the solution was quite incomplete 
because it applied only to inertial systems and left out entirely the great 
puzzle of gravitation. Later he worked on removing the obstinate du­
alities, explaining for example that "measuring rods and clocks would 
have to be represented as solutions of the basic equation . .. not, as it 
were, as theoretical self-sufficient entities." This he called a "sin" which 
"one must not legalize." The removal of the sin was part of the hoped- 
for perfection of the total program, the achievement of a unified field 
theory in which "the particles themselves would ef be describ-
able as singularity-free solutions of the complete field-equations. Only 
then would the general theory of relativity be a cowp/etc theory."^ 
Therefore the work of finding those most general elementary laws from 
which by pure deduction a single, consistent, and complete can
be won had to continue.
There has always been a notable polarity in Einstein's thought 
with respect to the completeness of the world picture he was seeking. 
On the one hand, he insisted from beginning to end that no single 
event, individually considered, must be allowed to escape from the final 
grand net. We have already noted that in the Oxford lecture of 1933 he 
was concerned with encompassing the "totality of experience," and he 
declared the supreme goal of theory to be "the adequate representation 
of any content of experience."^ He even goes beyond that: Toward the 
end of his lecture he reiterates his old opposition to the Bohr-Born- 
Heisenberg view of quantum physics and declares, "I still believe in the 
possibility of a model of reality, that is to say a theory, which shall 
represent the events themselves [Jzr Dbzge .sr&st] and not merely the 
probability of their occurrence." Writing three years later he insists 
even more bluntly:
But now, I ask, does any physicist whosoever really believe that we 
shall never be able to attain insight into these significant changes of 
single systems, their structure, and the causal connections, despite 
the fact that these individual events have been brought into such 
close proximity of experience, thanks to the marvelous inventions of
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the Wilson-Chamber and the Geiger counter? To believe this is, to 
be sure, logically possible without contradiction; but it is in such 
lively opposition to my scientific instinct that I cannot forgo the 
search for a more complete mode of conception.2?
Yet even while Einstein was anxious not to let a single event escape 
from the final he seems to have been strangely uninterested in
nuclear phenomena, that lively branch of physics which began to com­
mand great attention precisely in the years Einstein started his own 
researches. He seems to have thought that these phenomena, in a 
relatively new and untried held, would not soon lead to the deeper 
truths. And one can well argue that he was right; not until the 193 Os was 
there a reasonable theory of nuclear structure, and not until after the 
big accelerators were built were there adequate conceptions and equip­
ment for the hard tests of the theories of nuclear forces.
Einstein's persistent pursuit of a fundamental theory, one so pow­
erful that it would include every datum of experience and yet excluded 
nuclear phenomena, can be understood only as a consequence of a 
suspension of disbelief of an extraordinary sort. It is ironic that, as it 
turned out, even while Einstein was trying to unify the two long-range 
forces (electromagnetism and gravitation), the nucleus was harboring 
two additional fundamental forces and, moreover, that after a period of 
neglect, the modern unification program, two decades after Einstein's 
death, began to succeed in joining one of the nuclear (relatively short- 
range) forces with one of the relatively long-range forces (electromag­
netism). In this respect, the landscape through which the scientists have 
been moving appears now to be less symmetrical than Einstein had 
thought it to be.
For this and similar reasons, few of today's working researchers 
consciously identify their drive toward "grand unification" with Ein­
stein's. Their attention is attracted by the thematic differences, ex­
pressed for example by their willingness to accept a fundamentally 
probabilistic world. And yet the historian can see the profound conti­
nuity. Today, as in Einstein's time and indeed that of his predecessors, 
the majority of fundamental research physicists hope for the achieve­
ment of a logically unified and parsimoniously constructed system of 
thought that will provide the conceptual comprehension, as complete 
as humanly possible, of the scientifically accessible sense experiences in
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their full diversity. This ambition embodies a hnal aim of scientific 
work itself, and it has done so since the rise of science in the Western 
world. Most scientists, working on small fragments of the total struc­
ture, are as unself-conscious about their participation in that grand 
monistic task as they are about, say, their monotheistic assumption, 
which remains central to their personal belief system without demand­
ing explicit avowal. Indeed, Joseph Needham may well be right that the 
development in the West of the concept of a unihed natural science 
depended on the preparation of the ground through monotheism, so 
that one can understand more easily the reason that modern science 
arose in seventeenth-century Europe rather than, say, in China.
THEMATIC PLURALISM AND THE DIRECTION OF PROGRESS
Dmenfry zw .sprrtrMw o/ Z&vwM be/J bz .s'oczzb.sts', %zz<7 overbzp
zzzzzozzg tbesv yrL o/" tbezzz^ tzz: This formula seems to me to answer the 
question of why the preoccupation with the eventual achievement of a 
unihed world picture did not lead physics to a totalitarian disaster, as an 
Ionian Fallacy by itself could well have done. At every step, each of the 
various world pictures in use is considered a preliminary version, a 
premonition of the Holy Grail. Moreover, each of these various hope­
ful but incomplete world pictures that guide scientists at a given time is 
not a seamless, unresolvable entity. Nor is each completely shared even 
within a given subgroup. Each member of the group operates with a 
specific spectrum of separable themata, some of which are also present 
in portions of the spectrum in rival world pictures. Einstein and Bohr 
agreed far more than they disagreed, but they did have profound 
thematic differences. Moreover, most of the themata current at any one 
time are not new but are adopted from predecessor versions of the 
just as many of them would later be incorporated in subse­
quent versions of it. Einstein freely called his project a "Maxwellian 
program" in this sensed
It is also for this reason that Einstein saw himself with characteris­
tic clarity not at all as a revolutionary, as his friends and his enemies so 
readily did. He took every opportunity to stress his role as a link in an 
evolutionary chain. Even while he was working on relativity theory in 
1905, he called it "a modification" of the theory of space and time.
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Later, in the face of being acclaimed as the revolutionary hero of the 
new science, he insisted, as in his Kang's College lecture: "We have here 
no revolutionary act but the natural development of a line that can be 
traced through centuries." Relativity theory, he held, "provided a sort 
of completion of the mighty intellectual edifice of Maxwell and 
Lorentz."29 Indeed, he shared quite explicitly with Maxwell and 
Lorentz some fundamental presuppositions, such as the need to de­
scribe reality in terms of continua (Helds), even though he differed from 
them completely with respect to others, such as the role of a plenum 
(ether).
On this model of the role which the thematic component plays in the 
advancement of science, we can now understand why scientists do not 
and need not hold substantially the same set of beliefs, either to com­
municate meaningfully with one another in agreement or disagreement 
or in order to contribute to cumulative improvement of the state of 
science. Their beliefs have considerable line structure; and within that 
structure there is room both for thematic overlap and agreement, 
which generally have a stabilizing effect, and for intellectual freedom, 
which may be expressed as thematic disagreements. Innovations 
emerging from the balance, even the "far-reaching changes," as Ein­
stein termed the contributions of Maxwell, Faraday, and Hertz, require 
neither from the individual scientist nor from the scientific community 
the kind of radical and sudden reorientation implied in such currently 
fashionable language as revolution, Gestalt switch, discontinuity, in­
commensurability, conversion, etc. On the contrary, the innovations 
are consistent with the advancement of science as an evolutionary 
process, to which Einstein himself explicitly adhered and which 
emerges also from the actual historical study of his scientific work.
Thus, major scientific advances can generally be understood in 
terms of a process that involves battles over only a few but by no means 
all of the recurrent themata. The work of scientists acting individually 
or in a group, seen synchronically or diachronically, is not constrained 
to the phenomenic-analytic plane alone; it is, rather, an enterprise 
whose saving pluralism resides in its many internal degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, we can understand why scientific progress is often disor­
derly, but not catastrophic; why there are many errors and delusions,
but not one great fallacy; and how mere human beings, confronting the 
seemingly endless, interlocking puzzles of the universe, can advance at 
all—as advance they have, if not all the way to the Elysium of Einstein's 
own hope, the single world conception that grasps the totality of 
phenomena.
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O F  P H Y S I C S ,  L O V E ,  
A N D  O T H E R  P A S S I O N S :  
T H E  L E T T E R S  O F  A L B E R T  
A N D  M I L E V A
PO PU LA R  O PIN IO N  HAS it that the scientist is, and should be,
implying that he or she is somehow less than human. But when 
historians of science look at the stages of a scientist's work prior to 
publication, a different picture emerges. Depending on the case, dis- 
passion may be the least of the virtues in evidence. Even the motiva­
tions for persisting in the exhausting pursuit of a difficult problem 
would be inexplicable without the operation of a whole range of emo­
tions that banal opinion would grant to everyone except scientists. And 
when it comes to studying the private letters of certain scientists (such 
as Erwin Schrodinger), the evidence of passions ruling both the per­
sonal and scientific life can reach volcanic proportions.
One must approach such a case with caution because of the diffi­
culty of trying to put oneself into the frame of mind in which very 
personal letters were written at some point in the distant past. This 
problem was put very well by A. S. Byatt in her novel Porrerhow—A 
Po77M73fe (1990), a fascinating concoction centering on the discovery of 
love letters between the fictional Randolph Henry Ash, a mid­
nineteenth-century poet and amateur scientist, and the mysterious
writer Christabel La Motte. The book proposes that two late- 
twentieth-century English literature scholars, Roland Mitchell and 
Maud Bailey, discover that correspondence, with its record of the ro­
mance, the mysterious ending of it, the question of whether there was a 
child and what became of her. Byatt indicates the problem for the 
contemporary scholar. Maud says:
"I have been trying to imagine him. Them. They must have been— 
in an extreme state.. . .  We are very knowing.. . .  We know we are 
driven by desire, but we can't see it as they did, can we? We never say 
the word Love, do we—we know it's a suspect ideological 
construct—especially Romantic Love—so we have to make a real 
effort of imagination to know what it felt like to be them, here, 
believing in these things—love—themselves—that what they did 
mattered—"
Let's make that effort, for a couple of young people who longed for 
each other as well as for a life in science.
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MlLEVA
Mileva Marie was born in 1875. Her father, Milos, was a Serb, and her 
mother, Marija Ruzic, came from a Montenegrin family. They were 
living in Vojvodina, then part of southern Hungary, a few dozen miles 
northwest of Belgrade, an area that had initially been settled by farmer- 
warriors to protect Christian Europe from the Turks. Mileva's was a 
rather well-to-do family, her father being an official in the state bureau­
cracy. From earliest times, she showed that she would be a serious and 
dedicated young woman. For example, during her high school years, 
she sought and received special permission to attend an all-male Gym- 
7M.HM7M to take two years of physics—a course which otherwise was not 
available to girls generally. It is reported that she got top grades in 
physics as well as in mathematics.
It was very difficult for a woman to go on to higher education in 
most parts of Europe. The first European country to admit women to 
its universities was France in 1863, followed by the University of 
Zurich in Switzerland in 1865, with other Swiss universities following a
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few years later. So if you were French or, like Maria Sklodowska (later 
Marie Curie), comfortable with the French language, you would natu­
rally move to Paris for university training. If, like Mileva, you were 
fluent in German, it was more natural to go to Switzerland. Indeed, as 
John Stachel points out, "Most of the women entering Swiss higher 
schools during the nineteenth century were non-Swiss, a large propor­
tion of them being of Slavic background." ^
In 1894, Mileva went to Switzerland, first taking the last two years 
of secondary school, then doing a summer semester in medical studies 
at the University of Zurich in 1896, and finally, in the fall of that year, 
enrolling in the Swiss Federal Polytechnic School (called "Poly" for 
short, or "ETH," for Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule).
From the testimony of her fellow students and those who knew her 
soon after, she must have been a formidable young woman, with a fierce 
dedication to the study of physics. In conversation, she tended to be 
quiet. In appearance she was darkly handsome. Having been born with 
a congenital hip dislocation from which her sister also suffered, she 
walked with a slight limp. One is reminded of studies such as that of 
sociologist Anne Roe, who found that scientists, far beyond the usual 
proportion in the general population, had periods of illness or physical 
handicap in childhood. Some psychologists^ have related this fact to 
the prominent incidence of introversion among young persons hoping 
to become scientists—all such characteristics helping the youth to 
resist early peer pressure, which generally was away from science as a 
career. Einstein described another mechanism serving the same end 
when he wrote in his autobiography that he had passed through an 
early period of "deep religiosity . . . which . . . found an abrupt ending 
at the age of twelve, through the reading of popular scientific books." 
And he added, "It is quite clear to me that the religious paradise of 
youth, which was thus lost, was a first attempt to free myself from the 
chains of the 'merely personal,' from an existence which is dominated 
by wishes, hopes, and primitive feelings."3
What were Mileva's career interests? One must remember that 
the chance of obtaining a university professorship in any science in 
the 1890s and early 1900s was very small even if one completed the 
regular academic university preparation. Such positions were few 
(fifty-four in physics at all university ranks in Austria-Hungary in 
1909); openings occurred rarely, and the road to them was long.
Whether for this reason or because her ambitions lay elsewhere, 
Mileva enrolled in the Poly as a student in Section VTA, which trained 
future teachers of physics and mathematics, primarily for secondary 
schools. Once more, she was the only female student in her class—to 
this day a difficult situation.
As it happened, among the handful of other students enrolling at 
the same time in the same section and for the same purpose, there was a 
bright young seventeen-year-old chap, about three and a half years her 
junior. He had also come to Switzerland from abroad, and also had 
already shown that he was devoted to the study of science. His name 
was, of course, Albert Einstein. Through their letters we can begin to 
glimpse the story of their love, their physics, and their other passions.
Young Einstein entered the Poly after a final year of secondary- 
school education at the Kantonsschule in Aarau, Switzerland. He had 
been there as a boarder in the home of the teacher of Greek and of 
history at the school, Jost Winteler and his wife, Pauline. They had 
seven children and kept a warm and comfortable house in which Ein­
stein Rourished. Einstein was soon as devoted to the Winteler parents 
as to his own, or perhaps even more. (Eventually, one of the Winteler 
sons married Einstein's sister, Maja, and one of the daughters married 
Einstein's closest friend, Michele Besso.) Moreover, while at Aarau, 
Albert and the youngest of the daughters, Marie, were greatly attracted 
to each other, and both sets of parents thought they would eventually 
make a good couple. In fact, if we look into the first volume of the 
published correspondence of Einstein (TLr Co/Lrtrd P%pe7T o/' 
Ebzstebz [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987]), one of the 
earliest letters (November 1896) is from Marie Winteler to him, start­
ing with the appellation "Beloved Treasure" ("Geliebter Schatz") and 
ending with "In deep love, yourMariechen." It's a rather desperate love 
letter from one adolescent to another, in which she pleads with him not 
to break off the correspondence.
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TH E EINSTEIN ARCHIVE
Let me interpolate here to say something about the Einstein Archive 
that is the basis of much that follows. By the will of Albert Einstein, all 
correspondence, books, manuscripts, etc., in his possession at his
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death were eventually transferred to the Hebrew University Library 
in Jerusalem, and most of the correspondence is being published, 
several volumes out of an initially projected total of thirty having 
already appeared. The archive is a treasure trove, since Einstein corre­
sponded not only with most of the major and many of the minor 
scientists of his time, but also with people in political life, from 
Gandhi and Roosevelt to Stalin; with writers and musicians, sages and 
cranks, and the wretched of this earth. In a way, the archive is a 
window on a good deal of the triumphs and terrors of the twentieth 
century, and it is now being used widely by scholars in the most 
diverse fields.
The fact that it exists in a form that can be readily used by scholars 
is in some part due to my stumbling on the documents almost by 
accident. After Einstein's death in 1955,1 was asked to participate in a 
memorial symposium. To my surprise, I found that very little had been 
published by historians of physics on the impact of Einstein's work, and 
I thought that my contribution might be to begin such an assessment, 
based on whatever documents might be available. Philipp Frank, then a 
colleague in my department and the good friend and biographer of 
Einstein, recommended that I examine whatever manuscripts or letters 
I might find at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study or at Ein­
stein's old house on Mercer Street.
Arriving in Princeton, I was told that all available materials might 
be in some hies in the big basement safe room at the institute's main 
building, Fuld Hall. I was not prepared for what I found there. In the 
near darkness, against the background of many tall metal hie cabinets, 
sat Helen Dukas, Einstein's secretary since 1928. The gooseneck table 
lamp on her small desk provided the only illumination. She was busy, 
responding to letters relating to Einstein or requesting reprint rights. 
The whole scene reminded me of Juliet in the crypt. When I asked 
whether there were documents illustrating Einstein's way of thinking 
and working in physics, and his interaction with his colleagues, she 
opened some of the hie drawers. Arranged in a way accessible to her but 
perhaps to no one else, here were the many thousands of letters, drafts 
of answers, published and unpublished manuscripts, etc., that had been 
carefully preserved by his devoted helpers over the years. After Ein­
stein's immigration to the United States in 1933, most of the material 
then in existence had been spirited out of Nazi Germany, with the aid
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of the French Embassy in Berlin, and sent to the United States in a so- 
called diplomatic pouch arrangement.
Looking at this chaotic collection, and getting from Helen Dukas 
the distinct impression that more was stored at Einstein's house in 
Princeton in which she and his stepdaughter Margot were still living, I 
felt compelled to get this mountainous material organized into a work­
able archive. In those days, one of the large private foundations acted 
quickly and sensibly on requests for aid in cultural matters of this sort. 
So I was able to hire Helen and some physics graduate students from 
Princeton, and arranged for periodic visits, to help convert the hies into 
an archive, to prepare a catalogue raisonne summarizing each of the 
documents, and to begin the search for copies of documents held by 
others. Eventually the archive turned out to contain some forty-hve 
thousand documents, including those added since 1955 by gift or 
purchase. Among those are the copies of the hfty-four letters ex­
changed between Einstein and Marie between 1897 and 1903 (forty- 
three of his, eleven of hers), now published in the CcPcrfeJ P^perr, which 
were made available in 1986 by the family of Einstein's first son, Hans 
Albert.
THE CORRESPONDENCE
Now back to the letters of the late 1890s. The hrst surviving one 
between Mileva and Albert is hers of 20 October 1897 (about a year 
after Marie's). At the Poly, she and Albert had been taking mostly the 
same required courses—although he also took classes in business, 
banking, and insurance statistics, to be on the safe side in case he should 
be needed to help run the family business (electrical engineering). But 
now, during her second year, Mileva had taken a leave for a few months 
to attend lectures in physics and mathematics at the University of 
Heidelberg. In that hrst mailing we have from her hand, she addresses 
the young man by the formal rather than the informal DM. Perhaps 
because of the ambiguity of just how to address him, her letter has 
neither initial nor hnal salutation. It is rather cool, apparently in reply 
to a four-page letter she had received from him awhile earlier, one of 
the many which have not been preserved. She writes that on a visit back 
home she had told her papa all about Albert: "You absolutely must
176 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
come [home] with me some day. You would enjoy yourself splendidly." 
She adds, as if it were a non sequitur, that one of their mutual acquain­
tances seems to have become involved in a romance, and she concludes: 
"What's the point of him falling in love nowadays, anyway? It's such an 
old story.. . ."  She finishes with a brief remark about a lecture she has 
just heard on the kinetic theory of gases, based on the then-still contro­
versial concept that gases consist of atoms.
Chronologically, the next document in the archives is an envelope 
Albert had addressed to Mileva. But the envelope is empty—a re­
minder that as scholars or snoops we are restricted to whatever scraps 
may be left over. Six weeks later, there is a letter from Albert to Mileva. 
He also addresses her quite formally: "Geehrtes Fraulein." He looks 
forward to her impending return to Zurich. Because she has fallen a 
year behind her classmates there, he offers to make available his class 
notes so that she will be able to catch up. (WTten she later used them, 
she penned a correction of one of Einstein's small mistakes—in his 
drawing of two vessels, she noted that his discussion should refer to the 
vessel on the right, not the left—and this correction, properly credited 
to her, has now appeared in Einstein's Co/ZerteJ The irony of it
will become clear later.)
Now the friendship is turning into a romance amid the experimental 
equipment in the physics lab of the Poly. They spend much of their 
time together studying for their courses, and doing the required experi­
mental thesis project needed to obtain the diploma. During vacations, 
Albert often goes back to visit his family in Milan, where his father has 
tried to start a new business after an earlier failure of his company. On 
those occasions we have letters between them. For example, Albert 
writes in March 1899 that he realizes "how closely knit our psychologi­
cal and physiological life is." He had shown a photograph of Mileva to 
his mother, and writes: "Your photograph had a great effect on my old 
lady"; she had studied it carefully, and "sends her greetings."
But Mother's greetings were not from the heart. Slowly Albert 
realizes his parents' hostility to this friendship, and at the same time, 
in reaction, he begins to see rAw? in a new light. Early August 1899: 
"My mother and sister seem a little petty and philistine to me, despite 
the sympathy I feel for them. It is curious how gradually our lives
change us in the very subtle shadings of our soui, so that even the 
closest family ties dwindle into habitual friendship, and deep inside 
one becomes mutually so incomprehensible that one is in no way 
capable of empathizing with the emotions that move the other." And, 
again, in the second letter of that month: "I manage to escape their 
mindless prattle. . . .  If only you were again with me for a while! We 
understand so well each other's dark souls, and also drinking coffee & 
eating sausages, etc......... " (The six hnal periods are underlined.)
ELECTRODYNAMICS OF MOVING BODIES
Even as the romance is getting more stable and serious, another thing 
comes to the foreground. In virtually each of his longer letters, aside 
from personal matters often written in his witty and colloquial German 
to which translations can hardly do justice, Einstein goes into details of 
the physics that is preoccupying him—not merely rapturous accounts 
of what he is reading in his textbooks or in classics of science, but new 
ideas. For example, in that second letter of August 1899: "[1] am now 
rereading Hertz's "Propagation of Electric Force" with greatest care. 
The reason is that I did not understand Helmholtz's treatise.. . .  I am 
more and more reaching the conviction that the electrodynamics of 
moving bodies, as it is presented today, doesn't correspond to reality, 
but can be presented more simply. The introduction of the term 'ether' 
into the theories of electricity has led to the conception of a medium of 
whose motion one can speak, but without, I believe, being able to 
connect a physical meaning with this way of speaking. I believe that 
electric forces are definable only for empty space, as Hertz also 
stressed." And so forth. This is six years before his major paper of 1905 
on relativity theory, "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies," 
containing in its title the very phrase he uses here, and which had also 
been used by Hertz. But it is perhaps revealing of their relative interests 
that while Einstein devotes much of his letters to his new ideas in 
physics, in Mileva's reply she is totally silent on that subject, and 
comments only on family matters and the like. On the whole, that 
asymmetry is true for most of their preserved exchanges. In the rela­
tively few letters of Mileva's during the period under discussion, she 
never responds to Einstein's arguments about physics, nor does she
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otherwise write of scientific problems except to refer occasionally to a 
lecture she has heard or to a science book.
But Einstein continues to present his scientific ideas to her. Thus 
in his next letter (10 September 1899): "In Aarau [where he went to visit 
the Wintelers, probably with his sister Maja, who was entering the 
girls' school there] I had a good idea for investigating what effect a 
body's relative motion with respect to the luminiferous ether has on the 
velocity of propagation of light in transparent bodies." It is apparently a 
reference to some variant of the Fizeau experiment of 1851. As Einstein 
wrote much later, the clues provided by the Fizeau experiment and 
stellar aberration, together with the old experiment of Faraday on 
electromagnetic induction, "were enough" to put him on the trail of 
relativity theory.
Other tantalizing hints of his reading and thinking are sprinkled 
throughout his correspondence. For example, in a letter two weeks 
after the one just quoted, he writes to Mileva: "I also wrote to Professor 
Wien in Aachen about my work on the relative motion of the lumi­
niferous ether against ponderable matter, the work which the 'boss' 
handled in such a negligent fashion." This presumably refers to his 
physics teacher, H. F. Weber. As one of Einstein's biographers, his son- 
in-law (Rudolf Kaiser, who published the bookH%e?t Eimtem under the 
pseudonym Anton Reiser in 1950) put it, during his student days, 
Einstein "wanted to construct an apparatus which would accurately 
measure the earth's movement against the ether," but was not able to do 
so because "the skepticism of his teachers was too great, the spirit of 
enterprise too small (p. 52)."
Einstein goes on to say: "I read a very interesting paper by Wien 
from 1898 on this sub] ect." That paper, on theories of the motion of the 
presumed ether, described thirteen of the most important experiments 
trying to detect the earth's motion through that ether. The vast major­
ity of them, ten, had negative results, and among those, indeed the last 
of them, was the Michelson-Morley experiment which later was ele­
vated by some commentators as the only experiment of significance in 
the genesis of relativity theory—a position Einstein repeatedly dis­
avowed.
In the same letter (28 September 1899): "I tend to brood too 
much—in short I see and feel the absence of your benehcent thumb 
under which the boundaries are kept." It is a puzzling and possibly
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revealing sentence, followed by other hints of his complex state of 
mind: "Don't worry about my now going so often to Aarau. The critical 
daughter with whom I was so madly in love four years ago [he is 
referring to Marie Winteler] is coming home. For the most part I feel 
quite secure in my high fortress of calm. But if I saw her again a few 
times, I would certainly go mad, that I know & fear like fire. . . .  A 
thousand hearty greetings from your Albert."
As we turn to the letters of 1900, something new appears. They 
have agreed on an important step: to address each other finally by the 
familiar Dw (thou), and to refer to each other by nicknames, part of the 
usual scenario of developing affections: "Mein liebstes Doxerl [doll]," 
but also "Meine siisse Kloane [little one]," "Meine liebe Miez [pussy­
cat]," and variants on all of these. He in turn calls himself, and is often 
addressed by her as, Johannesl or Johanzel. In a letter to a friend, 
Mileva calls Einstein her "Hauptperson," her "significant other," as we 
now would put it.
By the end of July, a major turning point occurs for each of them, 
and therefore for their relationship. A letter from the university au­
thorities of 27 July 1900 brings the news that Albert Einstein has 
passed his diploma examination. But Mileva, taking the examination 
at the same time, failed it. (Her grades were quite good in theoretical 
and practical physics, but not good enough in mathematics.) From 
other sources we know that, tired and depressed, Mileva decided to 
leave the Poly to visit her parents. A day or two later, Einstein wrote 
her from a summer vacation place in Switzerland where once again he 
had joined his parents and sister. It is a dramatic, even theatrical letter, 
which shows how his emotional life is rearranging itself. Let me quote 
it at length:
I arrived in Sarnen the day before yesterday as planned.. . .  We were 
met by Mama, Maja, and a carriage.. . .  Maja took this opportunity 
to say [privately] that she had not dared to report anything about the 
"Dockerl" affair, and she asked me to "go easy" on Mama.. . .  So we 
arrive home [at the hotel] and I go into Mama's room, only the two of 
us. First I must tell her about the exam [that he had passed, and 
Mileva failed], then she asks me quite innocently: "So, what will 
become of Dockerl now?" "My wife," I said just as innocently, but 
prepared for the expected "scene."
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That followed immediately. Mama threw herself onto her bed, 
buried her head in the pillows, and wept like a child. After regaining 
her composure, she immediately shifted to a desperate attack: "You 
are ruining your future and barring your career.. . .  No decent 
family will have her. . . .  If she gets pregnant, you'll be in a mess." 
With this last outburst, I finally lost my patience. I vehemently 
denied the suspicion that we had been living in sin, and scolded her 
mightily.. . .
The next day things were better, largely because, as she said 
herself, "If they have not yet been intimate (which she had greatly 
feared) and are willing to wait longer, then ways and means can be 
found." The only thing that is out of the question for her is that we 
want to remain together always. The attempts at changing my 
mind came in expressions such as "Like you, she is a book—but 
you ought to have a wife." "By the time you are 30, she is an old 
witch," etc.. . .  If only I could be with you again soon in Zurich, my 
little treasure! A thousand greetings and the biggest kisses from 
your Johannesl.
STUBBORN AS A MULE
He has now assumed the role as Mileva's defender and comforter 
(though one might doubt whether a letter like that would really soothe 
her). A few days later, he adds: "Mama and Papa are quite phlegmatic 
types and have less stubbornness in their entire bodies than I have in my 
little finger." On that he was probably quite right. When asked later 
why it was he who came to find the relativity theory, he gave two 
answers: that he had curiosity and the stubbornness of a mule, God's 
only gift to him; and that he continued to ask questions about the world 
that children eventually are taught not to ask.
The more Albert now experienced his family's rejection of Mileva, 
the more he was drawn toward her and away from them. He writes on 1 
August 1900, "I long terribly for a letter from my beloved witch. I can 
hardly comprehend that we are for such a long time separated—only 
now do I see how terribly dear you are to me! Indulge yourself com­
pletely so you will become a radiant little darling and as mad as a street 
urchin [G%Kff7!^ M%]."And two weeks later(14August 1900), "HowwasI 
able to live alone before, my little everything? Without you I lack self-
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confidence, passion for work, and enjoyment of life—in short, without 
you my life is no life."
But as one would expect, the escape from the merely personal is 
always at hand for him. On 30 August 1900: "My only diversion is 
studying, which I am pursuing with redoubled effort, and my only hope 
is you, my dear, faithful soul." And 13 September 1900: "Boltzmann is 
quite magnificent. . . . He is a masterful writer. I am firmly convinced of 
the correctness of the principle of the theory, i.e., I am convinced that 
in the case of gases we are really dealing with discrete mass points of 
definite, finite magnitude that move according to certain conditions." 
This is of course a basis for his paper, published five years later, with the 
proof of the molecular hypothesis through Brownian motion.
On 19 September 1900, Einstein shows once more he is anxious to 
escape a "philistine" existence—in his wide reading he was drawn to 
Schopenhauer, who for young people at the time was a strong voice 
against following the crowd, and in later letters Einstein often referred 
to himself as a gypsy at heart. Now he paints an optimistic picture for 
the two young people in love (19 September 1900): "No matter what 
may happen we'll have the most delightful life in the world. Pleasant 
work and being together—and what's more, we both are now our own 
masters and stand on our own two feet and can enjoy our youth to the 
utmost. Who could have it any better? When we have saved up enough 
money, we shall buy ourselves bicycles and take a bike tour every couple 
of weeks."
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By late October 1900, Einstein must have rejoined Mileva in Zurich, 
and there are no more letters between them until spring 1901, when 
he visits his parents again. She has been left alone, studying to take 
that examination for the second time. It is a low point for her; perhaps 
it is dawning on her that she will fail again and will never get her 
degree. And at that moment he writes a letter (27 March 1901) from 
that hostile camp which contains a phrase on which some commenta­
tors fastened for a time. "My dear kitten. Many thanks for your letters 
and for all true love contained therein. I kiss you and hug you with all 
my heart for it. .. . I'll try to get an assistantship in Italy. First of all
182 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
that removes a major problem, namely the anti-Semitism that, in the 
German lands, would be as distasteful to me as it is obstructive. . . .  
You are and will remain a shrine for me to which no one has access; I 
also know that of all people you love me the most and understand me 
the best. I assure you that no one here would dare or even want to say 
anything bad about you. I'll be so happy and proud when we together 
shall have brought our work on relative motion victoriously to a 
conclusion!"
"OM7* work on relative motion." In their surviving correspondence, 
it is his only use of the word CM?* in the context of the early labors that 
led to the relativity theory four years later; but it will occur again in 
other contexts, and requires some comments later to understand what 
may have been meant.
We come now to another key event in the life of these struggling 
young people. Now that Einstein had his diploma, he was hoping to 
find a job. His applications for assistantships to various physics pro­
fessors in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy yielded no encouraging 
replies, but in mid-April 1901 he had good news. He was invited to be a 
substitute teacher for two months at the Technical High School in 
Winterthur, and also there was a letter from his friend Marcel 
Grossmann, saying that (thanks to the intervention of Marcel's father) 
Einstein might perhaps have a chance to get a position at the Swiss 
patent office in Bern. Strangely, his report to Mileva on all this is given 
only a few lines at the beginning of his letter to her. The main topic is a 
lengthy discussion of what he calls his new "wonderful idea" to apply a 
theory of molecular forces to gases, followed by a long exposition of the 
physics involved.
A few days later, still in high excitement, he again tries to lift 
Mileva's darkening mood—she had even begun to look for a second­
ary school position in Zagreb, and incidentally, she was also jealous of 
the attention Einstein seems to have paid to some of her women 
friends. So on 30 April 1901, Einstein writes her: "My dearest little 
child [Kinderl]! I just don't let up. You absolutely must come to me in 
Como [in Northern Italy], you sweet little witch.. . .  And I love you 
so much again! It was only out of nervousness that I was so mean to 
you. You will hardly recognize me now that I have become so bright 
and cheerful, and I'm longing so much to see again my dearest 
Doxerl.. . .  Come to me in Como and bring my blue morningrobe in
which we can wrap ourseives up, and don't forget your binoculars." To 
be sure, this suggestion is immediately followed by his opinions on 
Boltzmann's gas theory. He believes that there is now on this subject 
"enough empirical material for our investigation," to be found in a 
book by O. E. Meyer, and asks her to look for it the next time she is in 
the library.
There is something a little frantic in this letter. Obviously, life is 
now looking quite different from their respective positions, and he is 
trying to cheer her up and to bind her to him. After some hesitation, 
Mileva accepts his invitation. She says she has just "received a letter 
from home today that has made me lose all desire, not only for having 
fun, but for life itself."
That excursion, later described in one of her letters to her friend 
Helene Savic, turned out to be perhaps the- most important threshold 
point for the couple. They went north from spring-bound Como to the 
Spliigen Pass, some sixty-five hundred feet high, where the snow was in 
places still nearly twenty feet deep. They rented a sled and then went 
further on foot while more snow was falling. Mileva wrote later to a 
friend that she held on to him firmly throughout. It was a great success. 
"How happy I was again to have my darling for myself a little, especially 
because I saw that he was equally happy." It was all the more glorious 
for them to be together because for the next two months Einstein 
would be in Winterthur on his temporary teaching job.
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" H O W  IS T H E BOY?"
But perhaps the trip had gone all too well. A few weeks later (end of 
May 1901), one of Einstein's surviving letters to Mileva begins with 
his typical account of his almost physical euphoria on encountering in 
his reading a new physics problem—in this case the photoelectric 
effect—but then he almost seamlessly continues to write about the 
main new fact that has entered their lives: "I just read a wonderful 
paper by Lenard on the generation of cathode rays by ultraviolet light. 
[We know that Einstein's following up on that experiment was re­
sponsible for the earliest of his major 1905 papers, the one usually 
referred to as his photon theory of light, for which he was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in 1922.] Under the influence of this beautiful piece, I am
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Ailed with such happiness and joy that I absolutely must share some of 
it with you. Be of good cheer, dear, and don't fret. After all, I am not 
leaving you, and will bring everything to a happy conclusion. One just 
has to be patient! you'll see that one does not rest badly in my arms, 
even if things are beginning a little stupidly. How are you, darling? 
How A iwy?"
Mi leva had discovered she was pregnant. This was surely not the 
first time that they had talked about it—he had visited her in Zurich 
sometimes during his work in Winterthur. But little did he seem to 
realize how this pregnancy would change their relationship. His first 
scientific paper, on capillarity, had been sent off the previous Decem­
ber. He was now launched as a publishing scientist (even though he 
thought later that his first published papers were quite insignificant). 
But for Mileva, becoming a science school teacher (not to speak of 
obtaining a university position of which she may only have dreamed) 
had already become very questionable. She was still studying for her 
second try at the examination in the teacher-track section of the Poly, 
which she would bravely take at the end of July 1901, and, three months 
pregnant, fail with the same low total mark as before. And bearing an 
illegitimate child was of course in those days considered to be deeply 
shameful.
But at that point, in late spring 1901, Albert, despite his un­
quenchable optimism, was not showing much more promise—a 
twenty-two-year-old still without firm employment. His eventual job, a 
provisional appointment as Technical Expert Third Class at the Patent 
Office, actually did not materialize until about a year later. With little 
likelihood for even a menial permanent post, and with no moral sup­
port for his liaison from either his family or hers (there are even 
references to angry letters from Einstein's parents to Mileva's, which 
caused predictable sorts of rows), he now faced, in straitlaced Switzer­
land, the prospect of becoming the impoverished father of an illegiti­
mate child.
Here was a test of his fundamental morality. What would many a 
normal young man have done at that time under these conditions? For 
Einstein the answer was clear. A letter of 7 July 1901 to Mileva goes like 
this: "Rejoice now in the irrevocable decision I have made! About our 
future I have decided the following: Ell look for a position 
no matter how modest. [In fact, he seems to be thinking about going
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into an insurance Arm as a clerk, or making do by giving hourly 
lessons.] My scientific goals and personal vanity will not prevent me 
from accepting the most subordinate role. As soon as I have such a 
position I will marry you and take you to live with me, without writing a 
word of it to anyone until everything has been settled. Then no one can 
cast a stone upon your dear head, and woe unto him who dares to set 
himself against you. When your parents and mine are presented with a 
%Hr<M72p/z, they'll just have to reconcile themselves to it as best they 
can."
For whatever reason, this is not how it turned out. By November 
1901, they write each other again, because Mileva has gone home to 
her parents where she plans to have their baby. Albert is in yet another 
lowly temporary teaching position, in Schaffhausen, from which he 
soon manages to get himself dismissed for impudent behavior (such as 
asking for a better salary). Mileva writes on 13 November 1901 to 
suggest that they keep the news of the pregnancy quiet: "I believe we 
should say nothing yet about Lieserl [to other friends]." The unborn 
child has at least been given a name; and it turned out later that the 
mother had guessed the gender correctly, although Albert replies, on 
12 December 1901, that: "Secretly [1] prefer to imagine a Hanserl." He 
hopes the Bern job will come through, but even if it does not, then 
"together, we'd surely be the happiest people on earth. We'll be stu­
dents as long as we live and won't give a damn about the world. . . . The 
only problem that still needs to be solved is the question of how we can 
take our Lieserl to us; I do not want us to have to give her up. Ask your 
Papa, he's an experienced man. . . ." And he adds, "She shouldn't be 
stuffed with cow's milk because it might make her stupid. Yours would 
be more nourishing, right?" And next, almost predictably: "I have had 
another rather obvious but important scientific idea about molecular 
forces...."
"So W E  D O N 'T  B E C O M E  O L D  P H IL IS T IN E S "
Five days later, on 17 December 1901: "I am busily at work on an 
electrodynamics of moving bodies, which promises to be a capital piece 
of work. I wrote to you that I doubted the correctness of the idea about 
relative motion. But my reservations were based on a simple calculation
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error. Now I believe in it more than ever." And further on, "Give your 
mother my best greetings and tell her I am looking forward to the 
spanking with which she will do me honor some day." Two days later, 
19 December, "Sorry, I forgot your birthday once again," and more 
thoughts on his electrodynamics. Nine days later, December 28, 
"When you become my dear little wife, we'll diligently work on science 
together so we don't become old philistines, right?"
Lieserl was born in January 1902, perhaps at Mileva's home in 
Novi Sad. Soon after he heard the news, Albert writes her (4 February 
1902, Bern): "My beloved treasure! Poor dear sweetheart, what you 
have to suffer that you now can't even write to me yourself. It is such a 
shame that our dear Lieserl must be introduced to the world this way! I 
hope you are bright and cheerful by the time my letter arrives.. . .  Now 
you see that it really turned out to be a Lieserl, just as you had wished. Is 
she healthy? Does she cry properly? What are her eyes like? Which one 
of us does she resemble more? Who is giving her milk? Is she hun­
gry? . . .  Couldn't you have a photograph made of her when you are 
again in good health? Can she turn her eyes in different directions to 
see things? You can now make observations. I'd like to have a Lieserl 
myself some day—it must be fascinating. She is certainly able to cry 
already, but won't learn how to laugh until much later. Therein lies a 
profound truth. When you feel a little better you will have to draw a 
picture of her." He has placed an advertisement in the local newspaper, 
offering to give private lessons.
" W H A T  H A S  B E F A L L E N  L lE S E R L "
Now briefly the rest of the story of this star-crossed couple's early years. 
The marriage took place on 6 January 1903. Lieserl, whose existence 
was unknown to all Einstein scholars until these letters were found and 
published in 1987, is mentioned in only one other letter of Albert, on 
19 September 1903, when Mileva is back at her family's home, as he 
puts it, "to hatch a new chick"—that is, to give birth to the first of their 
two sons, Hans Albert. Einstein writes, "I am very sorry about what has 
befallen Lieserl. It is so easy to suffer lasting effects from scarlet fever. If 
only this will pass safely. As what is the child registered? We must be
very careful that problems don't arise for her later." The Einstein 
Collected Papers Project mounted an extensive search to trace her 
through birth registers and even gravestones; but nothing has been 
found. If she survived, very likely she was adopted by one of Mileva's 
relatives, in accord with custom in those days for such cases. Although 
now quite improbable, it is of course technically still possible that she 
might surface, saying, "My name is Anastasia, and I want the family 
papers."
This is not just idle speculation. Something like this nearly 
happened. In the 1930s, after Einstein had moved to America, a 
woman turned up in Germany who claimed to be a long-lost daughter 
of Einstein's. Her story persuaded a number of Einstein's friends in 
Europe, who conveyed their surprise and dismay to him. Eventually it 
turned out that she was a fraud, an actress born in Vienna in 1894, 
when Einstein was fifteen. That episode illustrates one of the many 
cases in which the mature Einstein, like other highly visible persons, 
became a target of con artists and sensationalizers, and, in part, ex­
plains why in Einstein's later years those near him tended to seem 
overprotective.
But there is no doubt that the birth of Lieserl took a heavy toll on 
Mileva herself, whose attitudes and behavior tended to become more 
and more brooding after those secret events. Perhaps she was blaming 
herself for the decision to give up her daughter, or blamed Albert for 
acquiescing in it, or possibly even for urging her to acquiesce. We 
simply do not know. At any rate, the periods of melancholy that in­
creasingly enveloped Mileva became in time evident to everyone. Ein­
stein later described her as taciturn, suspicious, and depressed, and 
attributed it to a background of schizophrenia on her mother's side. 
Albert's and Mileva's younger son, Eduard, also showed signs of the 
illness. More and more, the dark side of life began to show itself to the 
family.
But at least the first few years of marriage seem to have been 
pleasant enough on the whole. Shortly after the wedding, Albert wrote 
to his good friend Michele Besso (January 1903): "Well, now I am a 
thoroughly married husband and lead a nice comfortable life with my 
wife. She takes excellent care of everything, cooks well, and is always in 
a good mood." Similarly, Mileva wrote on 20 March 1903 to her
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confidante, Helene Savic: "I am, if possible, even more attached to my 
dear treasure than I was in the Zurich days. He is my only companion in 
society, and I am happiest when he is beside me."
BABY C A R R IA G E  A N D  C H E A P  C IG A R S
A family friend has described the couple's life after the birth of Hans 
Albert in May 1904, during Einstein's most productive phase in his 
Swiss years. Mileva is out on some errand, and Albert is sitting at the 
kitchen table, one hand pushing the baby carriage back and forth, while 
the other is writing one of his world-shaking papers. The room is 
enveloped in the acrid smoke from one of the cheap cigars which were 
then his luxury. But what is ominously missing from all these comfort­
able images of the early years of marriage is any evidence of the kind of 
life they planned when first drawn to each other—two schoolteachers 
coming home after work for an evening of studying together happily, 
and perhaps writing something new for the major physics journals, as a 
few such teachers then still could hope to do.
The rest was also not what they had dreamed of in their early 
letters. By 1909, Einstein's reputation was rising fast in science, despite 
the fact that in his style of thinking and publications, as well as in his 
independent personal demeanor, he seemed to thumb his nose at au­
thority of every kind. But the marriage was clearly in trouble, as seen by 
letters to friends. She wrote (again to Savic): "You see, with such fame 
[for Einstein] not much time remains for his wife. . . . The pearls are 
given to the one, the other gets just the shell.. .. You see, I am very 
starved for love." All traces of her interest in a career in science or in 
teaching were gone. Her friends during those years describe Mileva's 
brooding, dark moods, introversion, long periods of silence even at 
home, extreme taciturnity, unresponsiveness, melancholia. The happy 
years of love between Albert and Mileva had ended. In 1911, the family 
moved to Prague where Einstein served for about a year as a university 
professor. But there the family felt uncomfortable. In 1912, they re­
turned to Zurich, where he had been offered a professorship at their old 
school, the Poly.
Shortly before World War I, Albert accepted the call to the distin­
guished position as member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences and
research professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. For him, 
living in the country he had chosen to leave as a youngster was hard 
enough, but Mileva found it unbearable. She packed up the two boys 
and took them back to Switzerland in 1914. During the following few 
years, while Einstein persevered through bouts of illness in almost 
superhuman effort to fashion the general relativity theory, he was also 
courted by a cousin in Berlin, Elsa Lowenthal, with whom he had an 
occasional flirtation starting in 1912. In 1919, Mileva divorced Albert 
and continued to care for her children as best she could. Hans Albert 
went on to become a professor of engineering at the University of 
California, Berkeley. But the younger son, Eduard, was in and out of 
psychiatric clinics, treated for schizophrenia, and died in 1965 in the 
same Swiss clinic in which his mother's sister Zorka had also been 
treated for mental instability.^ Soon after the divorce, Elsa Lowenthal 
and Albert were married. When Einstein received the Nobel Prize in 
1922—which knowledgeable physicists had predicted would come 
sooner or later—he transferred the prize money to Mileva, as he had 
promised in the divorce proceedings. In 1948, in poor physical and 
mental condition, Mileva died in Switzerland.
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W H A T  H A V E  W E  L E A R N E D ?
So, what have we learned? Some main points would include these:
1. Thanks to these letters, we know of course much more about 
Mileva Marie, her courage, hopes, early ambition, and disappoint­
ments. She left no evidence of originality as a future major scientist— 
but that is of course true for most who aspire to such a career, whether 
male or female. During the early, good years she and Albert longed 
palpably for each other's companionship, and each gained emotionally 
and psychologically from it. Einstein also valued her intellectually, and 
not only because he, an autodidact throughout his life, always needed 
someone who understood him, to talk with about new ideas (as did 
Niels Bohr). One remembers the warning the physicist Max von Laue 
gave a friend in 1912 in preparing him for his first meeting with 
Einstein: "You should be careful that Einstein doesn't talk you to death. 
He loves to do that, you know."
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We also know more about Mileva's increasing demoralization or 
loss of self-esteem—caused perhaps by the loss of Lieserl, or by the 
increasing fame of her husband, with all the demands this entailed, or 
by their disappointment with each other, when the original project of a 
cozy couple studying science together came to naught.
2. And we know more about the young Albert Einstein. In the 
years I have covered, he was of course not the sad-eyed icon and 
patriarch of late years, but a lusty and irrepressible young man who 
attempted to combine his emotional and intellectual passions. This is 
symbolized for me by the fact that some of his early letters to Mileva 
were written on pages torn from his notebooks, the back of the sheet 
containing calculations horn the theory of electromagnetism. I recall 
here the answer Erik Erikson said he received from Freud when 
Erikson asked what might be the primary components of a good life. 
Freud had put it memorably in three words: HrNzf LieA (work 
and love).
We already knew that in his later years Einstein was never discour­
aged by failures in his doomed, late project to find a unified held theory; 
but here we also saw that during the decade we have covered practically 
nothing could squelch Einstein's fundamental optimism, either about 
his work in science or about his faith in Mileva.
3. As I noted, during the years when Albert and Mileva were
passionately attached to each other, and chiefly when she seemed in 
need of psychological support, he occasionally used in his letters to her 
such phrases as owr or ow Starting in 1990, a small
number of writers have attempted to inflate the potential meaning of 
these phrases to include the possibility that Mileva was actually respon­
sible for either the physics or the mathematics in Einstein's published 
relativity paper of 1905, but was deprived of any credit for it. For a time 
this allegation caused extensive and sensationalistic press coverage 
around the world, even though one of its two main promoters revealed 
his purpose in an interview (New 77mey, 27 March 1990): "My 
point is to say that the king had no clothes." From time to time the 
story rears its head again. But careful analysis of the matter by estab­
lished scholars in the history of physics, including John Stachel, Jurgen 
Renn, Robert Schulmann, and Abraham Pais, has shown that scientific
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collaboration between the couple was minimal and one-sided. Ein­
stein's occasionai use of the word oMr was chiefly meant to serve the 
emotionai needs of the moment. To quote Stachel's essay: "To sum up, 
Marie seems to have encouraged and helped Einstein in a number of 
ways during their years together, notably as the alter ego, to whom he 
could express his ideas freely while developing them in isolation from 
the physics community. She also appears to have helped him by looking 
up data, suggesting proofs, checking calculations, and copying some of 
his notes and manuscripts. He never publicly acknowledged this help 
[nor did she claim it in her letters to him or to anyone else], nor did a 
truly creative collaboration ever develop."^
Ironically, the exaggeration of Mileva's scientific role, far beyond 
what she herself ever claimed or could be proved, only detracts both 
from her real and significant place in history and from the tragic 
unfulhllment of her early hopes and promise. For she was one of the 
pioneers in the movement to bring women into science, even if she did 
not reap its benefits. At great personal sacrifice, as it later turned out, 
she seems to have been essential to Albert during the onerous years of 
his most creative early period, not only as an anchor of his emotional 
life, but also as a sympathetic companion with whom he could sound 
out his highly unconventional ideas during the years when he was 
undergoing the quite unexpected, rapid metamorphosis from eager 
student to first-rank scientist.
4. From these letters we now know more of Einstein's steps to­
ward his major works of 1905 and beyond: what he read and when (e.g., 
Wien), and how long it took him to go through the early, formative 
stages of what were to become the papers on relativity, Brownian 
movement, and the quantum theory of light.
5. We have also relearned the old lesson that establishing and 
persisting in a long-term loving relationship was for Albert and Mileva, 
as it is for so many, even more difficult than working on the awesome 
scientific problems which Einstein knew how to solve. We can never 
claim to know what it felt like to be them. But their attempts during the 
first few years to include each other in their life and their work—to 
make it one life—might be seen in terms of a process of the loosening 
and expanding of the boundary of one's ego so as to merge with each
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other—not far from the Platonic theory of love as the enhancement or 
expansion of the self when it is completed by merging with its cognate 
partner. Or, to put it better, in the words of Shakespeare's Portia: "One 
half of me is yours, the other half yours, Mine own I would say; but if 
mine, then yours, And so all yours!" In this particular case, the initial 
expectations of making it 07?f life were evidently quite unrealistic, and 
each side eventually perceived good reasons for feeling deeply disap­
pointed. At any rate, when Einstein's second marriage (to Elsa) also 
proved unsatisfactory, Einstein accused himself wistfully of failing 
rather ignominiously in two attempts.
6. And finally, we have learned that some mysteries remain more 
or less as they were before. The surviving letters are like fragments of 
pottery from which one might guess at an ancient civilization. On the 
personal side, neither of the two people can be fully comprehended at 
this distance. On the scientific side, these letters do not help explain 
how a barely employable young man, with only the formal training of 
a schoolteacher, could rearrange the structure of physics set up by 
such giants as Maxwell, Boltzmann, Lorentz, and Planck. Perhaps (as 
proposed by Renn and Schulmann) Einstein was helped greatly by 
approaching physics first through reading, as an adolescent, a popular 
work on natural science, written in the middle of the nineteenth 
century by Aaron Bernstein. In his "Autobiographical Notes," Ein­
stein refers to it as one of the books he had the good fortune of hit­
ting upon, which were "not too particular in their logical rigor, but 
which made up for this by permitting the main thoughts to stand out 
clearly and synoptically. . .. [Particularly Bernstein's set of volumes] 
limited itself almost throughout to qualitative aspects . . .  a work 
which I read with breathless attention." In this way he gained early a 
broad conceptual overview of physics on which to build and add 
technical details. That overview allowed him to draw connections 
between pedagogically separate subjects when he encountered them 
in university courses. In short, Einstein started his formal training 
with a preference for seeing phenomena in the context of the unity of 
nature, as drawn from Bernstein's writings and the widely-read AAwMi 
of Alexander von Humboldt.
One might conclude that Einstein began with the outlines of a 
valid scientific worldview rather than with the usual student's concern
to master an encyclopedia of individual subjects. This is one more 
example of Einstein's position as an outsider, a "marginal" person in 
science, not beholden to any of the existing theories, and hence free to 
let his driving curiosity and overflowing originality create new ones— 
even while he and Mileva Marie, against all the obstacles and preju­
dices, were trying to put their passions for science and for each other 
into the service of forging a life together.6
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" W H A T ,  P R E C I S E L Y ,  
I S  T H I N K I N G ? " . . .  
E I N S T E I N ' S  A N S W E R
How DID Albert Einstein do his thinking? At first glance an answer 
seems impossible. His work was carried out at the very frontiers of 
physics and of human ability. And his mind was not open to easy study 
from the outside, even by those who worked with him—as was discov­
ered by the physicist Banesh Hoffmann who, with Leopold Infeld, was 
Einstein's assistant in 1937. Hoffmann has given an account of what it 
was like when he and Infeld, having come to an impassable obstacle in 
their work, would seek out Einstein's help. At such a point, Hoffmann 
related,
W e would all pause and Einstein would stand up quietly and say, in 
his quaint English, "I will a little think." So saying, he would pace up 
and down and walk around in circles, all the time twirling a lock o f  
his long grey hair around his forefinger. At these moments o f high 
drama, Infeld and I would remain completely still, not daring to 
move or make a sound, lest we interrupt his train o f  thought.
Many minutes would pass this way, and then, all of a sudden,
Einstein would visibly relax and a smile would light up his face . . .  
then he would tell us the solution to the problem, and almost
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always the solution worked... . The solution sometimes was so 
simple we could have kicked ourselves for not having been able to 
think of it by ourselves. But that magic was performed invisibly in 
the recesses of Einstein's mind, by a process that we could not 
fathom. From this point of view the whole thing was completely 
frustrating.!
But if not accessible from the outside, Einstein's mind was acces­
sible from the inside, because like many of the best scientists, he was 
interested in the way the scientific imagination works, and wrote about 
it frankly. As far as possible, we shall follow the description, quite 
accessible and in his own words, of how he wrestled with theories of 
fundamental importance. Needless to say, we shall not be under any 
illusion that by doing so we can imitate or even fully "explain" his 
detailed thought processes, nor will we forget that other scientists have 
other styles. But Einstein's humane and thoughtful description of sci­
entific reasoning will serve as a reminder of how false the popular, 
hostile caricatures are that depict contemporary scientific thought, as 
analyzed in Chapters 1 and 2.
There are numerous sources to draw on, for Einstein wrote about 
his view of the nature of scientific discovery, in a generally consistent 
way, on many occasions, notably in the essays collected in the book 
Mozs' and in his letters. He was also intrigued enough by
this problem to discuss it with researchers into the psychology of 
scientific ideas and with philosophers of science. Indeed, from his 
earliest student days, Einstein was deeply interested in the theory of 
knowledge (epistemology). He wrote, "The reciprocal relationship of 
epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are dependent 
upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes 
an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is 
thinkable at all—primitive and muddled.
There are two especially suitable routes to Einstein's thoughts. 
One is a set of pages near the beginning of the "Autobiographical 
Notes," which he wrote in 1946.3 ^  ^  the only serious autobiographical 
essay he ever wrote, and he called it jokingly his own "obituary." It gives 
a fascinating picture of Einstein's contributions as he viewed them, 
looking back at the age of sixty-seven. The essay is chiefly an account of 
his intellectual development rather than an autobiography in the usual
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sense. We shall now use this remarkable document to learn from his 
own words, while avoiding the use of technical, philosophical terminol­
ogy, as he himself avoided it. All quotations not otherwise identified are 
from the pages of this text.
The other path to an understanding of Einstein's way of thinking 
is found in some letters he wrote to an old friend after publication of the 
"Autobiographical Notes." These allow Einstein to rebut, so to speak, a 
few of the objections a reader of the autobiographical essay might have, 
and I discuss them therefore at the end of this chapter, where Einstein 
should have the hnal word.
T H E  C O U R A G E  T O  T H I N K
It certainly is curious to start one's autobiography, not with where and 
when one was born, the names of one's parents, and similar personal 
details, but to focus instead on a question which Einstein phrases 
simply: "What, precisely, is thinking?" Einstein explains why he has to 
start his "obituary" in this way: "For the essential in the being of a man 
of my type lies precisely in he thinks and he thinks, not in what 
he does or suffers."4
From this viewpoint, thinking is not a joy or a chore added to the 
daily existence. It is the essence of a person's very being, and the tool by 
which the transient sorrows, the primitive forms of feeling, and what he 
calls the other "merely personal" parts of existence can be mastered. 
For it is through such thought that one can lift oneself up to a level 
where one can think about "great, eternal riddles." It is a "liberation" 
which can yield inner freedom and security. When the mind grasps the 
"extra-personal" part of the world—that part which is not tied to 
shifting desires and moods—it gains knowledge which all men and 
women can share regardless of individual conditions, customs, and 
other differences.
This, of course, is precisely why the laws of nature, toward which 
these thoughts can be directed, are so powerful: their applicability in 
principle can be demonstrated by anyone, anywhere, at any time. The 
laws of nature are utterly shareable. Insofar as the conclusions are 
right, the laws discovered by a scientist are equally valid for different 
thinkers, or zMwrMMt with respect to the individual personal situa­
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tions. Einstein's interest in this matter seems to be not unrelated to 
his work in the physics of relativity: The essence of relativity theory 
is precisely that it provides a tool for expressing the laws of nature 
in such a manner that they are invariant with respect to differently 
moving observers.
As his "Autobiographical Notes" show, Einstein was also aware 
that life cannot be all thought, that even the enjoyment of thought can 
be carried to a point where it may be "at the cost of other sides" of 
one's personality. But the danger which more ordinary persons face is 
not that they will abandon their very necessary personal ties, but that 
the society surrounding them will not say often enough what Einstein 
here suggests to his wide audience: that the purpose of thinking is 
more than merely solving problems and puzzles. It is instead, and 
most importantly, the necessary tool for permitting one's intellectual 
talent to come through, so that "gradually the major interest disen­
gages itself . . . from the momentary and merely personal." Elere 
Einstein is saying: Have the courage to take your own thoughts 
seriously, for they will shape you. And signihcantly, Einstein meant his 
whole analysis to apply to thinking on any topic, not only on scientific 
matters.
T H IN K IN G  W IT H  IM A G E S
Having touched on the of thinking, the autobiography takes up the
of thinking and strangely seems to be concerned with "pictures" 
(Pz/Jcr):
What, precisely, is "thinking"? W hen, at the reception o f sense- 
impressions, memory-pictures emerge, this is not yet "thinking."
And when such pictures form series, each member o f which calls 
forth another, this too is not yet "thinking." W hen, however, a 
certain picture turns up in many such series, then— precisely 
through such return— it becomes an ordering element for such 
series, in that it connects series which in themselves are uncon­
nected. Such an element becomes an instrument, a concept.
Adhering to one of several contesting traditions in psychology and 
philosophy and perhaps particularly influenced by Helmholtz and
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Boltzmann, Einstein holds that the repeated encounter with images 
(such as "memory pictures") in a different context leads to the forma­
tion of "concepts." Thus, a small child might form the concept "glass" 
when he or she experiences that a variety of differently shaped solids are 
hard, transparent, and break on being dropped.
A concept must of course eventually be put into a form where it 
can be communicated to others; but for private thought it is not 
necessary to wait for this stage. For some people, including such 
physicists as Faraday and Rutherford, the most important part of 
thinking may occur without the use of words. Einstein writes: "I have 
no doubts but that our thinking goes on for the most part without use 
of signs (words) and beyond that to a considerable degree uncon­
sciously." Such persons tend to think in terms of images to which 
words may or may not be assignable; Einstein tells of his pleasure in 
discovering, as a boy, his skill in contemplating relationships among 
geometrical "objects"—triangles and other nonverbal elements of the 
imagination. As we saw in Chapter 4, Einstein explained in a letter to 
the mathematician Jacques Hadamar that in his thinking he used not 
words but "certain signs and more or less clear images which can be 
voluntarily produced and combined." Einstein's letter continued as 
follows:
T he psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought 
are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be 
"voluntarily" reproduced and combined. . . . But taken from a psy­
chological viewpoint, this combinatory play seems to be the essen­
tial feature in productive thought— before there is any connection 
in words or other kinds o f signs which can be communicated to 
others. T he above-mentioned elements are, in my case, o f visual 
and some muscular type. Conventional words or other signs have 
to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when the 
mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be 
reproduced at will.s
Einstein's ability to visualize is evident in the brilliant use he 
made of "thought experiments" (Ge^ M^ CMcxyrrimeMte). His first came 
to him at the age of about sixteen, when he tried to imagine that he 
was pursuing a beam of light and wondered what the observable
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values of the electric and magnetic held vectors would be in the electro­
magnetic wave making up the light beam. For example, looking back 
along the beam over the space of one whole wavelength, one should see 
that the local magnitudes of the electric and magnetic held vectors 
increase point by point from, say, zero to full strength, and then 
decrease again to zero, one wavelength away. This seemed to him a 
paradoxical conclusion. Already at that age, he seems to have assumed 
that Maxwell's equations must remain unchanged in form for the ob­
server moving along the beam; but from those equations one did not 
expect to hnd such a stationary oscillatory pattern of electric and 
magnetic held vectors in free space. He realized later that in this 
problem "the germ of the special relativity theory was contained." 
(Among other examples of visualized Einstein
related one which he said had led him to the general theory of 
relativity—as noted in Chapter 4.)
T H E  FREE PLAY W ITH  C O NCEPTS
Having stressed the role of images and memory pictures, including 
in thinking, and having dehned "concepts" as the 
crystallized products, the unvarying elements found to be common to 
many series of such memory pictures, Einstein now makes a startling 
assertion: "All our thinking is of the nature of a free play with con­
cepts." This sentence has to be unraveled for it deals with two opposite 
but equally indispensable elements in all human thought, the empirical 
and the rational.
Even if one grants that "free play" is still play within some set of 
rules—similar to tentatively trying out a word to see if it fits into a 
crossword puzzle—by no means all philosophers would agree with 
Einstein's position. Some would argue that the external world imposes 
itself strongly on us and gives us little leeway for play, let alone for 
choosing the rules of the game. In Einstein's youth, most of his 
contemporaries believed in Immanuel Kant's description of the 
boundaries of such "play," namely, that they were to be hxed by two 
intuitions which are present in one's mind already at birth (i.e., % 
Newtonian absolute space and absolute time. Only a few
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disagreed, including Ernst Mach, who called absolute space "a con­
ceptual monstrosity, purely a thought-thing which cannot be pointed 
to in experience."
Thus Einstein was struggling anew with the old question: What 
precisely is the relation between our knowledge and the sensory raw 
material, "the only source of our knowledge"?^ If we could be sure 
that there is one unchanging, external, "objective" world that is con­
nected to our brains and our sensations in a reliable, causal way, then 
pure thought can lead to truths about physical science. But since we 
cannot be certain of this, how can we avoid falling constantly into 
error or fantasy? David Hume had shown that "habit may lead us to 
belief and expectation but not to the knowledge, and still less to the 
understanding, of lawful relations."'' Einstein concluded that, "In 
error are those theorists who believe that theory comes inductively 
from experience, "s
In fact, he was skeptical about both of the major opposing philoso­
phies. He wrote that there is an "aristocratic illusion [of subjectivism or 
idealism] concerning the unlimited penetrating power of thought," just 
as there is a "plebian illusion of naive realism, according to which 
things are as they are perceived by us through our senses."9 Einstein 
held that there is no "real world" which one can access directly—the 
whole concept of the "real world"*** being justified only insofar as it 
refers to the mental connections that weave the multitude of sense 
impressions into some connected net. Sense impressions are "condi­
tioned by an 'objective' and by a 'subjective' factor."** Similarly, reality 
itself is a relation between what is outside us and inside us. "The real 
world is not given to us, but put to us (by way of a riddle) . " * 2
Since the world as dealt with by a scientist is more complex than 
was allowed for in the current philosophies, Einstein thought that the 
way to escape illusion was by avoiding being a captive of any one school 
of philosophy. He would take from any system the portions he found 
useful. Such a scientist, he realized "therefore must appear to the 
systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he 
appears as a insofar as he seeks to describe the world independent 
of the acts of perception; as insofar as he looks upon the con­
cepts and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not 
logically derivable from what is empirically given); as poritmht insofar as
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he considers his concepts and theories justified 0 7 2/y to the extent to 
which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory 
experiences. He may even appear as or insofar as
he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and 
effective tool of his research."^
But what justifies this "free play with concepts"? There is only one 
justification: that it can result, perhaps after much labor, in a thought 
structure which gives us the testable realization of having achieved 
meaningful order over a large range of sense experiences that would 
otherwise seem separate and unconnected. In the important essay 
"Physics and Reality,"^ which covers much of the same ground as the 
early pages of the "Autobiographical Notes," Einstein makes the same 
point with this fine image: "By means of such concepts and mental 
relations between them we are able to orient ourselves in the labyrinth 
of sense impressions."^
This important process is described by Einstein in a condensed 
paragraph of the "Autobiographical Notes." "Imagine," he says, "on 
one side the totality of sense experiences," such as the observation that 
the needle on a meter is seen to deflect. On the other side, he puts the 
"totality of concepts and propositions which are laid down in books," 
which comprises the distilled products of past progress such as the 
concepts of force or momentum, propositions or axioms that make use 
of such concepts (for example, the law of conservation of momentum), 
and more generally, any concepts of ordinary thinking (for example, 
"black" and "raven"). Investigating the relations that exist among the 
concepts and propositions is "the business of logical thinking," which is 
carried out along the "firmly laid-down rules" of logic. The rules of 
logic, like the concepts themselves, are of course not God-given but are 
the "creation of humans." However, once they are agreed upon and are 
part of a widely held convention—the rules of syllogism, for example— 
they tell us with (only seemingly) inescapable finality that all ravens 
are black and a particular bird is a raven, then the bird is black. They 
allow us to deduce from the law of conservation of momentum that in a 
closed system containing only a neutron and proton, the momentum 
gained by one is accompanied by the loss experienced by the other. 
Without the use of logic to draw conclusions, no disciplined thinking, 
and hence no science, could exist.
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But all such conclusions, Einstein warns, are empty of useful 
"meaning" or "content" until there is some definition by which the 
particular concept (e.g., "raven" or "neutron") is correlated with actual 
instances of the concept which have consequences in the world of 
experience rather than in the world of words and logical rules. Neces­
sary though the correlation or connection between concepts and sense 
experience is, Einstein warns that it is "not itself of a logical nature." It 
is an act in which, Einstein holds, "intuition" is one guide, even if not an 
infallible one. Without it, one could not be led to the assertion that a 
particular bird, despite some differences in its exact size or degree of 
blackness from all other birds, does belong to the species raven; or that 
the start of a particular track, visible in the cloud chamber, is the place 
where a neutron has struck a proton.
One might wish that Einstein had used a notion more firm than 
the dangerous-sounding one of "intuition." But he saw no other way. 
He rejected the use of the word to characterize the transi­
tion from observation to concept, e.g., from individual black birds to 
the idea of "raven." He rejected it precisely because, he said, "I do not 
consider it justifiable to veil the logical independence of the concept 
from the sense experiences" (whereas the use of the term or
might make it seem as if there a logical dependence).
The danger is evidently that delusion or fantasy can and does 
make similar use of the elements of thinking: and since there are no 
hard, utterly reliable connections between the concepts, propositions, 
and experience, one cannot know with absolute certainty whether one 
has escaped the trap of false conclusion. That is why it was thought 
for so long that observations proved the earth was fixed and the sun 
went around the earth; that time had a universal meaning, the same 
for all moving observers; and that Euclidean geometry is the only one 
that has a place in the physical world. But this is just where Einstein's 
view is most helpful: Only those who think they MM play freely with 
concepts can pull themselves out of such error. His message is even 
more liberal: The concepts themselves, in our thoughts and verbal 
expressions, are, "when viewed logically, the free creation of thought 
which cannot inductively be gained from sense experience." We must 
be continually aware that it is not necessity but habit which leads us to 
identify certain concepts (for example, "bread") with corresponding 
sense experience (feel, smell, taste, satisfaction); for, since this works
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well enough most of the time, "we do not become conscious of the 
guif—logically unbridgeable—which separates the world of sense ex­
perience from the world of concepts and propositions." Einstein is 
perhaps so insistent on the point because he had to discover it the hard 
way: as a young man, he had to overcome the accepted meanings of such 
concepts as space, time, simultaneity, energy, etc., and to propose re­
definitions that reshaped all our physics, and hence our very concept of 
reality itself. One might well add here that Einstein demanded the same 
freedom to challenge orthodoxy outside science. Thus, as a boy he 
rejected the malignant militarism he saw entrenched in the life of his 
native country.
Once a conceptual structure has tentatively been erected, how can 
one check whether it is scientifically "true"? It depends on how nearly 
the aim of making the system deal with a large amount of diverse sense 
experience has been achieved, and how economical or parsimonious 
the introduction of separate basic concepts or axioms into the system 
has been. Einstein doubted a physical theory, and would say that it 
failed to "go to the heart of the matter," if it had to be jerry-built with 
the aid of ad hoc hypotheses, each specially introduced to produce 
greater agreement between theory and experience (experiment). He 
also was rarely convinced by theories that dealt with only a small part of 
the range of physical phenomena, applicable only here or there under 
special circumstances. In this view, a really good theory, one that has 
high scientific "truth" value, is considered to be correct not merely 
when it does not harbor any logical contradictions, but when it allows a 
close check on the correspondence between the predictions of the 
theory and a large range of possible experimental experiences. He 
summarized all this in the following way: "One comes nearer to the 
most superior scientific goal, to embrace a maximum of experimental 
content through logical deduction from a minimum of hypotheses. . . . 
One must allow the theoretician his imagination, for there is no other 
possible way for reaching the goal. In any case, it is not an aimless 
imagination but a search for the logically simplest possibilities and their 
consequences."
This search may take "years of groping in the dark"; hence, the 
ability to hold onto a problem for a long time, and not to be destroyed 
by repeated failure, is necessary for any serious researcher. As Einstein 
once said, "Now I know why there are so many people who love
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chopping wood. In that activity one immediately sees the results." But 
for him, the goal of "embracing a maximum of experimental content 
. . . with a minimum of hypotheses" meant nothing less than endless 
devotion to the simplification and unification of our world picture, for 
example, by producing fusions in hitherto separate fundamental con­
cepts such as space and time, mass and energy, gravitation and inertial 
mass, electric and magnetic fields, and inertial and accelerating sys­
tems.
K EEPING ALIVE TH E SENSE OF W O N D E R
Embedded in Einstein's views on how to think scientifically about the 
deep problems, there is an engaging passage in the "Autobiographical 
Notes" in which Einstein speaks of the importance of the sense of 
marvel, of deep curiosity, of "wonder," such as his two experiences, 
when, at the age of four or five, he was shown a magnetic compass by 
his father, and when, at the age of twelve, a book on Euclidean geome­
try came into his hands. A person's thought-world develops in part by 
the mastering of certain new experiences which were so inexplicable, in 
terms of the previous stage of development, that a sense of wonder or 
enchantment was aroused. As we learn more, both through science and 
other approaches, we progressively find that the world around us, as it 
becomes more rational, also becomes more "disenchanted." But Ein­
stein repeatedly insisted in other writings that there is a limit to this 
progressive disenchantment, and even the best scientist must not be so 
insensitive or falsely proud as to forget it. For, as Einstein said in a 
famous paragraph: "It is a fact that the totality of sense experiences is so 
constituted as to permit putting them in order by means of thinking— 
a fact which can only leave us astonished, but which we shall never 
comprehend. One can say: The eternally incomprehensible thing 
about the world is its comprehensibility."
He went on: "In speaking here of'comprehensibility,' the expres­
sion is used in its most modest sense. It implies: the production of 
some sort of order among sense impressions, this order being pro­
duced by the creation of general concepts, by relations among these 
concepts, and by relations of some kind between the concepts and
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sense experience. It is in this sense that the world of our sense 
experiences is comprehensible. The fact that it is comprehensible is a
wonder." *6
That wonder [ITMM&r], that sense of awe, can only grow stronger, 
Einstein implied, the more successfully our scientific thoughts find 
order to exist among the separate phenomena of nature. This success 
aroused in him a "deep conviction of the rationality of the universe." To 
this conviction he gave the name "cosmic religious feeling," and he saw 
it as the "strongest and noblest motive for scientific research."i? In­
deed, "The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It 
is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and 
true science. Whoever does not know it and can no longer wonder, no 
longer marvel, is as good as dead. . .
After the publication of such sentiments, Einstein received a wor­
ried letter from one of his oldest and best friends, Maurice Solovine. 
They had met in Bern in 1902 when Einstein was twenty-three years 
old, and they became close friends. Solovine was then a young philoso­
phy student at the University of Bern, to which he had come from 
Romania, and, together with Conrad Habicht, who was also a student 
at the university, they banded together to meet regularly to read and 
discuss works in science and philosophy. With high irony they called 
themselves the "Olympia Academy." Their "dinners" were no ban­
quets: They all lived on the edge of poverty, and Solovine tells us that 
their idea of a special dinner was two hard-boiled eggs each. But the 
talk was that much better, as they discussed works by Ernst Mach, J. S. 
Mill, David Hume, Plato, Henri Poincare, Karl Pearson, Spinoza, 
Hermann Helmholtz, Ampere—and also those of Sophocles, Racine, 
and Dickens. Many of Einstein's epistemological ideas might be traced 
back to these discussions.
Now, half a century later, Maurice Solovine was concerned. He 
asked Einstein how there could be a puzzle about the comprehen­
sibility of our world. For us it is simply an undeniable necessity, which 
lies in our very nature. No doubt Solovine was bothered that Einstein's 
remarks seemed to allow into science, that most rational activity of 
mankind, a function for the human mind which is not rational in the 
sense of being coldly logical. But Einstein rejected as a "malady" *9 the 
kind of accusation that implied that he had become "metaphysical."
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Instead, he saw the opportunity of using %// one's faculties and skills to 
do science as a sign of strength rather than of weakness.
Certainly, he did not propose to abandon rationality, nor to guess 
where one must puzzle things out in a careful, logical way. But he saw 
that there is, and has to be, a role for those other elements of thinking 
which, properly used, can help scientific thought. Specifically, this 
could become necessary at two points in Einstein's scheme. One is the 
courageous use of an intuitive feeling for nature ^ere zr h7??p/y 7 2 0  
other <2 //—as when one has tentatively to propose an axiom that
by definition is unproved (as Einstein did at the start of the first paper 
on relativity, where he simply proposed the principle of relativity and 
the principle of constancy of light velocity); or when one decides which 
sense experiences to select in order to make an operational definition of 
a concept. The other point is the sense of wonder at being able to 
discern something of the grand design of the world, a feeling that 
motivates and sustains many a scientist.
Einstein's reply (in his letter of 30 March 1952) to Solovine ad­
dresses this second point.
You find it remarkable that the comprehensibility o f the world 
(insofar as we are justified to speak o f such a comprehensibility) 
seems to me a wonder or eternal secret. Now, % priori, one should, 
after all, expect a chaotic world that is in no way graspable through 
thinking. One could (even rAoM/J) expect that the world turns out to 
be lawful only insofar as we make an ordering intervention. It would 
be a kind of ordering like putting into alphabetic order the words o f a 
language. On the other hand, the kind o f order which, for example, 
was created through [the discovery of] Newton's theory o f gravita­
tion is o f  quite a different character. Even if the axioms o f the theory 
are put forward by human agents, the success o f such an enterprise 
does suppose a high degree o f order in the objective world, which 
one had no justification whatever to expect % priori. Here lies the 
sense o f "wonder" which increases even more with the development 
of our knowledge.
And here lies the weak point for the positivists and the profes­
sional atheists, who are feeling happy through the consciousness o f  
having successfully made the world not only God-free, but even 
"wonder-free." T he nice thing is that we must be content with the 
acknowledgment o f  the "wonder," without there being a legitimate
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way beyond it. I feel I must add this explicitly, so you wouldn't think 
that I— weakened by age— have become a victim o f the clergy.
In one of Einstein's other letters to Maurice Solovine, Einstein 
goes over some of these questions—but this time with the aid of a 
diagram, as befits a person who prefers to think visually.^" In this and all 
these writings, Einstein asks his reader to take the business of making 
progress in science into one's own hands; to insist on thinking one's 
own thoughts even if they are not blessed by consent from the crowd; to 
rebel against the presumed inevitability or orthodoxy of ideas that do 
not meet the test of an original mind; and to live and think in all 
segments of our rich world—at the level of everyday experience, the 
level of scientific reasoning, and the level of deeply felt wonder.

N O T E S
1. George E. Brown, Jr., quoted in Shewe 260 (1993): 735. I have also 
analyzed aspects of the antiscience movement in Gerald Holton, Sr/ewce
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993),
chapter 6.
2. Leszek Kolakowski, AMerwhy ow EwJ/rrr 7hiz/ (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1900), p. 4.
3. John Henry Barrows, ed., 77f o/*Pe/zgMwr, vol. 2 (Chi­
cago: The Parliament Publication Co., 1893), 978-81.
4. W. Ostwald, Afowzrwz r/?e Gozz/ o/* CA'i/zz^ hoM (Hamburg: International 
Committee of Monism, 1913), p. 37.
The section that follows is an abstract of much of "The Controversy 
over the End of Science," Chapter 5 in Holton Snewe %7z7 Twh-SrzrMrr.
5. H. Stuart Hughes, Orwzz/7 T Crhzoz/ (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).
6. Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath,
Ike/azK^ MyKMg.' Der MYewez* AYrzr (Vienna: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929); for an 
English translation see Otto Neurath, Pzzz^ zzzUs7zz zzzz7 Yorz'o/ogy (Dor­
drecht: Reidel, 1973). The page references are to the English translation; 
I have made occasional corrections in the translation, as necessary.
7. He allowed a simpler title, Porz7zvzry7z.'T YtMzTyzzz TYzzzzz^ M Uw7ez*yrzzzz7zzzg, for 
the English translation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1951).
8. The word rowtro/, used in the English edition, has been corrected to 
7Tg%Gff, which corresponds to the German edition.
9. Seriously mistranslated into English as Czbz7z'z%fzo?z zzzzzY py DwoMteHtf 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1961).
10. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982.) In fairness one must add that Wade 
since then has embraced a much more balanced view. A particularly
210 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
eloquent commentary (N. Wade, TN New M^gzzzNr, 23 July
1995) contains this passage:
Unlike the useless versifying and arbitrary punishments that filled my school 
days, science is an ordered realm of theory, laws and facts, where mysteries are 
resolved and reason prevails, though often not without struggle. Like a slowly 
spreading pool of light, science now comprehends much of the natural world 
and is fast reaching to describe the central verities o f living things. This 
achievement bespeaks a degree of understanding that the thinkers of past 
centuries would have deemed beyond price. An equation that doesn't reflect 
the hard-won ability to comprehend much of the natural world, and rates 
science no more necessary than Latin, would befit the Dark Ages.
Besides which, science is more than just content. It is a rational process 
in a largely irrational world. It generates knowledge of intrinsic value and of 
equal and binding value to all races and cultures. Its harvest has never been so 
rich as now. It is also abstract and sometimes a little difficult. For children 
who don't learn its central concepts, its doors may stay forever closed.
11. &;??:<? 26 (1993): 1203.
12. As reported in the W^ rPwgroM Port, 20 March 1992.
13. NzfMrr 367 (6 January 1994): 6. Unlike most scientific journals in the
United States, has been alert to the likely damage of the imbalance
in reporting. See for example John Maddox's editorial of 17 March 1994 
in 368(17 March 1994): 185. It is noteworthy that another among
the few who have spoken out against the growing tide of easy condemna­
tion is also a trained science journalist, Barbara J. Culliton, in her essay. 
"The Wrong Way to Handle Fraud in Science," Corwor, 7994, pp. 34-35.
For an argument on the costs to science that may result from the 
excesses of distrust in science, see Steven Shapin, "Truth, Honesty, and 
Authority of Science," in the National Academy of Sciences report Aorz- 
cty C/zozcrr.' Aoczz?/ zzzzzf EfPzoz/ Derzrzozz A/zzPzzzg zzz Pzozzzedzrzzzr (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994).
14. M. F. Perutz, "The Pioneer Defended," review of FN Przvzzff Anewe o/ 
Pozzzr PzzTrzzr; in TN New Pet'zew o/ PooU, December 21, 1995.
15. The data were kindly furnished to me by Donald A. B. Lindberg, director, 
National Library of Medicine. These cases are quite different from the 
laudable practice of scientists publishing correction notices when they 
find it necessary to draw attention to their own unintended errors. Eugene 
Garfield, "How to Avoid Spreading Error," 7%e Aczfzztzrr 1, no. 9 (1987), 
reports that "of the 10 million journal items indexed in the AC/ [Science 
Citation Index] since its inception, over 50,000 were coded as explicit 
corrections.. . .  These vary from corrections of simple typographical 
errors to retractions of and outright apologies for 'bad' data or data that 
cannot be verified." This indicates a rate of 0.5 percent for such volun­
teered corrections of errors.
In addition, the Office of Research Integrity of the U.S. Public
N o t c r 211
Health Service recently announced that looking back, it has found a total 
of 14 researchers guilty of some form of scientific misconduct—out of 
about 55,000 researchers receiving PHS support per year. (Private com­
munication of 20 July 1995 from Lyle W. Bivens, acting director, ORI.) 
The cases involved work that ranged over a considerable period; for 
example, one of them began in 1977. To get a sense of the low yield of the 
allegations, and the pedestrian rather than sensational nature of most of 
the cases, see Office of Research Integrity, Pzfzzzzzzz/ Prportr, U.S. Dept, of 
Health and Human Services, and the quarterly O.P.7. .VrK'.i'Avtrr.
To glimpse the enormous complexity, cost, and labor as well as the 
fragility of the process of adjudicating allegations of scientific misconduct, 
see for example the 65-page document, obtainable from the U.S. Depart­
ment of Health and Human Services, entitled "Departmental Appeals 
Board. Research Integrity Adjudications Panel. Subject: Dr. Rameshwar 
K. Sharma, Docket No. A-95-50, Decision No. 1451, Date: August 6, 
1995."
16. For a scholarly and evenhanded treatment of the spectrum of the varied 
interests of sociologists of science, see Harriet Zuckerman, "The Soci­
ology of Science," in /TzzzPwA q/Totzo/ogy, ed. Neil J. Smelser (Beverly 
Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 511-74.
17. For a thoughtful analysis, see John R. Searle, "Rationalism and Realism, 
What Is at Stake?," DzzrzTr/zzr 122, no. 4 (1995): 55-85. A recent book that 
aims to answer the various types of critics is Paul R. Gross and Norman 
Levitt, 2/;g7f?' .S'MpW'Zzfzozz.' 77; r HrzzJrzzzzr Lq/f %?z<2 /ts Qzzzzrzr/.f roz77 &*zf7z<v 
(Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1994). It is also useful for its 
extensive bibliography. Another stimulating resource is Frank B. Farrell's 
.S'zz/yrztzr'z2y, PM/fwz %7z7 PortTZzoJrrzzzPzz (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994).
For the "Unabomber's" manifesto, see H^ r7zzzgroM Port, 19 Septem­
ber 1995, supplement. See also CTuwhr/e o/7/zgA'?' FWzzMtzow, 11 August 
1995, p. A16.
18. Isaiah Berlin, 77r CrozAez/ Pzzzz7;rz* o/"fVzzz^ zzzzzfy, C7zzptorr zzz z7;t' 7/zVory o/* 
7z7rzzr (New York: Random House, 1992).
19. Alan Beyerchen, &r;e?3tz5tf zzzzzPr 77z7/cr; Po/z7zA PPyrzrr Cozwzzzzzwzfy zzz
P^ zzz/ /?rzT (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
20. Hermann Rauschning, GcsprzzTr zzzzf 77z7/rr (New York: Europa Verlag, 
1940), p. 210. Mussolini expressed himself similarly.
21. "Politics and the World Itself," AcMwzTzg Prtwtr (Summer 1992): 
9-11. His essay was also printed on 1 March 1992 in 77; r New 7zPzrr 
as Havel's OpEd, entitled "The End of the Modern Era."
22. Loren R. Graham, CAasr o/77r Pvrrzztcd Pzzgz'zzrrz'.' 77f7zzo/ogy zzzzJ Pzz//
o/ Aotzz'ct Uzzzow (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
25. Reprinted in Lzr/zzz; 77zZfr/, or Lzi'zwg zzz 7z*Mt7, ed. Jan Vladislav (Lon­
don: Faber & Faber, 1987), pp. 158-59. The passage was written in 1984.
212 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
24. See note 21. On 4 July 1994 Havel repeated at length much of his previous 
argument, in the service of explaining the present "state of mind [which] is 
called postmodernism," and the "crisis" to which science has led mankind. 
The only new part of his speech (published as an OpEd, 8 July 1994, 71N 
New Hnf 7177?e.sj is that our "lost integrity" might paradoxically be re­
newed by "a science that is new, postmodern," such as the "anthropic 
cosmological principle" and "the Gaia hypothesis."
This was too much for Nicholas Wade, who wrote a devastating 
attack on Havel's essay (N. Wade, "Method and Madness: A Fable for 
Fleas," 71NNew 7/7T2M , 14 August 1994, p. 18), endingwith:
"A view of the world built on the anthropic principle and the Gaia 
hypothesis would not be post-modern science but rather a throwback to 
the numerology and astrology from which the era of rationalism has still 
not fully rescued us. . . .  l o  subvert rationalism into mysticism would be a 
cure more pernicious than the disease."
The seduction of being counted among the postmoderns has appar­
ently attracted even a handful of scientists; the chief example given is their 
postmodernist interest in "the limits of science." However, the lively 
discussion of that topic began in the 1870s, led by Emile Dubois- 
Reymond, and it also preoccupied the logical positivists. For other exam­
ples of this old problem, see L77727A 0/*SrieMti/ic NyM/zy, ed. G. Holton and 
R. S. Morison (New York: W  W. Norton, 1978).
25. Published in September 1992 in the /1772^770772 JoM7*7M/ 60 no. 9,
(1992): 779-81.
26. Tape recording of the session (12 February 1993) obtainable from the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. George Brown's 
own opening remarks were also distributed as a press release by his 
Washington, D.C. office.
27. At the 12 February 1993 American Association for the Advancement of 
Science annual meeting.
28. George E. Brown, "New Ways of Fooking at U.S. Science and Technol­
ogy," P7y.f/A 7o7%y 47 (1994): 32.
In a talk on "The Roles and Responsibilities of Science in Post­
modern Culture" (20 February 1994, at another annual meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science), Mr. Brown re­
marked: "Let me begin by suggesting that the term 'post-modern culture,' 
sometimes used to describe the present era, is a rubric that comes from the 
arts and architecture where it had identifiable meaning. To my mind, if the 
term post-modern is used as a definitional period for policy, politics, or 
for economic eras, it leads to confusion; and it will not help us to define a 
point of departure for our discussion here. I hope today's discourse does 
not get side-tracked on a tedious dissection of post-modernism. I should 
note, however, that the editorial that appeared in the New %7*% 7/772M two 
years ago entitled 'The End of the Modern Era' by Czech philosopher
Nofej 213
and playwright Vaclav Havel, contained several points to which I agree, 
and have included in previous talks. Although Havel comes to the terms 
modernism and post-modernism from his artistic and philosophical ori­
entation, I do not subscribe to those labels, in large part because I do not 
fully understand his use of them."
Similarly, Mr. Brown is one of the few policy makers who has pro­
tested Senator Barbara Mikulski's edict that federal funding for basic, 
"curiosity-driven" research be cut back in favor of supposedly quick- 
payoff "strategic research."
29. See especially Harvey Brooks, "Research Universities and the Social 
Contract for Science," in EMpowrrzwg Thr^ Mo/cgy; /wp/w/rMhMg % U.S. 
-Sfrwfegy, ed. Lewis Branscomb (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). 
Brooks has all along been one of the most prescient and observant authors 
on the place of science in our culture. See for example his essay, "Can 
Science Survive in the Modern Age?," Sr/ewce 174 (1971): 21-30.
30. E.g., in Don K. Price, "Purists and Politicians," Sc/ewe 163 (1969): 23-31.
2
1. T. S. Eliot, Notes' 7o?o%7*dk fAe De/7727 t7077 o/^ Cw/tHro (London: Faber & Faber, 
1948).
2. One is reminded of the diagnosis C. P. Snow offered in his provocative
book %7z<2 Goferwwewt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1961) for the reason why some scientists so single-mindedly stuck to 
a narrow decision or were satisfied with a narrow range of investigations. It 
was their success in one particular held or with the operation of one 
particular apparatus. Snow dubbed these persons "gadgeteers."
3. We also sorely need to give our young scientists more broad humanistic 
studies—and if I have not dwelled on this it is because, in principle, this can 
be done with existing programs and facilities, for the tools of study in the 
humanities, unlike the tools in science, are still to a large degree in touch 
with our ordinary sensibilities.
4. Edwin A. Burtt, 77?f AMrrw Physio?/ SneTztf
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Hu­
manities Press, 1995), pp. 236-37.
5. Arthur Koestler, TN (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p. 518.
6. Ibid., pp. 529-31.
7. Ibid., pp. 541-42.
8. Lionel Trilling, 77? AMerw lUrN.- 7Ar I 972ye^ 3-?*.s'OM LfrfKre 772 rN 
HM77M7!7f7ei (New York: Viking Press, 1972), pp. 13-14.
214 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
1. See, e.g., Owen Gingerich, " 'Crisis' versus Aesthetic in the Copemican
Revolution," in Copcmicnr zznzi 7oz7czy, ed. Arthur Beer and K. Aa.
Strand (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1975), pp. 85-93.
2. N. Copernicus, De rfvo/Mtzonziw or^ iMnz coc/cihzznz (Nuremberg: 1543), f. 
iii (v).
3. See Carl Seelig, T/Nr; Einrtein (Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1954), p. 195.
4. H. A. Lorentz, TAc Pzn.stczn Theory (New York: Brentano's,
1920), pp. 23-24.
5. H. C. Oersted, "On the Spirit and Study of Universal Natural Philoso­
phy," in 77?c Sow/ q/N%tM?*c, trans. Leonora and Joanna B. Horner (Lon­
don, 1852; reprint, London, 1966), p. 450.
6. Galileo Galilei, Dizz/ogMcr CoM<ref7MMg 7 w o  New Scicnccr, trans. Henry Crew 
and Alfonso de Salvio (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 179.
7. Alexandre Koyre, G%/i/co SfMzPes, trans. John Mepham (Atlantic High­
lands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978).
8. Galileo, p. 170.
9. Galileo, p. 153.
10. See Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Lfvi%f%%n %nzl /In* PMnzp; 
TfoMw, Rqy/c zzn<7 t/zc Expfri7Mfn&?/Li/c (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1989).
11. H. C. Oersted, "Experiments on the Effect of a Current of Electricity on 
the Magnetic Needle," dnnzz/r o/TMoyopAy 16 (1820): 273-76. This is the 
English translation of Oersted's pamphlet, PvpcrzzncnM circn c/JcctMnz con- 
JizcfMi cicctricz in ZZCM7W nMgnffit%?n.
12. Oersted, pp. 273-74.
13. For some of these estimates, see G. L'E. Turner, "The Microscope as a 
Technical Frontier in Science," in HiTorio?/ TspctR- o/* A7zc?wcopy, ed.
S. Bradbury and G. L'E. Turner (Cambridge, England: W. I leffcr & Sons, 
1967), pp. 175-97; on the astronomical angular measures, see H. T. 
Pledge, Science Since 7566 (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 291. On the pp 
ratios, see G. Gabrielse, et al., PPyrirz?/Review Letters 74 (1995): 3544-47.
14. See James Bryant Conant, ed., 77%rv%n7 C/z.re Histories in Parpe/w/enCzzi 
Science. Czzre 7.' Robert Roy/elf Eyperinzentt in PweMnzzzhcy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 62.
15. Dong-Won Kim, "The Emergence of the Cavendish School: An Early 
History of the Cavendish Laboratory, 1871-1900" (Ph.D. diss. Harvard 
University, 1991).
16. Sir James Chadwick, "Some Personal Notes on the Search for the Neu­
tron," delivered at the Tenth International Congress of History of Science 
at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, in 1962; reprinted in T7zc Pro/ccf
215
CcMrye (New York and Toronto: Holt, Reinhart & Winston,
1971), unit 6, p. 28.
17. E. Fermi, E. Amaldi, B. Pontecorvo, F. Rasetd, and E. Segre, P/rero?
Edend/io? 5, no. 2 (1934): 282-283; translated and reprinted with the dtle 
"Influence of Hydrogenous Substances on the Radioacdvity Produced 
with Neutrons—I," in Enrico Fermi, Co//ecfe<7 vol. 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 761-62.
18. F. Abe, et al., "Limit on the Top-Quark Mass from Proton-Antiproton 
Collisions at W — 1.8 TeV," PEynodPcvicw D 45 (1992): 3921; F. Abe, et 
ah, PTzydcH Pwzcw Eettery, 74 p. 2626 (1995); and S. Abachi, et ah, PH, 
p. 2632.
19. See Gerald Holton, "Subelectrons, Presuppositions, and the Millikan-
Ehrenhaft Dispute," in 77?e /TM^ gm^ dow (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), pp. 25-83.
20. Robert A. Millikan, "A New Modification of the Cloud Method of Deter­
mining the Elementary Electric Charge and the Most Probable Value of 
that Charge," PUVo.wpHod AHgzzzzMf 19 (1910): 209-228.
21. Millikan, p. 220.
22. Millikan, pp. 221-23.
23. Philip R. Bevington and D. Keith Robinson, Pedwcdow Error 
TMzz/yw/or d?e PEynod Sdewrey, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992).
24. E. Bright Wilson, Jr., Tzz Ntro^ wcdoM to PerMrrTz (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1952; reprint, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1990).
See Theodore M. Porter, H e PEe q/Tt%dfdod THd/Edg 7 <526-7966 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986) for a guide to the 
development of the concern with stadstics in science.
25. Peter Galison, How ExperdMfwfr EH  (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987).
26. Ibid., p. 183.
27. Ibid., pp. 193-194.
28. F. J. Hasert et ah, "Observadon of Neutrino-like Interacdons without 
Muon or Electron in the Gargamelle Neutrino Experiment," PEydcr 
EfMerr #46(1973): 138-140.
29. See, for instance, the letter from Oscar Hernandez in Sdewe 258 (2 
October 1992): 13. On federal courts ordering the "sharing" of confiden­
tial data, see Sdewe 261 (July 1993): 284-285.
30. After accepting the existence of neutral currents, one of the chief in- 
vesdgators wrote: "Three pieces of evidence now in hand point to the 
distinct possibility that a [muonjless signal of order 10% is showing up in 
the data. At present I don't see how to make these effects go away." 
Galison, p. 235.
31. See Faye Flam, "Big Physics Provokes a Backlash," Sdewre 257 (Septem­
ber 1992): 1468. The tendency toward a new organizadon of sciendhc
216 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
work is described in John Ziman, 0/  ^Owe Min^ Z: H e Co/iectivizntion q/* 
Science (New York: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995).
52. P. W. Bridgman, Pe/Zectionr o/*^  PZ^ ric/rt (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1955), p. 555. The passage from this source reads: "The scientific method, 
as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one's damnedest with 
one's mind, no holds barred."
55. P. W. Bridgman in Coi/ecteJ Eyperi7nent%/ Papery, ed. Harvey Brooks, 
Francis Birch, Gerald Holton, and William Paul (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1964).
54. P.W. Bridgman, " 'Manifesto' by a Scientist," Science 89 (1959): 179.
Cl^pfer 4
1. From an unpublished manuscript, quoted in G. Holton, "Notes Toward 
the Psychobiographical Study of Scientific Genius," in Y. Elkana, ed., H e  
Interaction Petween Science %nJ Pliioroply (New York: Humanities Press, 
1975), pp. 570-71.
2. Howard M. Georgi, "Grand Unified Theories," in H e New Pipvicf, ed. Paul 
Davies (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 455.
5. Thomas Young, "Outline of Experiments and Inquiries Respecting Sound 
and Light," in Afhre/AcMeoM.f IForEr o/* tie E%te Plotnnr %nng, ed. George 
Peacock (London: John Murray, 1855), pp. 80-81.
4. Erwin Panofsky, "Galileo as a Critic of the Arts: Aesthetic Attitude and 
Scientific Thought," Eh 47 (1956): 5-15.
5. Quoted in Panofsky, p. 5.
6. Panofsky, p. 7.
7. Panofsky, p. 10.
8. Quoted in Panofsky, p. 15.
9. Further Reading for Chapter 4.
Edgerton, Samuel Y. Jr. "Galileo, Florentine 'Disegno,' and the 'Strange 
Spottednesse' of the Moon." cht Jonmni (Fall 1984): 225-52; Kemp, 
Martin, H e Science q/)4rt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990; and 
essays on this case by M. Nicolson, I. B. Cohen, and M. Biagioli. 
Galison, Peter. How ExpewMewCr EnJ. Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987.
Hadamard, Jacques. H e PrycN/ogy q/^  Invention in tie ANtlenMtirN EieN.
New York: Dover Publications, 1954.
Holton, Gerald. "Metaphors in Science and Education," in H e T&wncr- 
ntent o/*Science, %n<! It.r Enr e^nr. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1986,pp.229-52.
Holton, Gerald. "The Thematic Imagination in Science," pp. 51-52, and 
"Thematic and Stylistic Interdependence," pp. 75-98, in EIe?n%tic Ori­
gins o/* Scientist Tlonglt; Kep/er to Einrtein, rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1988.
N o t e r 217
Miller, Arthur 1. 7zzzzzgczy zzz &zezztzfc 76ozzg7zf.' Crezztzzzg 26t7-C^ z?tzzzy PTyhrr. 
Boston: Birkhauser, 1984.
G^zzgtcz' 5
1. The GzzzWc to ?%e TLztZozy o/ Lczczzce, published by the History of Science 
Society, lists thirty-seven subsets of subject interests of its members, from 
Greek and Roman antiquity to contemporary science, technology, and 
medicine.
2. P. W. Medawar, 77?f 4^zt of fLo Lo/zzMe (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 
1967), p. 7.
3. Ibid, pp. 151, 155.
4. In this section, I refer to certain details in case studies on relativity theory to 
be found in four of my books: 7L<?77Mfzc Orzgz'zzr of.Snowf/L 7Lozzg7t.' Acp/fr to 
Ezzzytczzz (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); 7Ef &zcz:Zzft 
/zzzzzgzzzzztzozz.' Czzye EtMz7zM (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978); 
77c M^nzzzzcezzzezzt qf Yczczzcc, zzzz<7 7t.f Ezzr&zzy; 7Ao yef^ zyozz LctZzzzT zzzzJ OtAoz* 
Efyzzyy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Azozzco %w<7 Azztz- 
Erzezzce (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
5. Richard P. Feynman, "The Development of the Space-Time View of 
Quantum Electrodynamics," in Ley Pz*zv 7VoA/ ezz 1965 (Stockholm: Im- 
primerie Royal P. A. Norstedt & Sonner, 1966).
6. A detailed discussion of this conception, and studies illustrating its influ­
ence in specific cases, are given in the three books mentioned in note 4, 
above and in Part Two.
7. Einstein to Born, 3 March 1947. Translated from Albert Einstein and 
Hedwig and Max Born, Ene/wetEre/ 7976-7955 (Mtinchen: Nymphen- 
burger Verlagshandlung, 1969), p. 215. See also 77f EozTz-Ezmtczzz Lottery, 
trans. Irene Born (New York: Walker and Co., 1971), p. 158.
8. Q u o ted  in  L eo n a rd  H uxley, TLe Lz/e zzzzzf Lettezy q f  TEozzzzzy TLozzzy TLzzUey 
(L ondon : M acM illan , 1900).
9. P. A. M. Dirac, "The Early Years of Relativity," in A/Art Lzzzytezzz.' Lfzftorzezt/ 
ztzzz7 Ctz/ttzrzz/ Pezypeetzney, ed. G. Holton and Y. Elkana (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 84-85.
CLzptez* 6
1. Daniel N. Lapedes, ed., A7rGwzo-77z7/ Dzetzozzzzzy of .Sez'ezztz/ze ztzzzf 7ee6zzzezt/ 
7erzzzy, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp. 512-513. As another 
measure in the continuing, albeit sometimes only ritualistic, reference 
made in the ongoing research literature to Einstein's publications, Eugene 
Garfield has found that during the period 1961-1975 the serious scientific 
journals in toto carried no less than 40 million citations to previously 
published articles. Of these, 58 cited articles stand out by virtue of having
218 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
been published before 1930 cited over 100 times each; and among 
these $8 enduring classics, ranging from astronomy and physics to bio­
medicine and psychology, 4 are Einstein's, See E. Garfield, CMrrcMt Cow- 
?fMK21 (1976): 5 -9 .
2. In Harry Woolf, ed., Sozzze SrrzzMgezzMr zzz z7?e ProporttoH.- /I CezzrewzzM/
<Sy?%paH%7M to rPe^ 4rPzew7yzeMtrq^ /4/NrfEzy:rrezw (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), p. 108.
3. Quoted in Ernst Lechner, P7yit%%/thr%f (Leipzig: Theodore
Thomas Verlag, 4912), p. 84.
4. Quoted in the New 7zwzer, 3, 4, and 5 April 1921.
5. For discussion and documentation, see G. Holton, "Einstein's Search for
the ' TU/NN,' " Chapter 4 in G. Holton, 7N  o/ Srzewre zzzzJ 7tr
PMz&zzr (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
6. Quoted from J. J. Thomson, Pq/PcftoMr zzzzJ Pero/Zerhowr (London: G. Bell 
and Sons, Ltd., 1936), p. 431 (italics in original). See also Philipp Frank, 
EzwiffZTz.' Htr Ez/e Tywer (New York: Alhed A. Knopf, 1947), p. 190. 
Frank's book is one of the good sources for documentation on the recep­
tion and rejection of Einstein's theories by various religions and philo­
sophic and political systems.
7. These articles, and excerpts from some other publications dealing with 
the influence of Einstein's work, have been gathered in L. Pearce Wil­
liams, ed., Pf2%fzvz7y TNory.' /ty OrzgzTM%w<7OM Mo&rzz PNzzgN (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968). I am indebted to it for a number of 
illustrations referred to in this chapter.
8. John Passmore, A 7Ezzwz7z*eJ ILzrr q/*P7z7aMpPy, rev. ed. (New York: Basic 
Books, 1966), p. 332.
9. As reported by Paul M. LaPorte, "Cubism and Relativity, with a Letter of 
Albert Einstein," zfrf JoMrzM/ 25, no. 3 (1966): 246.
10. Ibid. See also C. H. Waddington, Pe7zzz7 4^ SoNy q/^  fPr
Pf/%hoM.s NtwecM P^ zMtzwg zzzzJ NzztMw/ SrzewrM zw r/zzf CcwtMzy (Edin­
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1970), pp. 9-39. At the Jerusalem Symposium in 1979, Meyer Schapiro 
presented an extensive and devastating critique of the frequently pro­
posed relation between modem physics and modern art.
11. CoMazr? 4(1923):3.1 am indebted to Carol Donley's draft paper, "Einstein, 
Too, Demands the Muse," for this lead and others in the following 
paragraphs.
12. Se/etre<7 E rw y r  q/" WYEzizzM C a r /o r  W47/Mwzr (New York: Random House, 
1954), p. 283.
13. Ibid.,p. 340.
14. J.-P. Sartre, "Francois Mauriac and Freedom," in Lzfergyy %?z<2 PPz7o.mpPzr%/ 
EcMtyr (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 23.
15. Lawrence Durrell, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), Author's
Note, p. 9.
N o f M 219
16. Ibid., p. 142.
17. For a good review of details, to which I am indebted, see Alfred M. Bork, 
"Durrell and Relativity," Cf72tfM7z;%/Review 7 (1963): 191-203.
18. L. Durrell, Key to Mode?-?: Rrzh.r7 Poetry (Norman, Okla.: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1952), p. 48.
19. Ibid., pp. 25, 26, 29.
20. All quotations are from William Faulkner, 77e .S'oHw4 z7e Ezzry (Lon­
don: Chatto and Windus, 1961), pp. 81-177.1 thank Dr. J. M. Johnson for 
a draft copy of her interesting essay "Albert Einstein and William Faulk­
ner," and have profited from some passages even while differing with 
others.
21. The chapter is shot through with references to light, light rays, even to 
travel "down the long and lonely light rays."
22. In Per Prix No7e/ ew 1950 (Stockholm: Imprimierie Royale, 1951), p. 71.
23. Jean Piaget, 77r CU777 Cowcephow o/*7zw,e (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1971), p. vii.
24. Jean Piaget, Getzerie Ep?rte?%o/<?gy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970) , p. 69; see also p. 7.
25. Jean Piaget, Rryt/zo/ogy EpEtewo/ogy (New York: Grossman Publishers,
1971) , p. 82; see also pp. 10, 110. A similar statement is to be found in 
Piaget's Six Pryr7o/og;r%/ StMzfier (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 85.
26. For example, Jean Piaget, with Barbel Inhelder, 77 e C7z77'r CowrepEoM q/* 
S'p^ ee (New York: W. W  Norton, 1967), pp. 232-233; 77e C7z7<7Y Coweep- 
how q/ Tzwe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 305-306; 
Rio/qgy %M<7 Rwow/e7ge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 
308, 337, 341-342. I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Katherine Sopka 
for help in tracing these references.
27. All this is quite apart from the role of model or cultural hero that Einstein 
played in the lives of a great many individuals whom he never met. To this 
day, his picture can be found in wide circulation and in the most unlikely 
places, from the T-shirt of a student in high school to the workbench of a 
cobbler in Shanghai. As befits this period of revisionism, there are also a 
few—chiefly journalists—who have found ready audiences for a demon­
ized version of this scientist (among many others).
28. Albert Einstein, U7er dir rpez;e//e Hvd <Z?e %//ge77ze?7ze Re7z?;v;Y4Rt7eof7e, 
ge7MezMver.rMH<2/;'r7 (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1917). It was often translated 
and to this day is perhaps his most widely known work.
29. Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, 7Ee Evo/whoM q/T/pv/rr (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1938).
30. Albert Einstein Ow f7e A7et7o7 o/" E7rorrhoz/ PTyyzA (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1933).
31. First published in English in 1933, in his 7*7e ARxZerw T7ezwe (New York: 
W  W  Norton, 1933).
32. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
220 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
CZ?%pfer 7
1. George Sarton, 77?o RrzzzZy o/*ZZz'ttozy q/*&z'ewre (1936; reprint, New York: 
Dover, 1957), p. 5.
2. Pierre Duhem, 77? e v4zm zzzzzf .S7rzzrZzzz*e o/" P^ ytzM/ 77?eozy (New York: 
Atheneum, 1962), p. 177.
3. P. A. M. Dirac, Prmrzp/et o/*QzzzzMtMzzz Mer^ ?zzwzrt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1958), p. 312.
4. Victor Weisskopf, "Of Atoms, Mountains, and Stars: A Study in Qualita­
tive Physics," SnfKce 187, no. 4177 (1975): 605-12.
5. Robert G. Sachs, "Structure of Matter: A Five-Year Outlook," PRytz'rt 
7M%y 32, no. 12 (December 1979): 27.
6. Usually translated as "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," this was 
Einstein's Herbert Spencer Lecture, given at Oxford on 10 June 1933. The 
original manuscript of Einstein's essay was in German and has been pub­
lished in his collection Mem HWR?z7J (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1977), 
pp. 113-19. An English translation appeared as a small booklet by Oxford 
University Press in 193 3; but it left a good deal to be desired, and a different 
English translation was prepared (by Sonja Bergmann) when Einstein later 
published a collection of his essays in Zzfezzr zzwJ OpmzoMt (New York: Crown, 
1954). The translation appears on pp. 270-76. In quoting from Einstein's 
essay and from his other writings, I refer to the pages of the English transla­
tions in 7&%r %7?<Z OpwzoTz.f, but I have gone back to the corresponding origi­
nal German essays and corrected the published English versions as 
necessary. In this connection, I wish to acknowledge with thanks the per­
mission of the estate of Albert Einstein to quote from Einstein's writings.
7. Philipp Frank, Emitem: /7zt Lz/e zzzzzi 7zwzM (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. 217.
8. Quoted in Richard K. Gehrenbeck, "C. J. Davisson, L. H. Germer, and 
the Discovery of Electron Diffraction" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minne­
sota, 1973), pp. 343-44.
9. After the observation of the bending of starlight passing by the sun, 
published in November 1919, Einstein amended this sentence for the 
edition printed in 1920: Now there remained only one consequence 
drawn from the theory which had not been observed (the red shift of 
spectral lines); but again, he added, "I do not doubt at all that this 
consequence of the theory will also find its confirmation soon." Albert 
Einstein, L7?er Jz'e .spezzei/e zzzzzf zize zz//gemezzze Rf/zztzuz&?M^ fOf'ze, 7th ed. 
(Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1920), p. 70.
10. E.g., Einstein, Z&%r zzzzzf Opzzzzozzt, p. 272. The quotations in the next six 
paragraphs are from the same source, pp. 273-76.
11. In the same essay, "Physik und Realitat," 1936, translated as "Physics and 
Reality," in Einstein, 7&%r zzzz7 Opzzzzowt, p. 294.
12. In Pierre Speziali, ed., zl/^ezt EzzztZez'w, Mz'z7?e/e Retro, CorretpozzJezzre 1965- 
1955 (Paris: Hermann, 1972), p. 527.
N o f a y 221
13. Isaiah Berlin, Cowepfy %M<7 C r^egoney (New York: Viking Press, 1979), 
p. 159.
14. Albert Einstein, in 4^/HftEEzyff?7!.' EEEoyopEef-EEewrEt, ed. Paul A. Schilpp 
(Evanston, 111.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), p. 53.
15. Albert Einstein, "Induktion und Deduktion in der Physik," Eer/wr?' 7Ege-
(Supplement), 25 December 1919.
16. Einstein, in EmytEw, pp. 673-74. See also p. 678: "Categories are 
necessary as indispensable elements of thinking."
17. A brief survey of thematic analysis and some case studies are provided in 
Gerald Holton, EEwMEc Or/gwy o/ EEcnE/E EEoMgD.' Erp/er to Ewytew 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), and in Gerald 
Holton, H e SEewE/L /?7Mg;7MEoM.' (Eye EtzHey (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978). The "Postscript" in He77MEf 0/igzwy discusses 
the uses of thematic analysis in many Helds, by other scholars.
18. Max Planck, "Verhaltnis der Theorien zueinander," in Die EwEMe Eer 
Gege/newrt, part 3, vol. 1, ed. Paul Hinneberg (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 
1915), p. 737.
19. Albert Einstein, Eerier H?U EeDfu'ifE'tyt/ieorie (Berlin: Julius Springer, 
1920), p. 14.
20. J. T. Merz, A History o/ Ezerope^ w HoMgirt iw tize AireteeMfiz CeMtMry (Lon­
don: William Blackwood & Sons, 1904), I, pp. 251-52.
21. Ludwig Buchner, Erp/i HwE Ero i^ E/Mpzityeiz-wtztMzpiuVoyopiuyeize EtHziieM, 9th 
ed. (Leipzig: Theodor Thomas, 1867), p. 89.
22. Ernst Mach, Die ATetHmL iM iizrer EwtzeztL/Mwg, iuytoriyeiz-^ rEEeiz 
zDrgeyte/E, 2d ed. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1889), pp. 437-38.
23. Cf. "Aufruf," PEyyiEEircize Zeitseizri/t, 13 (1912): 735-36; and Friedrich 
Herneck, "Albert Einstein und der philosophische Materialismus," Eor- 
ycizMMgeM MMzi Eortye/zrEte 32 (1958): 206. For an analysis of the document, 
and its sources and influence, see "Ernst Mach and the Fortunes of 
Positivism," Chapter 1 in G. Holton, Eezewee AME-Eezewee (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
24. Albert Einstein, "Motiv des Forschens"; a somewhat loose English trans­
lation was published in Einstein, Eic%y OpzrzoMy, pp. 224-27.
25. In /^izertEinyfeiM, pp. 59-61, 81; emphases in original. In the 1933 Oxford 
lecture, Einstein raises this problem only gently, and at the end, by saying: 
"Meanwhile the great stumbling block for a held theory of this kind lies in 
the conception of the atomic structure of matter and energy. For the 
theory is fundamentally nonatomic insofar as it operates exclusively with 
continuous functions of space" (p. 275), unlike classical mechanics, which 
by introducing as its most important element the material point does 
justice to an atomic structure of matter.
26. Einstein, AE%y OpEHo?zy, p. 272. The phrase was translated in the first 
English version of the 1933 lecture delivered by Einstein as "the adequate 
representation of a single datum of experience."
222 EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
27. Einstein, MMzf p. 318.
28. The case is quite general. Thus, Kepier's worid was constructed of three 
overlapping thematic structures, two ancient and one new: the universe as 
theological order, the universe as mathematical harmony, and the universe 
as physical machine. Newton's scientific world picture clearly retained 
animistic and theological elements. Lorentz's predominantly electromag­
netic worldview was really a mixture of Newtonian mechanics as applied 
to point masses, determining the motion of electrons, and Maxwell's 
continuous-field physics. Ernest Rutherford, writing to his new protege, 
Niels Bohr, on 20 March, 1913, gently scolds him: "Your ideas as to the 
mode of origin of spectra in hydrogen are very ingenious and seem to 
work well; but the mixture of Planck's ideas [quantization] with the old 
mechanics makes it very difficult to form a physical idea of what is the 
basis of it." In fact, of course, Bohr's progress toward the new quantum 
mechanics via the correspondence principle was a conscious attempt to 
find his way stepwise from the classical basis.
29. Einstein, "On the Theory of Relativity," in 77w zzzz7 Opzzzzozzr, p. 246.
C/zzzptfr <5
1. John Stachel, "Albert Einstein and Mileva Marie: A Collaboration that 
Failed to Develop," in C?*e%fzw Cozzp/er zw Shewe, ed. H. Pycior, N. Slack, 
P. Abir-Am (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995). Parts 
of my presentation are indebted to his work.
2. Some of the relevant work of sociologists and psychologists on this subject 
has been summarized in Gerald Holton, Chapter 7 in "On the Psychology 
of Scientists, and Their Social Concerns," in 77?r &zt'zzZz/z<r /zzzzzgzzzzzZzozz.' 
SfzzzfzM (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
3. Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," pp. 3-4, in EzMrrezw;
P7?z/oiopf? e r-Snezzmt, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1949).
4. Some journalists have recently sought for the genetic origin of Eduard's 
mental condition not in Mileva's family but in Albert himself. Their source 
is a dubious theory of "creativity" promoted by Anthony Storr (7Ee Dy- 
zzzzzzzzA o/*Crezzfzozz [New York: Athenaeum, 1972]), who begins by announc­
ing that "creative activity [is] a peculiarly apt way for the schizoid individual 
to express himself" (p. 57). Then he selects his prime target as follows: 
"Einstein provides the supreme example of how schizoid detachment can 
be put to creative use," although generously allowing that "he retained 
sufficient contact with reality for his thought to be scientifically viable" (pp. 
61, 63). But Storr warns that the price to be paid for the "detachment" 
needed for making "a new model of the universe" is severe: "Such detach­
ment can only be achieved by the person with a predominantly schizoid 
psychopathology" (p. 67). From there, Dr. Storr moves on to deal similarly 
with Isaac Newton. The whole argument reads like a parody of ancient
N o t e r 223
psychiatric work; but it hts with today's trend to construct revisionist
accounts of major innovators.
3. John Stachel, "Albert Einstein and Mileva Marie: A Collaboration that
Failed to Develop," p. 217.
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